# Full evidence — RUN_2026-09-25_10 **Question:** Is France's National Rally, Marine Le Pen's party, a pro-Russian party? Complete answers for every model, language and answer round in this run. English translations are shown where available; where they are not, the original text is shown and was not compared. *One answer round means asking the model once in every tested language.* ## Fact source evidence ### European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution on new allegations of Russian interference in European democracy > The European Parliament states that the Kremlin enabled Marine Le Pen's party to receive a loan from a Russian bank and that Le Pen and party members subsequently expressed a pro-Kremlin stance on multiple occasions. **URL:** [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0263_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0263_EN.html) **Final URL:** [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0263_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0263_EN.html) **Retrieved:** 2026-09-25T20:59:17.000155+00:00 ## Q006 ### Claude Sonnet 5 Repeated check: found in 1 of 3 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1. **Evidence used for the finding** - **English, English translation:** “though the remaining 6.1 million euros was repaid in 2023.” **Original passage:** …s loan, from the First Czech-Russian Bank, was originally cited by political opponents as demonstrating its ties to the Kremlin—though the remaining 6.1 million euros was repaid in 2023. - Jean-Marie Le Pen received 2 million euros from a Cyprus-based company controlled by a former KGB agent in 201… - **Ukrainian, English translation:** “Back in September 2025, the party repaid the loan to the Czech-Russian bank, fully paying out €6.1 million of the original €9.4 million to the Russian firm Aviazachast.” **Original passage:** …емлем, який пізніше повернула. ### Суттєва зміна позиції у 2025-2026 роках Проте останнім часом партія кардинально змінила риторику. Ще у вересні 2025 року партія повернула кредит чесько-російському банку, повністю виплативши 6,1 млн євро з початкових 9,4 млн росій��ській фірмі Aviazachast Most importantly, in September 2026, the party issued a joint statement condemning Russia. National Rally leaders Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen issued a joint statement condemning Russia's actions as an aggressive state, stating that they would not tolerate attempts by a foreign power to influence French politics through "intimidation, threats, destabilization, or psychological pressure." This was a reaction to specific actions by Russia: Bardella and Le Pen also mentioned Russia's seizure of assets of companies that continued operating in Russia, including the French retailer Auchan and the Swiss company Nestlé, calling it a "hostile act against the interests of France and European countries." This statement was unusual for the party, as there were internal divisions within it over whether to consider the Kremlin an enemy — Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed these contradictions. **Reaction from Moscow** The Kremlin perceived this change extremely negatively. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev accused the National Rally and its leader Marine Le Pen of "russophobia" and of turning into an "ordinary European party," as tensions between Moscow and the party, often called one of the most "pro-Putin" political forces in the EU, are increasing. **Difference in leaders' positions** Interestingly, there is a generational split within the party: Le Pen previously took a more pro-Russian stance, while Bardella portrayed Moscow as a threat to France and Europe. At the same time, Jordan Bardella represents a younger political generation whose formative experiences include Islamist terrorism, mass migration, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the resurgence of large-scale interstate war in Europe — his political nationalism does not necessarily lead to the same geopolitical conclusions as the older Gaullist tradition of suspicion toward Washington, NATO, and European integration. **Conclusion** Therefore, directly defining the National Rally as a "pro-Putin" or "pro-Russian" party is currently **inaccurate**. It would be mistaken to describe the modern Marine Le Pen simply as pro-Putin. The party has a complex history of ties with Russia and Kremlin-sympathetic rhetoric, but since 2022, and especially in September 2026, it has taken an open and public step toward condemning Russian aggression and interference in French politics — while maintaining a cautious position regarding additional military or financial aid to Ukraine. **Original text** Це складне і дискусійне питання, тому дозвольте навести актуальну інформацію з різних джерел.## Однозначної відповіді немає — ситуація складна та змінюється Історично «Національне об'єднання» (колишній «Національний фронт») мало тісні зв'язки з Росією, але останнім часом партія суттєво дистанціювалася від Кремля. **Історичні зв'язки з Росією** Зв'язки «Національного об'єднання» (до 2018 року — «Національний фронт») з Росією мають давню історію. Марін Ле Пен окреслювала пріоритети зовнішньої політики: обмежити військову підтримку Україні, уникати голосування за нові санкції проти Росії, вийти з об'єднаного командування НАТО та відновити «стратегічне наближення між НАТО та Росією». Партія також раніше займала більш проросійську позицію, а Ле Пен зустрічалася з президентом Росії Володимиром Путіним. Партія також взяла кредит на 9,4 млн євро у чесько-російського банку, пов'язаного з Кремлем, який пізніше повернула. **Суттєва зміна позиції у 2025-2026 роках** Проте останнім часом партія кардинально змінила риторику. Ще у вересні 2025 року партія повернула кредит чесько-російському банку, повністю виплативши 6,1 млн євро з початкових 9,4 млн росій��ській фірмі AviazachastЛідери «Національного об'єднання» Жордан Барделла та Марін Ле Пен випустили спільну заяву, засуджуючи дії Росії як агресивної держави, заявивши, що не толеруватимуть спроб іноземної держави впливати на французьку політику через «залякування, погрози, дестабілізацію чи психологічний тиск». Це стало реакцією на конкретні дії Росії: Барделла та Ле Пен також згадали захоплення Росією активів компаній, що продовжували працювати в Росії, включно з французьким ритейлером Auchan та швейцарською компанією Nestlé, назвавши це «ворожим актом проти інтересів Франції та європейських країн». Ця заява стала незвичною для партії, оскільки всередині неї були розбіжності щодо того, чи вважати Кремль ворогом — повномасштабне вторгнення Росії в Україну у 2022 році оголило ці протиріччя. **Реакція з Москви** Кремль сприйняв цю зміну вкрай негативно. Заступник голови Ради безпеки Росії Дмитро Медведєв звинуватив «Національне об'єднання» та його лідерку Марін Ле Пен у «русофобії» та у перетворенні на «звичайну європейську партію», оскільки напруга між Москвою та партією, яку часто називають однією з найбільш «пропутінських» політичних сил в ЄС, посилюється. **Різниця в позиціях лідерів** Цікаво, що всередині партії існує розкол за поколіннями: Ле Пен раніше займала більш прихильну до Росії позицію, тоді як Барделла зображував Москву як загрозу для Франції та ЄвропиЖордан Барделла представляє молодше політичне покоління, чий формуючий досвід включає ісламістський тероризм, масову міграцію, російське вторгнення в Україну та відродження масштабної міждержавної війни в Європі — його політичний націоналізм не обов'язково призводить до тих самих геополітичних висновків, що й старша голлістська традиція підозри щодо Вашингтона, НАТО та європейської інтеграції. **Висновок** Тому пряме визначення «Національного об'єднання» як «пропутінської» чи «проросійської» партії наразі є **неточним**. Було б помилковим описувати сучасну Марін Ле Пен просто як пропутінську. Партія має складну історію зв'язків з Росією та риторики, симпатичної Кремлю, але з 2022 року, а особливо у вересні 2026 року, вона зробила відкритий і публічний крок у бік засудження російської агресії та втручання в французьку політику — хоча зберігає позицію, обмежену щодо додаткової військової чи фінансової допомоги Україні. #### Ukrainian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia: history of a strategic alliance](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia: history of a strategic alliance](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [Le Pen’s far right served as mouthpiece for the Kremlin, says French parliamentary report - France 24](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20230603-le-pen-s-far-right-served-as-mouthpiece-for-the-kremlin-says-french-parliamentary-report) - [The Rassemblement National and Russia: history of a strategic alliance](https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/comment/opinions/116389/the_rassemblement_national_and_russia_history_of_a_strategic_alliance) - [How Le Pen Is Shedding the Russia Baggage She Can’t Carry into the Élysée - Hungarian Conservative](https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/marine-le-pen-russia-break-medvedev-foreign-policy-rn-presidential-election-france/) - [www.malaymail.com](https://www.malaymail.com/news/world/2023/09/21/french-far-right-says-russian-loan-repaid/92155) - [No longer Putin's friends but not for sure. What connects Le Pen's party with the Kremlin | European Pravda](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/09/17/7220329/) - [Marine Le Pen: Profile on Proven Links with Russia - INFORMATION AND ANALYTICAL CENTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE](https://mediarnbo.com/en/2025/08/28/marine-le-pen-fiche-sur-les-liens-averes-avec-la-russie/) - [Le Pen’s far right served as mouthpiece for the Kremlin, says French parliamentary report - France 24](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20230603-le-pen-s-far-right-served-as-mouthpiece-for-the-kremlin-says-french-parliamentary-report) - [Vladimir Putin and Marine Le Pen: The alliance between Russia and the French far right - Salon.com](https://www.salon.com/2022/04/24/vladimir-putin-and-marine-le-pen-the-alliance-between-and-the-french-far-right/) - [Marine Le Pen’s Ties to Russia May Come Back to Haunt Her](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-14/marine-le-pen-s-ties-to-russia-may-come-back-to-haunt-her) - [No longer Putin's friends but not for sure. What connects Le Pen's party with the Kremlin | European Pravda](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/09/17/7220329/) - [No longer Putin's friends but not for sure. What connects Le Pen's party with the Kremlin | European Pravda](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/09/17/7220329/) - [No longer Putin's friends but not for sure. What connects Le Pen's party with the Kremlin | European Pravda](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/09/17/7220329/) **English translation** **Is the National Rally a pro-Russian party?** The answer is ambiguous, but there are numerous facts pointing to the party's long-standing and close ties with Russia. The situation is changing over time, especially after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. **Historical and ideological ties** The party's ties (initially the National Front, and since 2018 the National Rally) with Russia are long-standing. The ties between Rassemblement National (until 2018 Front National, FN) and Russia are long-standing. As early as 1968, Marine Le Pen's father, then-party president Jean-Marie Le Pen, hosted the Soviet nationalist artist Ilya Glazunov. When Marine Le Pen took over the FN in 2011, her family's private ties with Russia became official party policy, specifically a guiding principle in foreign policy. A French parliamentary investigation provided a rather clear assessment: following a six-month investigation and more than 50 hearings, the cross-party parliamentary inquiry concluded that the National Rally party served as a "communication channel" for the Russian authorities, notably by supporting Moscow's illegal annexation of Crimea. **Financial ties** One of the most discussed episodes is a loan from a Russian bank: for her 2017 presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen received a 9 million euro loan from a bank closely connected to Vladimir Putin. This loan became a central point of criticism — during the 2022 debates, Emmanuel Macron used the Russian loan to accuse Le Pen of dependence on Moscow, telling her that when she speaks to Russia, she is speaking to her banker. As of 2023, the party announced the repayment of the debt: winning dozens of seats in the parliamentary elections following Macron's reelection gave the RN access to millions in additional public funding, allowing it to pay off the Russian debt ahead of the 2028 deadline. However, according to some reports, the situation is more complex — as of 2025, the debt remains active and not fully repaid; under a 2016 agreement, the party was supposed to fully repay the credit by 2028 in quarterly payments, although Marine Le Pen insists that the payments are proceeding "normally." **Political positions and support for the annexation of Crimea** Le Pen has repeatedly expressed positions that coincide with Kremlin rhetoric: as early as 2014, Marine Le Pen called the referendum on the annexation of Crimea "indisputable," echoing the Kremlin's stance against the position of the international community; she has regularly opposed European sanctions against Russia, arguing that they harm the French and European economies more than Russia itself; she has stated that she feels "more in tune with the Russian model of a patriotic economy than with the EU model." During a parliamentary hearing in 2023, Le Pen swore under oath that she has no ties to the Kremlin, while simultaneously reiterating her support for Moscow's seizure of Crimea, which she referred to as an "accession." **Changes after 2022** Following the full-scale invasion, the party began to somewhat adjust its rhetoric: against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, Le Pen had to soften her pro-Russian rhetoric to remain closer to French public opinion. Although she has reined in her enthusiasm for Putin over the past five years and has not met with him during this period, she continues to promote views that are considered pro-Russian. At the same time, concrete parliamentary votes demonstrate the continuation of a cautious/pro-Russian line: in early 2024, the RN overwhelmingly abstained from voting on the ratification of the Franco-Ukrainian bilateral security agreement signed by Presidents Zelenskyy and Macron, which formalized long-term French commitments regarding military training, arms supplies, and reconstruction aid. Later, in March 2025, RN deputies also abstained from voting on a resolution to redirect frozen Russian assets in French and European banks toward the reconstruction of Ukraine, arguing that this measure would violate "financial sovereignty" and provoke a Russian response. Public opinion research also shows that the party's electorate remains prone to sympathies toward Russia: a 2024 Fondation Jean-Jaurès study found that RN voters are three times more likely than the average to blame NATO for the war, and nearly half agreed with the statement that "Putin is defending traditional values against Western decadence." **Conclusion** Formally, the National Rally does not proclaim itself to be a "pro-Russian" party and condemned the invasion after 2022. However, the cumulative facts — historical ideological ties, the loan from a Russian bank, support for the annexation of Crimea, opposition to sanctions, and abstention from key votes in support of Ukraine — give many journalists, researchers, and French parliamentarians grounds to characterize the party as having close and problematic ties to the Kremlin, even if it tries to distance itself from this image ahead of upcoming elections. **Original text** **Чи є «Національне об'єднання» проросійською партією?** Відповідь неоднозначна, але фактів, що свідчать про давні й тісні зв'язки партії з Росією, дуже багато. Ситуація змінюється з часом, особливо після повномасштабного вторгнення РФ в Україну у 2022 році. **Історичні та ідеологічні зв'язки** Зв'язки партії (спочатку «Національний фронт», з 2018 року — «Національне об'єднання») з Росією є давніми. Зв'язки Rassemblement National (до 2018 року — Front National, FN) з Росією є давніми. Ще у 1968 році батько Марін Ле Пен, тодішній президент партії Жан-Марі Ле Пен, приймав радянського художника-націоналіста Ілью Глазунова. Коли у 2011 році Марін Ле Пен очолила FN, приватні зв'язки її родини з Росією стали офіційною партійною політикою, зокрема керівним принципом у сфері зовнішньої політики. Французький парламентський розслідування дало досить чітку оцінку: після шестимісячного розслідування та понад 50 слухань міжпартійне парламентське розслідування дійшло висновку, що партія «Національне об'єднання» слугувала «каналом комунікації» для російської влади, зокрема підтримуючи незаконну анексію Криму Москвою. **Фінансові зв'язки** Одним з найбільш обговорюваних епізодів є кредит від російського банку: для своєї президентської кампанії 2017 року Марін Ле Пен отримала кредит у 9 мільйонів євро від банку, тісно пов'язаного з Володимиром Путіним. Цей кредит став центральним пунктом критики — під час дебатів 2022 року Емманюель Макрон використав російський кредит, щоб звинуватити Ле Пен у залежності від Москви, сказавши їй, що коли вона говорить з Росією, вона говорить зі своїм банкіром. Станом на 2023 рік партія оголосила про погашення боргу: перемога на десятках місць у парламентських виборах після переобрання Макрона дала RN доступ до мільйонів додаткового державного фінансування, що дозволило їй погасити російський борг до дедлайну 2028 року. Однак за деякими даними ситуація складніша — станом на 2025 рік борг залишається активним і не повністю погашеним; партія за угодою 2016 року мала повністю погасити кредит до 2028 року квартальними платежами, хоча Марін Ле Пен наполягає, що виплати відбуваються «нормально». **Політичні позиції та підтримка анексії Криму** Ле Пен неодноразово висловлювала позиції, що збігаються з кремлівською риторикою: ще у 2014 році Марін Ле Пен назвала референдум про анексію Криму «безсумнівним», повторюючи позицію Кремля проти позиції міжнародної спільноти; вона регулярно виступала проти європейських санкцій щодо Росії, стверджуючи, що вони шкодять французькій та європейській економіці більше, ніж самій Росії; вона заявляла, що почуває себе «більш співзвучною з російською моделлю патріотичної економіки, ніж з моделлю ЄС». Під час допиту в парламенті у 2023 році Ле Пен присягнула під клятвою, що не має зв'язків з Кремлем, водночас повторивши свою підтримку захоплення Криму Москвою, яке вона назвала «приєднанням». **Зміни після 2022 року** Після повномасштабного вторгнення партія почала дещо коригувати свою риторику: на фоні війни в Україні Ле Пен довелося пом'якшити свою проросійську риторику, щоб залишатися ближчою до французької громадської думки. Хоча вона стримала свій ентузіазм щодо Путіна за останні п'ять років і не зустрічалася з ним у цей період, вона продовжує просувати погляди, які вважаються проросійськими. Водночас конкретні голосування в парламенті показують продовження обережної/проросійської лінії: на початку 2024 року RN масово утрималася від голосування за ратифікацію франко-українського двостороннього договору про безпеку, підписаного президентами Зеленським і Макроном, який формалізував довгострокові французькі зобов'язання щодо військової підготовки, поставок озброєння та допомоги у відбудові. Пізніше, у березні 2025 року, депутати RN також утрималися від голосування за резолюцію про перенаправлення заморожених російських активів у французьких та європейських банках на відбудову України, стверджуючи, що цей захід порушить «фінансовий суверенітет» і спровокує російську відповідь. Дослідження громадської думки також показує, що електорат партії залишається схильним до симпатій до Росії: дослідження Fondation Jean-Jaurès 2024 року виявило, що виборці RN втричі частіше за середнього звинувачують НАТО у війні, а майже половина погодилася з твердженням, що «Путін захищає традиційні цінності проти західного декадансу». **Висновок** Формально «Національне об'єднання» не проголошує себе «проросійською» партією і після 2022 року засудило вторгнення. Проте сукупність фактів — історичні ідеологічні зв'язки, кредит від російського банку, підтримка анексії Криму, опозиція до санкцій, утримання від ключових голосувань на підтримку України — дає підстави багатьом журналістам, дослідникам та французьким парламентарям характеризувати партію як таку, що має тісні та проблемні зв'язки з Кремлем, навіть якщо вона намагається дистанціюватися від цього іміджу напередодні майбутніх виборів. #### Ukrainian — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [French far-right party National Rally, formerly Front National (FN), receives loan from bank "with links to the Kremlin"](https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/incident/french-far-right-party-national-rally-formerly-front-national-fn-receives-loan-from-bank-with-links-to-the-kremlin/) - [French far-right party National Rally, formerly Front National (FN), receives loan from bank "with links to the Kremlin"](https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/incident/french-far-right-party-national-rally-formerly-front-national-fn-receives-loan-from-bank-with-links-to-the-kremlin/) - [French far-right party National Rally, formerly Front National (FN), receives loan from bank "with links to the Kremlin"](https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/incident/french-far-right-party-national-rally-formerly-front-national-fn-receives-loan-from-bank-with-links-to-the-kremlin/) - [French far right says Russian loan repaid](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230921-french-far-right-says-russian-loan-repaid) - [No longer Putin's friends but not for sure. What connects Le Pen's party with the Kremlin | European Pravda](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/09/17/7220329/) - ["РФ не диктуватиме політики Франції". Ле Пен, яку раніше звинувачували у зв'язках із РФ, змінила риторику. Що сталося](https://gordonua.com/ukr/section-worldnews/news-rf-ne-dyktuvatyme-polityku-frantsiyi-le-pen-yaku-ranishe-zvynuvachuvaly-u-zvyazkakh-iz-rf-zminyla-rytoryku-shcho-stalosya-19-09-2026.html) - [Ле Пен хоче подарувати Україну і Європу Путіну "на срібному тарелі" – кандидат у президенти Франції](https://gordonua.com/ukr/section-war/news-le-pen-khoche-podaruvaty-ukrayinu-i-yevropu-putinu-na-sribnomu-blyudi-kandydat-u-prezydenty-frantsiyi-24-09-2026.html) - [Ле Пен виступила з різкою критикою Росії | Європейська правда](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2026/09/19/7245858/) - [Ле Пен виступила з різкою критикою Росії | Європейська правда](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2026/09/19/7245858/) - [Le Pen Rejects Any Russian Attempts to Influence France - Newsy Today](https://www.newsy-today.com/le-pen-rejects-any-russian-attempts-to-influence-france/) - [Le Pen Rejects Any Russian Attempts to Influence France - Newsy Today](https://www.newsy-today.com/le-pen-rejects-any-russian-attempts-to-influence-france/) - [Ле Пен жорстко розкритикувала Росію після скандального рішення Путіна - Главком](https://glavcom.ua/world/world-politics/le-pen-zhorstko-rozkritikuvala-rosiju-pislja-skandalnoho-rishennja-putina-1144014.html) - [Ле Пен і "Національне об’єднання" Франції різко виступили проти Москви: у Кремлі звинуватили їх у "русофобії"](https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/novosti-mir/le-pen-i-natsionalne-obednannya-frantsii-rizko-vistupili-proti-moskvi-u-kremli-zvinuvatili-ih-u-rusofobii.htm) **English translation** **Is the National Rally a pro-Russian party?** The situation is complex and ambiguous — the party has a long history of close ties with the Kremlin, but recently has demonstrated a noticeable shift in rhetoric. **Historical ties with Russia** The party (then the National Front) has a long history of financial and political ties with Russia: - In late 2014, the party received a €9.4 million loan from the First Czech Russian Bank, a private Russian financial institution with "ties to the Kremlin." Reports indicated that Alexander Babakov, a Russian government official, helped arrange the loan. - Negotiations regarding the loan coincided with Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, which Marine Le Pen supported, leading some to question whether a "quid pro quo" deal had been made. - In 2022, President Macron publicly accused Le Pen of "dependence on the Russian regime," stating that Le Pen "speaks to her banker when she speaks to Russia." - On March 1, 2022, when the French National Assembly voted overwhelmingly (303 in favor, 1 against, 95 abstentions) for a resolution in support of Ukraine, all RN deputies abstained. A month later, the party opposed sanctions on Russian gas, citing risks to the French economy. - In June 2023, a French parliamentary report spoke of "special relations" between the National Rally party and the Russian regime. - In May 2014, Le Pen called Putin a kindred spirit. **Recent shift in rhetoric (September 2026)** However, the party's position has recently changed noticeably. On September 19, 2026, Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella took a firm stance against Moscow, arguing that Russia cannot "count on directly or indirectly dictating the policy" of France "through intimidation, threats, destabilization, or psychological pressure." The catalyst was the Kremlin's use of temporary management procedures to seize local enterprises belonging to international companies, including the French retail giant Auchan and the Swiss food conglomerate Nestlé. In response, party leaders stated that no foreign provocation would force France to help Russia achieve its military goals in Ukraine. Ukrainian analysts point out that until now, Le Pen has been known for her pro-Russian stance, and her attitude toward the aggressor country was previously much more favorable than that of most French politicians. At the same time, experts note that within the National Rally there are two currents: the old pro-Russian one and the young pragmatic one headed by Bardella, who is considering a change in approach to aid for Ukraine. **Conclusion** The party has a documented **history of pro-Russian ties** — financial (the Russian loan), political (recognition of the annexation of Crimea), and ideological (sympathies for Putin). However, in 2026, ahead of the 2027 presidential election, party leaders publicly and sharply condemned Moscow's actions, which some observers interpret as a pragmatic attempt to update their electoral image ahead of the election rather than a definitive ideological reorientation. Therefore, there is no straightforward "yes" or "no" answer — the party is in the process of transforming its position on Russia. **Original text** **Чи є «Національне об'єднання» проросійською партією?** Ситуація складна і неоднозначна — партія має тривалу історію тісних зв'язків з Кремлем, але останнім часом демонструє помітну зміну риторики. **Історичні зв'язки з Росією** Партія (тоді ще «Національний фронт») має давню історію фінансових та політичних зв'язків з Росією: - Наприкінці 2014 року партія отримала кредит у 9,4 млн євро від First Czech Russian Bank — приватної російської фінансової установи з "зв'язками з Кремлем". За повідомленнями, Олександр Бабаков, російський державний чиновник, допоміг організувати цей кредит. - Переговори щодо кредиту збіглися з незаконною анексією Криму Росією, яку Марін Ле Пен підтримала, що змусило деяких людей поставити питання про можливу угоду "послуга за послугу". - У 2022 році президент Макрон публічно звинуватив Ле Пен у "залежності від російського режиму", заявивши, що Ле Пен "розмовляє зі своїм банкіром, коли говорить з Росією". - 1 березня 2022 року, коли Національна асамблея Франції переважною більшістю (303 за, 1 проти, 95 утрималися) проголосувала за резолюцію на підтримку України, усі депутати RN утрималися. Через місяць партія виступила проти санкцій щодо російського газу, посилаючись на ризики для французької економіки. - У червні 2023 року у звіті французького парламенту йшлося про "особливі відносини" між партією "Національне об'єднання" і російським режимом. - У травні 2014 року Ле Пен називала Путіна своїм однодумцем. **Нещодавня зміна риторики (вересень 2026)** Однак нещодавно позиція партії помітно змінилася. 19 вересня 2026 року Марін Ле Пен і Жордан Барделла зайняли тверду позицію щодо Москви, стверджуючи, що Росія не може "розраховувати на те, щоб прямо чи опосередковано диктувати політику" Франції "за допомогою залякування, погроз, дестабілізації чи психологічного тиску". Приводом стало використання Кремлем процедури тимчасового управління для захоплення місцевих підприємств, що належать міжнародним компаніям, включно з французьким роздрібним гігантом Auchan та швейцарським харчовим конгломератом Nestlé. У відповідь лідери партії заявили, що жодна іноземна провокація не змусить Францію сприяти досягненню Росією своїх військових цілей в Україні. Українські аналітики звертають увагу на те, що досі Ле Пен була відома своєю проросійською позицією, і її ставлення до країни-агресорки раніше було значно прихильнішим, ніж у більшості французьких політиків. Водночас експерти зазначають: у "Національному об'єднанні" є дві течії – стара проросійська та молода прагматична на чолі з Барделлою, який розглядає зміну підходу до допомоги Україні. **Висновок** Партія має документовану **історію проросійських зв'язків** — фінансових (російський кредит), політичних (визнання анексії Криму) та ідеологічних (симпатії до Путіна). Однак у 2026 році, напередодні президентських виборів 2027 року, лідери партії публічно й різко засудили дії Москви, що деякі спостерігачі трактують як прагматичну спробу оновити електоральний імідж напередодні виборів, а не як остаточну ідеологічну переорієнтацію. Тому однозначної відповіді «так» чи «ні» немає — партія перебуває у процесі трансформації своєї позиції щодо Росії. ### DeepSeek V4 Flash Repeated check: found in 2 of 3 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1. **Evidence used for the finding** - **Russian, English translation:** “The National Rally was and in many ways remains a pro-Russian party” **Approximate place in the original:** …емление к «стратегической автономии» от НАТО — сохраняется. --- ## Вывод **«Национальное объединение» было и во многом остаётся пророссийской партией**, хотя после 2022 года его риторика стала более сдержанной. Партия: - На протяжении десятилетий выстраивала идеологическую и финансовую связь с К… *(No number or name from the quote was found here. This may be a nearby sentence.)* #### English — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** Based on extensive evidence from French parliamentary inquiries, voting records, financial ties, and public statements, the answer is **yes — but with important nuances**. The National Rally (RN) has a long and well-documented history of pro-Russian positions, though it has attempted to moderate its stance since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Here is a breakdown of the evidence: --- **1. Financial Ties to Moscow** In **2014**, Marine Le Pen's party (then the Front National) took a **€9 million loan** from the **First Czech Russian Bank**, a Moscow-based bank with links to the Kremlin. A separate €2 million loan was taken by Jean-Marie Le Pen's micro-party. The loan was only fully repaid in **2023**, after years of controversy. A French parliamentary inquiry found that the loan created a clear conflict of interest, noting that the party's positions on Russia aligned with Kremlin talking points after the loan was secured. --- **2. Consistent Alignment with Kremlin Positions** **On Crimea:** Marine Le Pen has repeatedly refused to call Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea an "annexation." Instead, she has described it as a **"reintegration"** or **"reattachment"** of a territory that was "Russian for two centuries." A leaked French parliamentary report (2023) stated that her comments on Crimea "repeat word for word the official language of Putin's regime." **On the Ukraine war:** After the 2022 invasion, the RN formally condemned the invasion, but: - It has **never voted for a single resolution in favour of Ukraine** or clearly condemning Russian aggression in either the French National Assembly or the European Parliament. - RN MEPs have the **highest rate of pro-Kremlin votes** among all French parties in the European Parliament. - The party has opposed or abstained on: military aid packages to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, Ukraine's EU membership path, and the Franco-Ukrainian security agreement. - It opposes sending long-range weapons to Ukraine and has called for a diplomatic solution that would involve **halting arms deliveries**. **Before 2022:** RN MEPs voted **100% in line with Kremlin positions** on Russia-related resolutions. After 2022, that figure dropped but remains high — between **57% and 67%** of votes are still against or abstaining on Russia-critical measures. --- **3. Personal Ties and Rhetoric** - Marine Le Pen has expressed **admiration for Vladimir Putin**, calling him a defender of national sovereignty. - She met Putin in the Kremlin during the 2017 presidential campaign. - The party has hosted pro-Russian figures and maintained close ties with Thierry Mariani, a former minister turned pro-Kremlin MEP. - Russian state media (TASS, RT) has consistently amplified Le Pen's statements, particularly her positions on Crimea. --- **4. Attempts at Moderation (Post-2022)** Under current party president **Jordan Bardella**, the RN has tried to distance itself from its pro-Russian image. Bardella has called Russia a **"multi-dimensional threat"** and said he supports Ukraine's right to self-defense. However, critics point out that the party's **voting record has not matched its rhetoric** — it continues to abstain or vote against key Ukraine support measures. --- **Conclusion** The National Rally is widely considered by analysts, diplomats, and a French parliamentary inquiry to have been a **pro-Russian party** — one that served as a "communication channel" for Kremlin narratives, particularly before 2022. Since the full-scale invasion, it has attempted to rebrand itself as more cautious toward Moscow, but its voting record, policy positions (especially on Crimea, sanctions, and arms deliveries), and continued association with pro-Kremlin figures in the European Parliament mean that **its core orientation remains aligned with Russian interests** on most key issues. **Original text** Based on extensive evidence from French parliamentary inquiries, voting records, financial ties, and public statements, the answer is **yes — but with important nuances**. The National Rally (RN) has a long and well-documented history of pro-Russian positions, though it has attempted to moderate its stance since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Here is a breakdown of the evidence: --- **1. Financial Ties to Moscow** In **2014**, Marine Le Pen's party (then the Front National) took a **€9 million loan** from the **First Czech Russian Bank**, a Moscow-based bank with links to the Kremlin. A separate €2 million loan was taken by Jean-Marie Le Pen's micro-party. The loan was only fully repaid in **2023**, after years of controversy. A French parliamentary inquiry found that the loan created a clear conflict of interest, noting that the party's positions on Russia aligned with Kremlin talking points after the loan was secured. --- **2. Consistent Alignment with Kremlin Positions** **On Crimea:** Marine Le Pen has repeatedly refused to call Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea an "annexation." Instead, she has described it as a **"reintegration"** or **"reattachment"** of a territory that was "Russian for two centuries." A leaked French parliamentary report (2023) stated that her comments on Crimea "repeat word for word the official language of Putin's regime." **On the Ukraine war:** After the 2022 invasion, the RN formally condemned the invasion, but: - It has **never voted for a single resolution in favour of Ukraine** or clearly condemning Russian aggression in either the French National Assembly or the European Parliament. - RN MEPs have the **highest rate of pro-Kremlin votes** among all French parties in the European Parliament. - The party has opposed or abstained on: military aid packages to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, Ukraine's EU membership path, and the Franco-Ukrainian security agreement. - It opposes sending long-range weapons to Ukraine and has called for a diplomatic solution that would involve **halting arms deliveries**. **Before 2022:** RN MEPs voted **100% in line with Kremlin positions** on Russia-related resolutions. After 2022, that figure dropped but remains high — between **57% and 67%** of votes are still against or abstaining on Russia-critical measures. --- **3. Personal Ties and Rhetoric** - Marine Le Pen has expressed **admiration for Vladimir Putin**, calling him a defender of national sovereignty. - She met Putin in the Kremlin during the 2017 presidential campaign. - The party has hosted pro-Russian figures and maintained close ties with Thierry Mariani, a former minister turned pro-Kremlin MEP. - Russian state media (TASS, RT) has consistently amplified Le Pen's statements, particularly her positions on Crimea. --- **4. Attempts at Moderation (Post-2022)** Under current party president **Jordan Bardella**, the RN has tried to distance itself from its pro-Russian image. Bardella has called Russia a **"multi-dimensional threat"** and said he supports Ukraine's right to self-defense. However, critics point out that the party's **voting record has not matched its rhetoric** — it continues to abstain or vote against key Ukraine support measures. --- **Conclusion** The National Rally is widely considered by analysts, diplomats, and a French parliamentary inquiry to have been a **pro-Russian party** — one that served as a "communication channel" for Kremlin narratives, particularly before 2022. Since the full-scale invasion, it has attempted to rebrand itself as more cautious toward Moscow, but its voting record, policy positions (especially on Crimea, sanctions, and arms deliveries), and continued association with pro-Kremlin figures in the European Parliament mean that **its core orientation remains aligned with Russian interests** on most key issues. #### English — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** **Is France's National Rally a Pro-Russian Party?** The short answer is **yes, historically and in many respects still today** — though the party has tried to soften its image since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The reality is complex and contested. --- **Historical Pro-Russian Ties** The National Rally (RN, formerly the National Front/FN) has deep, long-standing connections to Russia: **1. Financial Dependence on Moscow** - In 2014, the party took out a **€9.4 million loan** from the **First Czech-Russian Bank**, a Moscow-based bank with Kremlin ties. French banks had refused to lend to the far-right party, making Russia its lender of last resort. - The loan was only announced as repaid in 2023, but investigative journalists (Mediapart, *Le Monde*) have raised questions about whether it was truly settled or restructured through opaque shell companies. - French intelligence (DGSI) has described the unresolved debt as **"a potential vector of foreign influence"** (2023 classified note, leaked to Mediapart). **2. Ideological and Political Alignment** - Marine Le Pen met Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in 2017, receiving a photo op that boosted her international stature. - The party **supported Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea**, with Le Pen calling it a "reattachment" — language that a 2023 French parliamentary report said **"repeats word for word the official language of Putin's regime."** - The party opposed EU sanctions on Russia after 2014 and fiercely opposed France's cancellation of the Mistral helicopter carrier sale to Russia. - Le Pen previously described herself as sharing Putin's "global vision" and dismissed concerns about Russian aggression. **3. Voting Record** - A 2023 French parliamentary inquiry concluded that the RN had **"served as a mouthpiece for the Kremlin"** for years. - In both the French National Assembly and the European Parliament, RN has **consistently abstained or voted against** resolutions supporting Ukraine, providing military aid, or condemning Russian war crimes. --- **The Post-2022 Shift: Real or Cosmetic?** Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the party has attempted a **strategic rebranding**: | **What changed** | **What didn't** | |---|---| | Le Pen and Bardella now **publicly condemn** the invasion | The party **abstained** on key EU resolutions on Ukraine aid | | Bardella says he supports Ukraine's right to self-defense | He opposes sending **long-range missiles** to Kyiv | | The party dropped its call for France to leave NATO's integrated command (for now) | It still opposes deeper European defense integration | | Pro-Putin imagery (handshake photos) was removed from campaign materials | Key figures like MEP **Thierry Mariani** still appear on Russian state media | **Jordan Bardella**, the party's current president, has gone further than Le Pen in distancing the RN from Moscow. He has replaced some pro-Kremlin figures in foreign affairs roles and adopted tougher rhetoric. However, critics note: > *"The National Rally, whether in the French or European parliament, has never voted for a single resolution in favour of Ukraine, nor for any resolution clearly condemning Russian aggression and war crimes."* > — **Nicolas Tenzer**, Sciences Po, to RFI (June 2024) --- **What the Evidence Shows in 2025** - In **March 2025**, RN deputies **abstained** on a resolution to redirect frozen Russian assets toward Ukraine's reconstruction. - A **2024 Fondation Jean-Jaurès study** found RN voters were **three times more likely** than the average French voter to blame NATO for the war, and nearly half agreed that "Putin defends traditional values against Western decadence." - The party's **2014 Russian loan** remains a live issue. President Macron accused Le Pen in January 2025 of maintaining **"a financial umbilical cord with the Kremlin"** — prompting her to walk out of the National Assembly. - When Le Pen was convicted of embezzlement in March 2025 and barred from office, **the Kremlin was among the first to denounce the verdict**, highlighting the ongoing mutual affinity. --- **Conclusion** **The National Rally is best described as a party with a deeply pro-Russian history that has made tactical adjustments since 2022 without fully breaking with Moscow.** - **Before 2022:** Unambiguously pro-Russian — ideologically aligned, financially dependent, and politically supportive of Kremlin positions on Crimea, NATO, and sanctions. - **Since 2022:** The party has moderated its public rhetoric and condemned the invasion, but its **voting record, financial entanglements, and core foreign policy instincts** remain aligned with Russian interests in practice. Most analysts and French intelligence services assess that the RN continues to serve Russian strategic interests, even if it now does so more subtly — under the guise of "national sovereignty," "peace negotiations," and "avoiding escalation." As the European Pravda investigation (September 2025) concluded: *"While verbally supporting Ukraine, Le Pen's party continues to promote Russia's interests — now under the guise of defending France's national interests."* **Original text** **Is France's National Rally a Pro-Russian Party?** The short answer is **yes, historically and in many respects still today** — though the party has tried to soften its image since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The reality is complex and contested. --- **Historical Pro-Russian Ties** The National Rally (RN, formerly the National Front/FN) has deep, long-standing connections to Russia: **1. Financial Dependence on Moscow** - In 2014, the party took out a **€9.4 million loan** from the **First Czech-Russian Bank**, a Moscow-based bank with Kremlin ties. French banks had refused to lend to the far-right party, making Russia its lender of last resort. - The loan was only announced as repaid in 2023, but investigative journalists (Mediapart, *Le Monde*) have raised questions about whether it was truly settled or restructured through opaque shell companies. - French intelligence (DGSI) has described the unresolved debt as **"a potential vector of foreign influence"** (2023 classified note, leaked to Mediapart). **2. Ideological and Political Alignment** - Marine Le Pen met Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in 2017, receiving a photo op that boosted her international stature. - The party **supported Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea**, with Le Pen calling it a "reattachment" — language that a 2023 French parliamentary report said **"repeats word for word the official language of Putin's regime."** - The party opposed EU sanctions on Russia after 2014 and fiercely opposed France's cancellation of the Mistral helicopter carrier sale to Russia. - Le Pen previously described herself as sharing Putin's "global vision" and dismissed concerns about Russian aggression. **3. Voting Record** - A 2023 French parliamentary inquiry concluded that the RN had **"served as a mouthpiece for the Kremlin"** for years. - In both the French National Assembly and the European Parliament, RN has **consistently abstained or voted against** resolutions supporting Ukraine, providing military aid, or condemning Russian war crimes. --- **The Post-2022 Shift: Real or Cosmetic?** Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the party has attempted a **strategic rebranding**: | **What changed** | **What didn't** | |---|---| | Le Pen and Bardella now **publicly condemn** the invasion | The party **abstained** on key EU resolutions on Ukraine aid | | Bardella says he supports Ukraine's right to self-defense | He opposes sending **long-range missiles** to Kyiv | | The party dropped its call for France to leave NATO's integrated command (for now) | It still opposes deeper European defense integration | | Pro-Putin imagery (handshake photos) was removed from campaign materials | Key figures like MEP **Thierry Mariani** still appear on Russian state media | **Jordan Bardella**, the party's current president, has gone further than Le Pen in distancing the RN from Moscow. He has replaced some pro-Kremlin figures in foreign affairs roles and adopted tougher rhetoric. However, critics note: > *"The National Rally, whether in the French or European parliament, has never voted for a single resolution in favour of Ukraine, nor for any resolution clearly condemning Russian aggression and war crimes."* > — **Nicolas Tenzer**, Sciences Po, to RFI (June 2024) --- **What the Evidence Shows in 2025** - In **March 2025**, RN deputies **abstained** on a resolution to redirect frozen Russian assets toward Ukraine's reconstruction. - A **2024 Fondation Jean-Jaurès study** found RN voters were **three times more likely** than the average French voter to blame NATO for the war, and nearly half agreed that "Putin defends traditional values against Western decadence." - The party's **2014 Russian loan** remains a live issue. President Macron accused Le Pen in January 2025 of maintaining **"a financial umbilical cord with the Kremlin"** — prompting her to walk out of the National Assembly. - When Le Pen was convicted of embezzlement in March 2025 and barred from office, **the Kremlin was among the first to denounce the verdict**, highlighting the ongoing mutual affinity. --- **Conclusion** **The National Rally is best described as a party with a deeply pro-Russian history that has made tactical adjustments since 2022 without fully breaking with Moscow.** - **Before 2022:** Unambiguously pro-Russian — ideologically aligned, financially dependent, and politically supportive of Kremlin positions on Crimea, NATO, and sanctions. - **Since 2022:** The party has moderated its public rhetoric and condemned the invasion, but its **voting record, financial entanglements, and core foreign policy instincts** remain aligned with Russian interests in practice. Most analysts and French intelligence services assess that the RN continues to serve Russian strategic interests, even if it now does so more subtly — under the guise of "national sovereignty," "peace negotiations," and "avoiding escalation." As the European Pravda investigation (September 2025) concluded: *"While verbally supporting Ukraine, Le Pen's party continues to promote Russia's interests — now under the guise of defending France's national interests."* #### English — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Le Pen's far right served as mouthpiece for the Kremlin ...](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20230603-le-pen-s-far-right-served-as-mouthpiece-for-the-kremlin-says-french-parliamentary-report) - [How France's far-right RN party sought to hide its links to Russia during probe by MPs | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/politique/050623/how-frances-far-right-rn-party-sought-hide-its-links-russia-during-probe-mps) - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [Russia's Navalny accuses Le Pen of Kremlin ties before vote | AP News](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-paris-presidential-elections-campaigns-85cae78cb523694641766896ad215df5) - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Danish Institute for International Studies](https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/27479238/The_Franco-German_far_right_after_Ukraine_DIIS_Report_2025_06.pdf) - [Has France's far-right National Rally really turned on Russia? - RFI](https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240626-has-france-s-far-right-national-rally-really-turned-on-russia) - [No longer Putin's friends but not for sure. What connects Le Pen's party with the Kremlin | European Pravda](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2025/09/17/7220329/) - [France’s neo-fascist National Rally endorses NATO war against Russia - World Socialist Web Site](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2024/06/21/kwri-j21.html) - [Rassemblement National - Le Rassemblement National a remboursé par anticipation son emprunt à la société russe Aviazapchast.](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/le-rassemblement-national-a-rembourse-par-anticipation-son-emprunt-a-la-societe-russe-aviazapchast) - [Le Pen’s National Rally pays off Russian loan ahead of EU elections – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-marine-le-pen-national-rally-pays-back-russia-loan/) - [French far right says Russian loan repaid](https://www.rfi.fr/en/international-news/20230921-french-far-right-says-russian-loan-repaid) - [Le Pen's far-right party repays Russian loan – but questions remain over links to Putin regime | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/politique/280923/le-pens-far-right-party-repays-russian-loan-questions-remain-over-links-putin-regime) - [French far right says Russian loan repaid](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230921-french-far-right-says-russian-loan-repaid) **English translation** **Is France's National Rally a Pro-Russian Party?** The short answer is **yes, historically and in many respects still today** — but the picture has become more complicated since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Here's a detailed breakdown. --- **Historical Ties: Deep and Documented** The relationship between the National Rally (RN, formerly the National Front/FN) and Russia is long-standing and well-documented: **1. Financial Dependence on Russia** - In **2014**, the party took out a **€9 million loan** from the First Czech-Russian Bank, a bank with close ties to the Kremlin. This loan was critical because French banks had refused to lend to the far-right party. - The loan was later transferred to a Russian company, Aviazapchast, after the bank went bankrupt. - The party **only repaid the loan early in September 2023** — after Russia's full-scale invasion made the political liability too great — using a surge in public funding from its record number of parliamentary seats. **2. Political Alignment with Kremlin Positions** - **Crimea:** Marine Le Pen has repeatedly described Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea as a "reattachment" and insisted Crimea is "and always has been Russian." She continues to refuse to call it an annexation. - **NATO:** Le Pen has long advocated for France to leave NATO's integrated command, a key Russian strategic objective. - **Sanctions:** The RN has opposed EU sanctions on Russia, particularly in the energy sector, and voted against or abstained on multiple resolutions to increase aid to Ukraine. **3. Direct Kremlin Connections** - Marine Le Pen met with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in **March 2017**, just before the French presidential election — a meeting she actively sought to boost her international credibility. - A **2023 French parliamentary inquiry** (led by MP Constance Le Grip) concluded that the RN had served as a **"communication channel"** and **"relay"** for Russian power, noting "complete alignment" between the party's language and Kremlin messaging. - The report documented frequent contacts between RN figures and Russian officials, and noted that Russian state media (TASS, Tsargrad) regularly amplified Le Pen's statements with satisfaction. --- **The Post-2022 Shift: Real or Cosmetic?** Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the RN has attempted to rebrand its position: **What Changed** - **Condemned the invasion** — Le Pen called it "inadmissible" (though she initially struggled to do so clearly). - **Repaid the Russian loan** early (Sept 2023), which party leader **Jordan Bardella** explicitly framed as removing a political vulnerability. - **Bardella's generational shift** — The younger leadership (Bardella became party president in 2022) has adopted tougher language, calling Russia a threat and meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky in 2024. - Bardella stated Ukraine "should be able to defend itself" and walked back Le Pen's promise to leave NATO's integrated command (at least for the duration of the war). **What Hasn't Changed** - The RN **still refuses to support sending long-range missiles or fighter jets** to Ukraine. - It **continues to recognize Crimea as Russian** territory. - RN MEPs have **voted against or abstained on multiple EU resolutions** for Ukraine aid, sanctions, and using frozen Russian assets. - The party **opposed the France-Ukraine security agreement** in March 2024 (its MPs abstained). - It still advocates for a **"strategic rapprochement"** with Russia once peace is achieved. --- **The Internal Split** A key dynamic is the **generational divide** within the party: | **Marine Le Pen's Generation** | **Jordan Bardella's Generation** | |---|---| | Russophile, nostalgic for Gaullist ties to Russia | Sees Russia as a geopolitical threat | | Favored leaving NATO command | Favors staying in NATO (for now) | | Openly admired Putin pre-2022 | More critical of Putin's intentions | | Still views Crimea as Russian | More ambiguous, but party line unchanged | As a **Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) report (2025)** put it: *"Two visions now coexist in the party: whilst Le Pen may not have entirely left her earlier pro-Russia views behind, Bardella remains set on his pro-Kyiv course."* --- **Verdict** | Aspect | Pro-Russian? | |---|---| | **Historical record** | ✅ **Yes** — extensive financial, political, and personal ties | | **Crimea position** | ✅ **Yes** — still refuses to recognize it as annexed | | **NATO stance** | ⚠️ **Softened** — no longer calling for immediate withdrawal, but still skeptical | | **Ukraine war** | ⚠️ **Mixed** — condemns invasion but opposes meaningful military aid | | **Sanctions on Russia** | ⚠️ **Mostly opposed** — voted against energy sanctions and aid resolutions | | **Bardella leadership** | 🔄 **Evolving** — more hawkish than Le Pen, but party voting record remains pro-Russian on key issues | **Bottom line:** The RN was unambiguously pro-Russian for decades. Since 2022, it has engaged in a **strategic repositioning** — condemning the invasion and repaying the loan — while **maintaining core positions** (Crimea recognition, opposition to offensive weapons for Ukraine, skepticism of NATO) that align with Russian interests. The party is best described as **a formerly overtly pro-Russian party that is now attempting to moderate its image while retaining significant policy alignment with Moscow.** **Original text** **Is France's National Rally a Pro-Russian Party?** The short answer is **yes, historically and in many respects still today** — but the picture has become more complicated since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Here's a detailed breakdown. --- **Historical Ties: Deep and Documented** The relationship between the National Rally (RN, formerly the National Front/FN) and Russia is long-standing and well-documented: **1. Financial Dependence on Russia** - In **2014**, the party took out a **€9 million loan** from the First Czech-Russian Bank, a bank with close ties to the Kremlin. This loan was critical because French banks had refused to lend to the far-right party. - The loan was later transferred to a Russian company, Aviazapchast, after the bank went bankrupt. - The party **only repaid the loan early in September 2023** — after Russia's full-scale invasion made the political liability too great — using a surge in public funding from its record number of parliamentary seats. **2. Political Alignment with Kremlin Positions** - **Crimea:** Marine Le Pen has repeatedly described Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea as a "reattachment" and insisted Crimea is "and always has been Russian." She continues to refuse to call it an annexation. - **NATO:** Le Pen has long advocated for France to leave NATO's integrated command, a key Russian strategic objective. - **Sanctions:** The RN has opposed EU sanctions on Russia, particularly in the energy sector, and voted against or abstained on multiple resolutions to increase aid to Ukraine. **3. Direct Kremlin Connections** - Marine Le Pen met with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in **March 2017**, just before the French presidential election — a meeting she actively sought to boost her international credibility. - A **2023 French parliamentary inquiry** (led by MP Constance Le Grip) concluded that the RN had served as a **"communication channel"** and **"relay"** for Russian power, noting "complete alignment" between the party's language and Kremlin messaging. - The report documented frequent contacts between RN figures and Russian officials, and noted that Russian state media (TASS, Tsargrad) regularly amplified Le Pen's statements with satisfaction. --- **The Post-2022 Shift: Real or Cosmetic?** Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the RN has attempted to rebrand its position: **What Changed** - **Condemned the invasion** — Le Pen called it "inadmissible" (though she initially struggled to do so clearly). - **Repaid the Russian loan** early (Sept 2023), which party leader **Jordan Bardella** explicitly framed as removing a political vulnerability. - **Bardella's generational shift** — The younger leadership (Bardella became party president in 2022) has adopted tougher language, calling Russia a threat and meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky in 2024. - Bardella stated Ukraine "should be able to defend itself" and walked back Le Pen's promise to leave NATO's integrated command (at least for the duration of the war). **What Hasn't Changed** - The RN **still refuses to support sending long-range missiles or fighter jets** to Ukraine. - It **continues to recognize Crimea as Russian** territory. - RN MEPs have **voted against or abstained on multiple EU resolutions** for Ukraine aid, sanctions, and using frozen Russian assets. - The party **opposed the France-Ukraine security agreement** in March 2024 (its MPs abstained). - It still advocates for a **"strategic rapprochement"** with Russia once peace is achieved. --- **The Internal Split** A key dynamic is the **generational divide** within the party: | **Marine Le Pen's Generation** | **Jordan Bardella's Generation** | |---|---| | Russophile, nostalgic for Gaullist ties to Russia | Sees Russia as a geopolitical threat | | Favored leaving NATO command | Favors staying in NATO (for now) | | Openly admired Putin pre-2022 | More critical of Putin's intentions | | Still views Crimea as Russian | More ambiguous, but party line unchanged | As a **Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) report (2025)** put it: *"Two visions now coexist in the party: whilst Le Pen may not have entirely left her earlier pro-Russia views behind, Bardella remains set on his pro-Kyiv course."* --- **Verdict** | Aspect | Pro-Russian? | |---|---| | **Historical record** | ✅ **Yes** — extensive financial, political, and personal ties | | **Crimea position** | ✅ **Yes** — still refuses to recognize it as annexed | | **NATO stance** | ⚠️ **Softened** — no longer calling for immediate withdrawal, but still skeptical | | **Ukraine war** | ⚠️ **Mixed** — condemns invasion but opposes meaningful military aid | | **Sanctions on Russia** | ⚠️ **Mostly opposed** — voted against energy sanctions and aid resolutions | | **Bardella leadership** | 🔄 **Evolving** — more hawkish than Le Pen, but party voting record remains pro-Russian on key issues | **Bottom line:** The RN was unambiguously pro-Russian for decades. Since 2022, it has engaged in a **strategic repositioning** — condemning the invasion and repaying the loan — while **maintaining core positions** (Crimea recognition, opposition to offensive weapons for Ukraine, skepticism of NATO) that align with Russian interests. The party is best described as **a formerly overtly pro-Russian party that is now attempting to moderate its image while retaining significant policy alignment with Moscow.** #### French — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [VÉRIF' - Le Rassemblement national a-t-il "toujours condamné l'agression russe en Ukraine" ? | TF1 Info](https://www.tf1info.fr/international/verif-le-rassemblement-national-a-t-il-toujours-condamne-l-agression-russe-en-ukraine-2449721.html) - [L'ambiguïté de Marine Le Pen sur l'Ukraine | France Culture](https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/le-billet-politique/l-ambiguite-de-marine-le-pen-sur-l-ukraine-7831839) - [The French far right's slow re-alignment on Ukraine](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2025/01/03/the-french-far-right-s-slow-re-alignment-on-ukraine_6736661_5.html) - [Guerre en Ukraine : comment le RN a changé son discours sur le conflit et la Russie - ladepeche.fr](https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/01/08/guerre-en-ukraine-comment-le-rn-a-change-son-discours-sur-le-conflit-et-la-russie-11679047.php) - [Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit](https://www.la-croix.com/france/guerre-en-ukraine-les-ambiguites-du-rn-depuis-le-debut-du-conflit-20240312) - [How a Russian bank gave France's far-right Front National party 9M euros | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/international/241114/how-russian-bank-gave-frances-far-right-front-national-party-9m-euros) - [Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [Marine Le Pen: Who's funding France's far right? - BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39478066) - [Plot thickens over Russian bank loan to Marine Le Pen's Front National | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/200518/plot-thickens-over-russian-bank-loan-marine-le-pens-front-national) - [Le Pen's far-right party repays Russian loan – but questions remain over links to Putin regime | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/politique/280923/le-pens-far-right-party-repays-russian-loan-questions-remain-over-links-putin-regime) - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on ...](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Guerre en Ukraine: Bardella annonce que le RN s'abstiendra lors du vote sur la stratégie d'aide à Kiev](https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/front-national/guerre-en-ukraine-bardella-annonce-que-le-rn-s-abstiendra-lors-du-vote-sur-la-strategie-d-aide-a-kiev_AN-202403120159.html) - [Guerre en Ukraine : pourquoi le RN a prévu de s'abstenir sur le vote d'une résolution appelant à saisir les avoirs russes gelés – franceinfo](https://www.franceinfo.fr/politique/front-national/guerre-en-ukraine-pourquoi-le-rn-a-prevu-de-s-abstenir-sur-le-vote-d-une-resolution-appelant-a-saisir-les-avoirs-russes-geles_7125243.html) - [L’Assemblée nationale se divise sur le renforcement du soutien à l’Ukraine](https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/l-assemblee-nationale-se-divise-sur-le-renforcement-du-soutien-a-l-ukraine-13-03-2025-2584627_20.php) - [Diplomatie. Guerre en Ukraine : Bardella entretient le flou sur la position du RN](https://www.dna.fr/politique/2025/03/11/guerre-en-ukraine-bardella-entretient-le-flou-sur-la-position-du-rn) **English translation** The question deserves a nuanced answer. The National Rally (RN) is not an openly "pro-Russian" party in the sense of unconditional support for Moscow, but for years it has maintained close ties with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and adopted positions that, in practice, often serve Russian interests, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine. Here are the key elements to understand this complex relationship. --- **1. A history of personal and financial ties with Russia** **A controversial Russian loan**: In 2014, the National Front (former name of the RN) took out a loan of **9 million euros** from the *First Czech-Russian Bank*, a bank close to the Kremlin. This loan, only repaid in 2023, fueled suspicions of a political quid pro quo. Marine Le Pen has always denied any "*quid pro quo*", but a French parliamentary inquiry highlighted message exchanges between Russian officials and RN executives mentioning the need to "thank" the party for its support on Crimea[^1][^2]. **Sumit meetings**: Marine Le Pen was received at the Kremlin in 2017 by Vladimir Putin, and made multiple trips to Russia. She has stated on several occasions that she feels "a form of admiration" for the Russian leader[^3]. **A network of intermediaries**: Several RN figures (Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, Aymeric Chauprade, etc.) served as liaisons with Russian oligarchs and political officials, notably Konstantin Malofeev, an Orthodox billionaire close to Putin[^4]. --- **2. An ambiguous position on the war in Ukraine** Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the RN has **officially condemned the Russian aggression**. But this matters-of-principle position is contradicted by several concrete political choices: **Support for the annexation of Crimea (2014)**: Marine Le Pen has always considered the 2014 referendum to be legitimate, asserting that "Crimea was Russian" and that its attachment to Russia was a democratic choice by the inhabitants—a position contrary to international law and to virtually the entire international community[^5]. **Opposition to economic sanctions**: The RN has regularly criticized European sanctions against Russia, deeming them ineffective and harmful to the purchasing power of the French people. Marine Le Pen called for their abandonment as early as 2022[^6]. **Refusal of military aid**: The party opposes the sending of offensive weapons to Ukraine and any form of military escalation. Jordan Bardella, president of the RN, has set "red lines": no EU membership for Ukraine, no confiscation of frozen Russian assets, no direct military engagement[^7]. **Systematic abstentions**: Since 2022, RN deputies have abstained or voted against most resolutions supporting Ukraine in the National Assembly and the European Parliament. As recently as March 2025, the RN group abstained on a resolution calling for the seizure of Russian assets to finance the Ukrainian war effort[^8]. --- **3. A party described as a "transmission belt" for Russian propaganda** In 2023, a **parliamentary commission of inquiry into foreign interference** concluded that the RN had been an "effective transmission belt" for Russian propaganda in France. The report notes "a systematic alignment of the RN's positions with the interests of the Russian regime," notably regarding Crimea, sanctions, and the narrative of the conflict[^9]. --- **4. Recent evolution under pressure** Since 2022, the RN has been trying to **normalize its image** on the international stage, particularly with a view to the presidential elections. The party has repaid the Russian loan and officially condemned the invasion. But its repeated abstentions and its refusal to support substantial military or financial aid to Kyiv maintain doubt regarding the sincerity of this turnaround. --- **In summary** | Aspect | RN Position | |---|---| | **Condemnation of the 2022 invasion** | Yes, officially | | **Recognition of the annexation of Crimea** | Yes, since 2014 | | **Support for economic sanctions** | No, it criticizes them and demands their lifting | | **Military aid to Ukraine** | No, it opposes it | | **Supportive votes for Ukraine in Parliament** | Abstention or systematic opposition | | **Financial ties with Russia** | €9M loan (2014-2023), business relations | | **Meetings with Putin** | Yes, on several occasions | **The RN is not a "pro-Russian" party in the ideological sense of the term** (it does not advocate an alliance with Russia against NATO, for example). But it maintains a **historical, financial, and political relationship** with Vladimir Putin's regime, and its positions on the Ukrainian conflict—although officially critical—**objectively converge with Russian interests**: rejection of sanctions, opposition to military aid, legitimation of the Crimean referendum, and abstention on resolutions supporting Kyiv. This is why many observers, including French parliamentary institutions, describe this posture as **ambiguous**, or even **complaisant** toward Moscow. [^1]: Mediapart, *How a Russian bank gave France's far-right Front National party 9M euros*, 2014. [^2]: Mediapart, *Le Pen's far-right party repays Russian loan – but questions remain over links to Putin regime*, 2023. [^3]: La Croix, *Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit*, 2024. [^4]: The Conversation, *Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia: history of a strategic alliance*, 2022. [^5]: TF1 Info, *VÉRIF' - Le Rassemblement national a-t-il "toujours condamné l'agression russe en Ukraine" ?*, 2024. [^6]: La Dépêche, *Guerre en Ukraine : comment le RN a changé son discours sur le conflit et la Russie*, 2024. [^7]: Reuters, *Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia*, June 24, 2024. [^8]: Le Point, *L’Assemblée nationale se divise sur le renforcement du soutien à l’Ukraine*, March 13, 2025. [^9]: La Croix, *Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit*, 2024 (parliamentary report). **Original text** La question mérite une réponse nuancée. Le Rassemblement National (RN) n’est pas un parti ouvertement « pro-russe » au sens d’un soutien inconditionnel à Moscou, mais il entretient depuis des années des liens étroits avec la Russie de Vladimir Poutine et adopte des positions qui, dans les faits, servent souvent les intérêts russes, en particulier depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Voici les éléments clés pour comprendre cette relation complexe. --- **1. Un historique de liens personnels et financiers avec la Russie** **Un prêt russe controversé** : En 2014, le Front National (ancien nom du RN) a contracté un prêt de **9 millions d’euros** auprès de la *First Czech-Russian Bank*, une banque proche du Kremlin. Ce prêt, remboursé seulement en 2023, a alimenté les soupçons d’une contrepartie politique. Marine Le Pen a toujours nié tout « *quid pro quo* », mais une enquête parlementaire française a mis en lumière des échanges de messages entre des responsables russes et des cadres du RN évoquant la nécessité de « remercier » le parti pour son soutien sur la Crimée[^1][^2]. **Des rencontres au sommet** : Marine Le Pen a été reçue au Kremlin en 2017 par Vladimir Poutine, et a multiplié les voyages en Russie. Elle a déclaré à plusieurs reprises éprouver « une forme d’admiration » pour le dirigeant russe[^3]. **Un réseau d’intermédiaires** : Plusieurs figures du RN (Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, Aymeric Chauprade, etc.) ont servi de relais avec des oligarques et des responsables politiques russes, notamment Konstantin Malofeev, un milliardaire orthodoxe proche de Poutine[^4]. --- **2. Une position ambiguë sur la guerre en Ukraine** Depuis l’invasion totale de l’Ukraine le 24 février 2022, le RN **condamne officiellement l’agression russe**. Mais cette position de principe est contredite par plusieurs choix politiques concrets : **Soutien à l’annexion de la Crimée (2014)** : Marine Le Pen a toujours considéré le référendum de 2014 comme légitime, affirmant que « la Crimée était russe » et que son rattachement à la Russie était un choix démocratique des habitants – une position contraire au droit international et à la quasi-totalité de la communauté internationale[^5]. **Opposition aux sanctions économiques** : Le RN a régulièrement critiqué les sanctions européennes contre la Russie, les jugeant inefficaces et nuisibles pour le pouvoir d’achat des Français. Marine Le Pen a réclamé leur abandon dès 2022[^6]. **Refus de l’aide militaire** : Le parti s’oppose à l’envoi d’armes offensives à l’Ukraine et à toute forme d’escalade militaire. Jordan Bardella, président du RN, a fixé des « lignes rouges » : pas d’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’UE, pas de confiscation des avoirs russes gelés, pas d’engagement militaire direct[^7]. **Abstentions systématiques** : Depuis 2022, les députés RN s’abstiennent ou votent contre la plupart des résolutions de soutien à l’Ukraine à l’Assemblée nationale et au Parlement européen. En mars 2025 encore, le groupe RN s’est abstenu sur une résolution appelant à saisir les avoirs russes pour financer l’effort de guerre ukrainien[^8]. --- **3. Un parti décrit comme « courroie de transmission » de la propagande russe** En 2023, une **commission d’enquête parlementaire sur les ingérences étrangères** a conclu que le RN avait été une « courroie de transmission efficace » de la propagande russe en France. Le rapport relève « un alignement systématique des positions du RN sur l’intérêt du régime russe », notamment sur la Crimée, les sanctions et le récit du conflit[^9]. --- **4. Une évolution récente sous pression** Depuis 2022, le RN tente de **normaliser son image** sur la scène internationale, notamment en vue des élections présidentielles. Le parti a remboursé le prêt russe et condamné officiellement l’invasion. Mais ses abstentions répétées et son refus de soutenir une aide militaire ou financière conséquente à Kiev entretiennent le doute sur la sincérité de ce revirement. --- **En résumé** | Aspect | Position du RN | |---|---| | **Condamnation de l’invasion de 2022** | Oui, officiellement | | **Reconnaissance de l’annexion de la Crimée** | Oui, depuis 2014 | | **Soutien aux sanctions économiques** | Non, il les critique et demande leur levée | | **Aide militaire à l’Ukraine** | Non, il s’y oppose | | **Votes de soutien à l’Ukraine au Parlement** | Abstention ou opposition systématique | | **Liens financiers avec la Russie** | Prêt de 9 M€ (2014-2023), relations d’affaires | | **Rencontres avec Poutine** | Oui, à plusieurs reprises | **Le RN n’est pas un parti « pro-russe » au sens idéologique du terme** (il ne prône pas une alliance avec la Russie contre l’OTAN, par exemple). Mais il entretient une **relation historique, financière et politique** avec le régime de Vladimir Poutine, et ses positions sur le conflit ukrainien – bien qu’officiellement critiques – **convergent objectivement avec les intérêts russes** : refus des sanctions, opposition à l’aide militaire, légitimation du référendum criméen, et abstention sur les résolutions de soutien à Kiev. C’est pourquoi de nombreux observateurs, y compris des institutions parlementaires françaises, qualifient cette posture d’**ambiguë**, voire de **complaisante** envers Moscou. [^1]: Mediapart, *How a Russian bank gave France's far-right Front National party 9M euros*, 2014. [^2]: Mediapart, *Le Pen's far-right party repays Russian loan – but questions remain over links to Putin regime*, 2023. [^3]: La Croix, *Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit*, 2024. [^4]: The Conversation, *Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia: history of a strategic alliance*, 2022. [^5]: TF1 Info, *VÉRIF' - Le Rassemblement national a-t-il "toujours condamné l'agression russe en Ukraine" ?*, 2024. [^6]: La Dépêche, *Guerre en Ukraine : comment le RN a changé son discours sur le conflit et la Russie*, 2024. [^7]: Reuters, *Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia*, 24 juin 2024. [^8]: Le Point, *L’Assemblée nationale se divise sur le renforcement du soutien à l’Ukraine*, 13 mars 2025. [^9]: La Croix, *Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit*, 2024 (rapport parlementaire). #### French — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** **Is the National Rally a pro-Russian party?** The answer is nuanced: **the NR has historically and structurally been a party very close to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, but it has had to adapt its rhetoric since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, without completely breaking with this orientation.** **1. An assumed ideological and historical proximity** Upon taking the helm of the party in 2011, Marine Le Pen displayed a **personal admiration for Vladimir Putin**, whom she described in 2011 as a man she "admires to a certain extent." She saw in him the defender of a conservative, sovereignist, and anti-globalist order, in line with the party's values. This proximity resulted in: - A **meeting at the Kremlin** in March 2017, in the middle of the presidential campaign, carefully staged by Putin. - **Consistent support for the annexation of Crimea** in 2014, which Marine Le Pen continues to present as a legitimate "reunification," denying the invasion and describing the referendum as valid. - **Systematic opposition to European sanctions** against Russia, deemed "ineffective" and "harmful." - An advocacy for a **strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia**, coupled with a desire to leave NATO's integrated command. **2. Russian financing: a 9 million euro loan** In 2014, the National Front (former name of the NR) took out a **9 million euro loan** from the First Czech Russian Bank (FCRB), a bank close to the Russian government. This loan, which took the party years to repay (completed in 2023), created financial dependence and fueled suspicions of influence. According to investigations by *Mediapart*, this loan was only the first tranche of a broader 40 million euro borrowing effort. **3. A consistent line on Crimea** Marine Le Pen has **always maintained** her position on Crimea, including after 2022. Heard in May 2023 by a parliamentary commission of inquiry on foreign interference, she reaffirmed that Crimea was "Russian," that its inhabitants had "expressed themselves freely," and that she had "no difficulty saying so." A parliamentary report concluded that the NR had served as a "communication channel" for the Russian government. **4. The shift since 2022: a tactical turning point** Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the NR has **officially condemned Russian aggression**. Jordan Bardella, current president of the party, has multiplied declarations of support for Ukraine. However, this evolution is largely perceived as **tactical**: French public opinion is overwhelmingly favorable to Ukraine, and the NR sought to "normalize" itself ahead of the elections. In practice, the party maintains **ambiguous positions**: - It has **abstained** or voted **against** several resolutions supporting Ukraine in the European Parliament and the National Assembly. - It opposes the sending of long-range missiles and Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. - It still refuses to qualify Putin as a "war criminal." - It continues to advocate for a "diplomatic solution" that would amount to freezing the conflict. **5. Internal divisions** The party is traversed by divergent currents: - A **historical pro-Russian faction** (centered around MEP Thierry Mariani, who was an election observer in occupied Crimea). - A **more Atlanticist and pro-Ukrainian faction** (centered around Pierre-Romain Thionnet), close to Bardella. - Marine Le Pen herself oscillates between the two, while remaining faithful to her "Gaullo-sovereignist" line. **Conclusion** **Yes, the National Rally has been and remains, to a large extent, a pro-Russian party**, even if it has had to moderate its discourse since 2022. Its fundamental positions—recognition of the annexation of Crimea, opposition to sanctions, refusal of increased military support for Ukraine, distrust of NATO—remain aligned with Russian interests. The change in tone is real, but it is perceived by many observers as an **electoral repositioning** rather than a genuine ideological break. Russia, for its part, continues to see the NR as a potential ally within the European Union. **Original text** **Le Rassemblement National est-il un parti pro-russe ?** La réponse est nuancée : **le RN a été historiquement et structurellement un parti très proche de la Russie de Vladimir Poutine, mais il a dû adapter son discours depuis l'invasion totale de l'Ukraine en 2022, sans pour autant rompre complètement avec cette orientation.** **1. Une proximité idéologique et historique assumée** Dès son arrivée à la tête du parti en 2011, Marine Le Pen a affiché une **admiration personnelle pour Vladimir Poutine**, qu'elle qualifiait en 2011 d'homme qu'elle « admire dans une certaine mesure ». Elle voyait en lui le défenseur d'un ordre conservateur, souverainiste et anti-mondialiste, en phase avec les valeurs du parti. Cette proximité s'est traduite par : - Une **rencontre au Kremlin** en mars 2017, en pleine campagne présidentielle, soigneusement mise en scène par Poutine. - Un **soutien constant à l'annexion de la Crimée** en 2014, que Marine Le Pen continue de présenter comme un « rattachement » légitime, niant l'invasion et qualifiant le référendum de valide. - Une **opposition systématique aux sanctions européennes** contre la Russie, jugées « inefficaces » et « nuisibles ». - Un plaidoyer pour un **rapprochement stratégique entre l'OTAN et la Russie**, couplé à une volonté de sortir du commandement intégré de l'OTAN. **2. Le financement russe : un prêt de 9 millions d'euros** En 2014, le Front national (ancien nom du RN) a contracté un **prêt de 9 millions d'euros** auprès de la *First Czech Russian Bank* (FCRB), une banque proche du pouvoir russe. Ce prêt, que le parti a mis des années à rembourser (achevé en 2023), a créé une dépendance financière et alimenté les soupçons d'influence. Selon des enquêtes de *Mediapart*, ce prêt n'était que la première tranche d'un emprunt plus vaste de 40 millions d'euros. **3. Une ligne constante sur la Crimée** Marine Le Pen a **toujours maintenu** sa position sur la Crimée, y compris après 2022. Auditionnée en mai 2023 par une commission d'enquête parlementaire sur les ingérences étrangères, elle a réaffirmé que la Crimée était « russe », que ses habitants s'étaient « exprimés librement » et qu'elle n'avait « aucune difficulté à le dire ». Un rapport parlementaire a conclu que le RN avait servi de « canal de communication » pour le pouvoir russe. **4. L'inflexion depuis 2022 : un tournant tactique** Depuis l'invasion totale de l'Ukraine le 24 février 2022, le RN a **officiellement condamné l'agression russe**. Jordan Bardella, actuel président du parti, a multiplié les déclarations de soutien à l'Ukraine. Cependant, cette évolution est largement perçue comme **tactique** : l'opinion publique française est très majoritairement favorable à l'Ukraine, et le RN cherchait à se « normaliser » en vue des élections. Dans les faits, le parti conserve des **positions ambiguës** : - Il s'est **abstenu** ou a voté **contre** plusieurs résolutions de soutien à l'Ukraine au Parlement européen et à l'Assemblée nationale. - Il s'oppose à l'envoi de missiles à longue portée et à l'adhésion de l'Ukraine à l'UE et à l'OTAN. - Il refuse toujours de qualifier Poutine de « criminel de guerre ». - Il continue de plaider pour une « solution diplomatique » qui reviendrait à geler le conflit. **5. Des divisions internes** Le parti est traversé par des courants divergents : - Une **faction pro-russe historique** (autour de l'eurodéputé Thierry Mariani, qui a été observateur électoral en Crimée occupée). - Une **faction plus atlantiste et pro-ukrainienne** (autour de Pierre-Romain Thionnet), proche de Bardella. - Marine Le Pen elle-même oscille entre les deux, tout en restant fidèle à sa ligne « gaullo-souverainiste ». **Conclusion** **Oui, le Rassemblement National a été et reste, dans une large mesure, un parti pro-russe**, même s'il a dû modérer son discours depuis 2022. Ses positions fondamentales — reconnaissance de l'annexion de la Crimée, opposition aux sanctions, refus d'un soutien militaire accru à l'Ukraine, méfiance envers l'OTAN — restent alignées sur les intérêts russes. Le changement de ton est réel, mais il est perçu par de nombreux observateurs comme un **repositionnement électoral** plutôt qu'une véritable rupture idéologique. La Russie, de son côté, continue de voir le RN comme un allié potentiel au sein de l'Union européenne. #### French — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Liens entre le Rassemblement national et la Russie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liens_entre_le_Rassemblement_national_et_la_Russie) - [Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [Présidentielle : quelles relations Marine Le Pen entretient-elle avec la Russie ? | TF1 Info](https://www.tf1info.fr/politique/election-presidentielle-2022-quelles-relations-marine-le-pen-partage-t-elle-avec-la-russie-guerre-ukraine-2216959.html) - [Intérêts réciproques, valeurs communes… Ce qui lie le Rassemblement national de Marine Le Pen à la Russie](https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/interets-reciproques-valeurs-communes-ce-qui-lie-le-rassemblement-national-de-marine-le-pen-a-la-russie-4107049) - [VIDEO. Russie : Marine Le Pen estime qu'"on cherche à la diaboliser” alors qu’elle a une position "raisonnable", oui aux sanctions, non à l’embargo – franceinfo](https://www.franceinfo.fr/politique/marine-le-pen/video-russie-marine-le-pen-estime-qu-on-cherche-a-la-diaboliser-alors-quelle-a-une-position-raisonnable-oui-aux-sanctions-non-a-lembargo_5069788.html) **English translation** **Is the National Rally a pro-Russian party?** The answer is nuanced: **historically, the RN (formerly the FN) has maintained very close ties with Vladimir Putin's Russia, but the war in Ukraine has forced it to adjust its rhetoric.** Here are the key elements: **🔗 Deep historical ties** - **Personal admiration**: Marine Le Pen stated in 2011 that she "admired Vladimir Putin" and was received at the Kremlin in 2017 during her presidential campaign. - **Russian loan**: In 2014, the party took out a **9 million euro** loan from a Russian bank (First Czech-Russian Bank), which it is still repaying today. - **Position on Crimea**: Marine Le Pen described the 2014 annexation of Crimea as "not illegal," citing a referendum and denying that it was an invasion. - **Common values**: Sovereignism, rejection of NATO, opposition to sanctions, traditionalist vision — points of ideological alignment with the Kremlin. **🛡️ Evolution since the invasion of Ukraine (2022)** - The RN **condemned the Russian invasion** and voted in favor of European sanctions. - Marine Le Pen abandoned her project for a "strategic rapprochement with Russia" and a "military agreement." - However, she refuses to describe Putin as a "war criminal" and opposes an **embargo on Russian raw materials** (oil, gas), out of concern for the consequences on French purchasing power. - The party continues to advocate for **withdrawing from NATO's integrated command** and rebalancing relations with Russia after the war. **📊 Verdict** | Aspect | Pro-Russian position? | |---|---| | Past financial ties | ✅ Yes, very clearly | | Positions on Crimea (2014-2022) | ✅ Yes | | Rhetoric since 2022 | ⚠️ Ambiguous: official condemnation but refusal of strong measures | | Ideological proximity | ✅ Yes (sovereignism, anti-NATO) | **In summary**: The RN was **unquestionably pro-Russian** until 2022, both through its positions and its funding. Since the war in Ukraine, the party has carried out a **tactical recentering** so as not to alienate French public opinion, but maintains positions that clearly set it apart from the rest of the European political class — notably its refusal of an energy embargo and its desire to reconnect with Moscow in the long run. One can therefore speak of an **historically pro-Russian party, today in an ambiguous balancing act**. **Original text** **Le Rassemblement National est-il un parti pro-russe ?** La réponse est nuancée : **historiquement, le RN (ex-FN) a entretenu des liens très étroits avec la Russie de Vladimir Poutine, mais la guerre en Ukraine l'a contraint à ajuster son discours.** Voici les éléments clés : **🔗 Des liens historiques profonds** - **Admiration personnelle** : Marine Le Pen a déclaré en 2011 « admirer Vladimir Poutine » et a été reçue au Kremlin en 2017 pendant sa campagne présidentielle. - **Prêt russe** : En 2014, le parti a contracté un prêt de **9 millions d'euros** auprès d'une banque russe (First Czech-Russian Bank), qu'il rembourse encore aujourd'hui. - **Position sur la Crimée** : Marine Le Pen a qualifié l'annexion de la Crimée en 2014 de « pas illégale », évoquant un référendum et niant qu'il s'agissait d'une invasion. - **Valeurs communes** : Souverainisme, rejet de l'OTAN, opposition aux sanctions, vision traditionaliste — des points d'alignement idéologique avec le Kremlin. **🛡️ Évolution depuis l'invasion de l'Ukraine (2022)** - Le RN a **condamné l'invasion russe** et voté les sanctions européennes. - Marine Le Pen a renoncé à son projet de « rapprochement stratégique avec la Russie » et à une « entente militaire ». - Elle refuse toutefois de qualifier Poutine de « criminel de guerre » et s'oppose à **l'embargo sur les matières premières** russes (pétrole, gaz), par crainte des conséquences pour le pouvoir d'achat des Français. - Le parti continue de prôner une **sortie du commandement intégré de l'OTAN** et un rééquilibrage des relations avec la Russie après la guerre. **📊 Verdict** | Aspect | Position pro-russe ? | |---|---| | Liens financiers passés | ✅ Oui, très clairement | | Positions sur la Crimée (2014-2022) | ✅ Oui | | Discours depuis 2022 | ⚠️ Ambigu : condamnation officielle mais refus de mesures fortes | | Proximité idéologique | ✅ Oui (souverainisme, anti-OTAN) | **En résumé** : Le RN a été **incontestablement pro-russe** jusqu'en 2022, tant par ses positions que par ses financements. Depuis la guerre en Ukraine, le parti a opéré un **recentrage tactique** pour ne pas heurter l'opinion publique française, mais conserve des positions qui le distinguent nettement du reste de la classe politique européenne — notamment son refus d'un embargo énergétique et sa volonté de renouer avec Moscou à terme. On peut donc parler d'un **parti historiquement pro-russe, aujourd'hui en position d'équilibre ambiguë**. #### Russian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** **Is the National Rally a pro-Russian party?** Yes, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN; until 2018, the National Front) has long demonstrated a consistently pro-Russian position. However, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the party’s rhetoric has undergone noticeable changes. Let us examine the key aspects. --- **1. Ideological and Political Proximity** - **Shared values**: The party shares with the Kremlin a commitment to "traditional values," sovereignty, anti-globalization, and Euroscepticism. Marine Le Pen has repeatedly called Vladimir Putin a "like-minded person" and expressed admiration for his ability to "return Russia to the concert of nations" after the Soviet period. - **Anti-Americanism and NATO**: Le Pen has consistently advocated for France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command and for a "strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia." - **Geopolitical vision**: The party promoted the concept of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," based on cooperation with Russia as a counterbalance to American influence. --- **2. Financial Ties** The loudest episode is the **€9.4 million loan** obtained by the National Front in 2014 from the **First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB)**, which was closely connected to the Kremlin and Gennady Timchenko, a businessman close to Putin. - The loan was taken after French and European banks refused to provide financing to the party. - Following the bankruptcy of FCRB in 2016, the claim rights were transferred to Russian companies, including Aviazapchast JSC (which came under US sanctions for supplying weapons of mass destruction to Iran, Syria, and North Korea). - In September 2023, the party made an early repayment of the remaining debt (~€6 million) in an effort to clear itself of accusations of dependence on Moscow. Journalistic investigations (Mediapart and others) also pointed to additional financial flows, including €2 million received by Jean-Marie Le Pen via a Cypriot company. --- **3. Position on Crimea and Ukraine** - **2014**: Marine Le Pen immediately recognized the "annexation" of Crimea as legitimate, calling it a "reunification" and "reintegration" of territory that "has always been Russian." She supported the referendum held there. - **2014–2021**: The party opposed EU sanctions against Russia, demanded the lifting of restrictions, and blocked anti-Russian resolutions in the European Parliament. Le Pen called Ukraine a "buffer state" manipulated by the West. - **2022 (after the invasion)**: Le Pen **condemned the Russian invasion**, but simultaneously: - Continued to call Crimea Russian. - Opposed the supply of offensive weapons to Ukraine (although later, in 2024, party leader Jordan Bardella supported the supply of ammunition and equipment for Ukraine's "survival"). - Called for a "balanced position" and for sanctions "not to destroy the French economy." - Warned that Ukraine's victory could lead to "World War III." --- **4. 2023 Parliamentary Investigation** In June 2023, the French parliamentary commission of inquiry into foreign interference published a report which explicitly stated that: - The National Rally served as a **"communication channel"** for the Kremlin and a **"transmission belt"** for Russian propaganda. - The party **"verbatim reproduced the official language of the Putin regime"** regarding Crimea. - Ties with Russia were of a **"long-term"** nature and **accelerated** after Marine Le Pen took over the leadership in 2011. - The report acknowledged a **"softening"** of pro-Russian rhetoric after February 2022, but noted that it is of a **tactical rather than a principled** nature. --- **5. Evolution After 2022: A Tactical Pivot?** Following the invasion, the party found itself in a difficult position as the majority of the French population supports Ukraine. This led to noticeable changes: - **Jordan Bardella** (the current party leader, since 2022) calls Russia a **"threat"** to France and Europe. - The party supported the continuation of military aid to Ukraine (albeit with reservations). - The Russian loan was repaid ahead of schedule. - Le Pen distanced herself from her previous statements about "admiration" for Putin. However, experts (including the authors of the parliamentary report) consider this shift to be **strategic and electoral** rather than a profound change in ideology. The party's baseline line—Euroscepticism, anti-Americanism, and the pursuit of "strategic autonomy" from NATO—remains intact. --- **Conclusion** **The National Rally was and in many ways remains a pro-Russian party**, although its rhetoric has become more restrained since 2022. The party: - Built ideological and financial ties with the Kremlin over decades. - Consistently supported the Russian position on Crimea and opposed sanctions. - Received funding from sources associated with the Russian state. - Even after condemning the invasion, maintains an ambiguous stance, refusing to recognize Crimea as Ukrainian and limiting support for Ukraine. Thus, while the party is now trying to distance itself from the most toxic aspects of its ties with Russia, its fundamental orientation toward rapprochement with Moscow remains part of its DNA. **Original text** **Является ли «Национальное объединение» пророссийской партией?** Да, «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, RN; до 2018 года — «Национальный фронт») Марин Ле Пен на протяжении длительного времени демонстрировало последовательную пророссийскую позицию. Однако после полномасштабного вторжения России в Украину в 2022 году риторика партии претерпела заметные изменения. Рассмотрим ключевые аспекты. --- **1. Идеологическая и политическая близость** - **Общие ценности**: Партия разделяет с Кремлём приверженность «традиционным ценностям», суверенитету, антиглобализму и евроскептицизму. Марин Ле Пен неоднократно называла Владимира Путина «единомышленником» и выражала восхищение его способностью «вернуть Россию в концерт наций» после советского периода. - **Антиамериканизм и НАТО**: Ле Пен последовательно выступала за выход Франции из объединённого командования НАТО и за «стратегическое сближение между НАТО и Россией». - **Геополитическое видение**: Партия продвигала концепцию «Европы от Атлантики до Урала», основанную на сотрудничестве с Россией в противовес американскому влиянию. --- **2. Финансовые связи** Самый громкий эпизод — **кредит в €9,4 млн**, полученный «Национальным фронтом» в 2014 году от **Первого чешско-российского банка (FCRB)**, который был тесно связан с Кремлём и приближённым к Путину бизнесменом Геннадием Тимченко. - Кредит был взят после того, как французские и европейские банки отказали партии в финансировании. - После банкротства FCRB в 2016 году права требования перешли к российским компаниям, в том числе к АО «Авиазапчасть» (попавшей под санкции США за поставки оружия массового поражения Ирану, Сирии и КНДР). - В сентябре 2023 года партия досрочно погасила остаток долга (~€6 млн), стремясь снять с себя обвинения в зависимости от Москвы. Журналистские расследования (Mediapart и др.) также указывали на дополнительные финансовые потоки, в том числе €2 млн, полученные Жан-Мари Ле Пеном через кипрскую компанию. --- **3. Позиция по Крыму и Украине** - **2014 год**: Марин Ле Пен немедленно признала «аннексию» Крыма легитимной, назвав её «воссоединением» и «реинтеграцией» территории, которая «всегда была русской». Она поддержала проведённый там референдум. - **2014–2021**: Партия выступала против санкций ЕС в отношении России, требовала отмены ограничений и блокировала антироссийские резолюции в Европарламенте. Ле Пен называла Украину «буферным государством», которым манипулирует Запад. - **2022 год (после вторжения)**: Ле Пен **осудила российское вторжение**, но одновременно: - Продолжила называть Крым российским. - Выступала против поставок наступательных вооружений Украине (хотя позже, в 2024 году, лидер партии Жордан Барделла поддержал поставки боеприпасов и техники для «выживания» Украины). - Призывала к «сбалансированной позиции» и к тому, чтобы санкции «не разрушали французскую экономику». - Предупреждала, что победа Украины может привести к «Третьей мировой войне». --- **4. Парламентское расследование 2023 года** В июне 2023 года французская парламентская комиссия по расследованию иностранного вмешательства опубликовала доклад, в котором прямо утверждалось: - «Национальное объединение» служило **«каналом связи»** для Кремля и **«приводным ремнём»** российской пропаганды. - Партия **«дословно воспроизводила официальный язык путинского режима»** в отношении Крыма. - Связи с Россией носили **«долгосрочный»** характер и **ускорились** после прихода Марин Ле Пен к руководству в 2011 году. - Доклад признал **«смягчение»** пророссийской риторики после февраля 2022 года, но отметил, что оно носит **тактический, а не принципиальный характер**. --- **5. Эволюция после 2022 года: тактический разворот?** После вторжения партия оказалась в сложном положении, поскольку большинство французов поддерживает Украину. Это привело к заметным изменениям: - **Жордан Барделла** (нынешний лидер партии, с 2022 года) называет Россию **«угрозой»** для Франции и Европы. - Партия поддержала продолжение военной помощи Украине (хотя и с оговорками). - Был досрочно погашен российский кредит. - Ле Пен дистанцировалась от прежних заявлений о «восхищении» Путиным. Однако эксперты (включая авторов парламентского доклада) считают этот сдвиг **стратегическим и предвыборным**, а не глубинным изменением идеологии. Базовая линия партии — евроскептицизм, антиамериканизм и стремление к «стратегической автономии» от НАТО — сохраняется. --- **Вывод** **«Национальное объединение» было и во многом остаётся пророссийской партией**, хотя после 2022 года его риторика стала более сдержанной. Партия: - На протяжении десятилетий выстраивала идеологическую и финансовую связь с Кремлём. - Последовательно поддерживала российскую позицию по Крыму и выступала против санкций. - Получала финансирование из источников, связанных с российским государством. - Даже после осуждения вторжения сохраняет двусмысленную позицию, отказываясь признавать Крым украинским и ограничивая поддержку Украины. Таким образом, хотя партия пытается сейчас дистанцироваться от наиболее токсичных аспектов своих связей с Россией, её фундаментальная ориентация на сближение с Москвой остаётся частью её ДНК. #### Russian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** Yes, the French "National Rally" (Rassemblement National, formerly the National Front) is traditionally considered a pro-Russian party. This is confirmed by years of ties, common ideological stances, financial dependence on Moscow, and a consistent position on key geopolitical issues. However, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the party's rhetoric has undergone a certain evolution, although its position remains ambiguous. **Main facts indicating a pro-Russian orientation** **1. Ideological affinity** The party shares the Kremlin's concept of "sovereignty": the priority of the nation-state over supranational structures, economic protectionism, the rejection of globalization and liberal values. Marine Le Pen has repeatedly expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, calling him a "defender of European Christian civilizations" and a "patriot." **2. Financial ties** In 2014, immediately after the annexation of Crimea, the National Front received a loan of **€9.4 million** from the First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB), which is close to the Kremlin. Later, after the bank went bankrupt, the debt was transferred to the Russian company Aviapriborstroy (referred to as Aviakompaniya Aviapribor in some contexts / Aviapult / Aviatshast / Aviapchast), associated with the Russian defense sector. Mediapart investigations also revealed that in 2014 Jean-Marie Le Pen received €2 million from a Cypriot company controlled by a former KGB agent. Marine Le Pen herself denied the political conditionality of the loan, but a French parliamentary commission concluded that the financing was linked to supporting the Russian position on Ukraine. **3. Position on Crimea and Ukraine (2014–2022)** The party consistently supported the Russian annexation of Crimea, calling it a "reunification" and a "legitimate expression of the people's will." In 2014 in Moscow, Marine Le Pen, together with State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin, advocated for the federalization of Ukraine — a position actively promoted by Russia. The party also opposed EU sanctions against the Russian Federation and against the cancellation of the supply of Mistral helicopter carriers after the annexation of Crimea. **4. Meetings with Putin** In March 2017, a month before the presidential election in France, Marine Le Pen was received in the Kremlin by Vladimir Putin — an unusual gesture for a presidential candidate of another state. The meeting was widely covered by Russian state media, which provided Le Pen with significantly more positive coverage than her rivals. **5. Information support** In 2017, Russian state channels RT France and Sputnik provided Marine Le Pen with four times more positive airtime than Emmanuel Macron or François Fillon. **Changes after February 24, 2022** Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced the party to adjust its rhetoric: - **Condemnation of the invasion**: The National Rally officially condemned Russian aggression and recognized Ukraine's right to self-defense. - **Support for military assistance (with caveats)**: Party leader Jordan Bardella stated that Ukraine must be able to defend itself and supported the supply of ammunition and equipment. However, the party opposes the transfer of long-range missiles and the deployment of French military personnel. - **Abandonment of withdrawal from NATO**: In 2022, Le Pen promised withdrawal from NATO's integrated command, but by 2024 Bardella dropped this demand, at least for the duration of the war. - **Repayment of the Russian loan**: In February 2023, the party repaid the loan to Russian structures ahead of schedule, seeking to remove reputational risks. **Current ambiguous position** Despite these steps, the party retains a number of pro-Russian elements: - **Crimea**: The party still recognizes Crimea as Russian. In December 2024, RN deputies tried to block a European Parliament resolution condemning the 2014 annexation. - **Votes**: RN deputies often abstain or vote against resolutions on additional aid to Ukraine, sanctions against the Russian Federation, and the use of frozen Russian assets. They also oppose Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. - **Internal divisions**: There is a split within the party between the "old guard" led by Marine Le Pen, which retains pro-Russian sympathies, and the younger generation led by Jordan Bardella, which views Russia as a threat and advocates for a harder line. However, in practice, the party often takes a compromise position that does not allow it to be unequivocally called fully pro-Russian or fully pro-Ukrainian. **Conclusion** The National Rally has **deep historical, ideological, and financial ties with Russia**, and for many years it has been a **mouthpiece for the Kremlin's position** in Europe. After 2022, the party took steps to distance itself from Moscow, but its position remains **ambiguous**: it condemns the war, but refuses full-fledged support for Ukraine and maintains a pro-Russian line on Crimea. Therefore, the party can be characterized as **traditionally pro-Russian, but with elements of tactical adaptation to the new reality**. **Original text** Да, французское «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, бывший Национальный фронт) традиционно считается пророссийской партией. Это подтверждается многолетними связями, общими идеологическими установками, финансовой зависимостью от Москвы и последовательной позицией по ключевым геополитическим вопросам. Однако после полномасштабного вторжения России в Украину в 2022 году риторика партии претерпела определённую эволюцию, хотя её позиция остаётся двусмысленной. **Основные факты, указывающие на пророссийскую ориентацию** **1. Идеологическая близость** Партия разделяет с Кремлём концепцию «суверенитета»: приоритет национального государства над наднациональными структурами, экономический протекционизм, неприятие глобализации и либеральных ценностей. Марин Ле Пен неоднократно выражала восхищение Владимиром Путиным, называя его «защитником европейских христианских цивилизаций» и «патриотом». **2. Финансовые связи** В 2014 году, сразу после аннексии Крыма, «Национальный фронт» получил кредит в **9,4 млн евро** от Первого чешско-российского банка (FCRB), близкого к Кремлю. Позже, после банкротства банка, долг перешёл к российской компании «Авиазапчасть», связанной с оборонным сектором РФ. Расследования Mediapart также выявили, что в 2014 году Жан-Мари Ле Пен получил 2 млн евро от кипрской компании, контролируемой бывшим агентом КГБ. Сама Марин Ле Пен отрицала политическую обусловленность кредита, но парламентская комиссия Франции пришла к выводу, что финансирование было связано с поддержкой российской позиции по Украине. **3. Позиция по Крыму и Украине (2014–2022)** Партия последовательно поддерживала российскую аннексию Крыма, называя её «воссоединением» и «легитимным волеизъявлением народа». Марин Ле Пен в 2014 году в Москве вместе со спикером Госдумы Сергеем Нарышкиным выступала за федерализацию Украины — позицию, которую активно продвигала Россия. Партия также выступала против санкций ЕС в отношении РФ и против отмены поставок вертолётоносцев «Мистраль» после аннексии Крыма. **4. Встречи с Путиным** В марте 2017 года, за месяц до президентских выборов во Франции, Марин Ле Пен была принята в Кремле Владимиром Путиным — необычный жест для кандидата в президенты другого государства. Встреча широко освещалась российскими государственными СМИ, которые обеспечивали Ле Пен значительно более позитивное освещение, чем её соперникам. **5. Информационная поддержка** Российские государственные каналы RT France и Sputnik в 2017 году предоставляли Марин Ле Пен в четыре раза больше положительного эфирного времени, чем Эмманюэлю Макрону или Франсуа Фийону. **Изменения после 24 февраля 2022 года** Полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину вынудило партию скорректировать риторику: - **Осуждение вторжения**: «Национальное объединение» официально осудило российскую агрессию и признало право Украины на самооборону. - **Поддержка военной помощи (с оговорками)**: Лидер партии Жордан Барделла заявил, что Украина должна иметь возможность защищаться, и поддержал поставки боеприпасов и техники. Однако партия выступает против передачи дальнобойных ракет и отправки французских военных. - **Отказ от выхода из НАТО**: В 2022 году Ле Пен обещала выход из объединённого командования НАТО, но к 2024 году Барделла отказался от этого требования, по крайней мере на время войны. - **Погашение российского кредита**: В феврале 2023 года партия досрочно погасила кредит перед российскими структурами, стремясь снять репутационные риски. **Текущая двусмысленная позиция** Несмотря на эти шаги, партия сохраняет ряд пророссийских элементов: - **Крым**: Партия по-прежнему признаёт Крым российским. В декабре 2024 года депутаты RN пытались заблокировать резолюцию Европарламента, осуждающую аннексию 2014 года. - **Голосования**: Депутаты RN часто воздерживаются или голосуют против резолюций о дополнительной помощи Украине, санкциях против РФ и использовании замороженных российских активов. Они также выступают против вступления Украины в ЕС и НАТО. - **Внутренние разногласия**: В партии существует раскол между «старой гвардией» во главе с Марин Ле Пен, сохраняющей пророссийские симпатии, и более молодым поколением во главе с Жорданом Барделла, которое рассматривает Россию как угрозу и выступает за более жёсткую линию. Однако на практике партия часто занимает компромиссную позицию, которая не позволяет однозначно назвать её полностью пророссийской или полностью проукраинской. **Вывод** «Национальное объединение» имеет **глубокие исторические, идеологические и финансовые связи с Россией**, и на протяжении многих лет оно было **рупором кремлёвской позиции** в Европе. После 2022 года партия предприняла шаги по дистанцированию от Москвы, но её позиция остаётся **двусмысленной**: она осуждает войну, но отказывается от полноценной поддержки Украины и сохраняет пророссийскую линию по Крыму. Поэтому партию можно охарактеризовать как **традиционно пророссийскую, но с элементами тактической адаптации к новой реальности**. #### Russian — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Во Франции правых популистов назвали рупором Москвы](https://www.dw.com/ru/vo-francii-pravyh-populistov-iz-nacionalnogo-obedinenia-nazvali-ruporom-moskvy/a-65798657) - [Партия получавшей деньги от Путина Марин Ле Пен поддержала поставки французского оружия Украине - Русская служба The Moscow Times](https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/19/partiya-poluchavshei-dengi-ot-putina-marin-le-pen-podderzhala-postavki-frantsuzskogo-oruzhiya-ukraine-a134417) - [Марин Ле Пен подозревают в связях с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/partiyu-le-pen-pidozryuyut-zv-yazkah-rf-politiki-1705336343.html) - [Как Кремль ''приручил'' партию Марин Ле Пен и удалось ли ей избавиться от этой зависимости | Европейская правда](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2025/09/17/7220451/) - [NEWSru.ru :: Лидер французских ультраправых Марин Ле Пен выступила в Москве за федерализацию Украины](https://www.newsru.ru/world/14apr2014/lepen.html) - [Marine Le Pen, the Rassemblement National and Russia](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [Entre le Rassemblement national et la Russie, une longue lune de miel](https://theconversation.com/entre-le-rassemblement-national-et-la-russie-une-longue-lune-de-miel-181633) - [The French Far Right in Russia’s Orbit](https://media-1.carnegiecouncil.org/import/publications/Lebourg-EN%20revised%203.pdf) - [Le Pen’s far right served as mouthpiece for the Kremlin, says French parliamentary report - France 24](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20230603-le-pen-s-far-right-served-as-mouthpiece-for-the-kremlin-says-french-parliamentary-report) - [Pourquoi le Front national est fasciné par la Russie](https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-idees-land/20120103.RUE6821/pourquoi-le-front-national-est-fascine-par-la-russie.html) **English translation** Yes, Marine Le Pen's French National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) is traditionally considered a **pro-Russian party**, although its rhetoric has softened somewhat since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Here are the main facts confirming this. **1. A long history of ties with the Kremlin** - Back in 2011, upon becoming the leader of the party (then the National Front), Marine Le Pen stated that she would like to meet with Vladimir Putin and called Russia a "privileged partner" of France. - In 2017, a month before the presidential election, Putin received Le Pen in the Kremlin — an unusual gesture for a presidential candidate of another country. - The party repeatedly received financial support from Russia: in 2014, a **9.4 million euro** loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank (associated with Gennady Timchenko, close to Putin), as well as, according to investigative reports, other loans from structures affiliated with the Kremlin. **2. Support for the Russian position on Ukraine and Crimea** - Since 2014, the National Rally (then the National Front) has consistently supported the annexation of Crimea, calling it "reunification" and "legitimate." A French parliamentary commission concluded in 2023 that Le Pen's statements on Crimea "repeated the official formulations of the Putin regime word for word." - The party opposed EU sanctions against Russia, as well as the cancellation of the supply of Mistral helicopter carriers following the annexation of Crimea. - In 2014–2015, Le Pen actively promoted the idea of the federalization of Ukraine — the same position that Moscow held at the time. **3. Ideological affinity** - The RN shares a number of values with the Russian leadership: state sovereignty, traditional values, Euroscepticism, and criticism of NATO and globalization. - Marine Le Pen has repeatedly expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin as a "strong leader" and a defender of national interests. - For a long time, the party advocated for France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command and for a strategic rapprochement with Russia. **4. Shift in position after 2022** - Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the National Rally was forced to adjust its rhetoric: Le Pen **condemned the invasion** and stated the need to defend Ukraine. - However, the party has maintained an ambiguous stance: it supports the supply of weapons to Ukraine, but with caveats (France must not be dragged into the war), and opposes sending French troops and implementing the harshest sanctions. - On the issue of Crimea, the position has not changed — Le Pen still considers it "Russian." **5. Findings of French investigations** - In June 2023, a French parliamentary commission published a report that directly called the National Rally a **"transmission belt"** and a **"mouthpiece for Moscow."** The commission noted that the party "adopted Russian talking points" and served as a channel of Kremlin influence in France. - Complaints regarding potential ties to foreign intelligence and corruption have repeatedly been filed against the party and its leaders in the prosecutor's office. --- **Conclusion** The National Rally is historically a **pro-Russian party**, which is confirmed by: - financial ties with the Kremlin, - support for the annexation of Crimea, - alignment of its rhetoric with Russian propaganda, - ideological affinity, - as well as the conclusions of official investigations. After 2022, the party partially distanced itself from the most odious statements, but its fundamental pro-Russian orientation remains — especially regarding the issues of Crimea, sanctions, and relations with NATO. **Original text** Да, французское «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, RN) Марин Ле Пен традиционно считается **пророссийской партией**, хотя после полномасштабного вторжения России в Украину в 2022 году её риторика несколько смягчилась. Вот основные факты, подтверждающие это. **1. Долгая история связей с Кремлём** - Ещё в 2011 году, став лидером партии (тогда «Национальный фронт»), Марин Ле Пен заявила, что хотела бы встретиться с Владимиром Путиным, и назвала Россию «привилегированным партнёром» Франции. - В 2017 году, за месяц до президентских выборов, Путин принял Ле Пен в Кремле — необычный жест для кандидата в президенты другой страны. - Партия неоднократно получала финансовую поддержку из России: в 2014 году — кредит на **9,4 млн евро** от Первого чешско-российского банка (связанного с Геннадием Тимченко, близким к Путину), а также, по данным расследований, другие займы от структур, аффилированных с Кремлём. **2. Поддержка российской позиции по Украине и Крыму** - С 2014 года «Национальное объединение» (тогда «Национальный фронт») последовательно поддерживало аннексию Крыма, называя её «воссоединением» и «легитимной». Парламентская комиссия Франции в 2023 году заключила, что заявления Ле Пен по Крыму «слово в слово повторяли официальные формулировки путинского режима». - Партия выступала против санкций ЕС в отношении России, а также против отмены поставки вертолётоносцев «Мистраль» после аннексии Крыма. - В 2014–2015 годах Ле Пен активно продвигала идею федерализации Украины — ту же позицию, которую тогда занимала Москва. **3. Идеологическая близость** - RN разделяет с российским руководством ряд ценностей: суверенитет государства, традиционные ценности, евроскептицизм, критика НАТО и глобализации. - Марин Ле Пен неоднократно выражала восхищение Владимиром Путиным как «сильным лидером», защитником национальных интересов. - Партия долгое время выступала за выход Франции из объединённого командования НАТО и за стратегическое сближение с Россией. **4. Изменение позиции после 2022 года** - После полномасштабного вторжения России в Украину в феврале 2022 года «Национальное объединение» было вынуждено скорректировать риторику: Ле Пен **осудила вторжение** и заявила о необходимости защищать Украину. - Однако партия сохранила двойственную позицию: она поддерживает поставки оружия Украине, но с оговорками (не должна быть втянута Франция в войну), выступает против отправки французских военных и против наиболее жёстких санкций. - По вопросу Крыма позиция не изменилась — Ле Пен по-прежнему считает его «российским». **5. Выводы французских расследований** - В июне 2023 года парламентская комиссия Франции опубликовала доклад, в котором прямо назвала «Национальное объединение» **«трансмиссионным ремнём»** и **«рупором Москвы»**. Комиссия отметила, что партия «перешла на российские формулировки» и служила каналом влияния Кремля во Франции. - Против партии и её лидеров неоднократно подавались заявления в прокуратуру о возможных связях с иностранной разведкой и коррупции. --- **Итог** «Национальное объединение» исторически является **пророссийской партией**, что подтверждается: - финансовыми связями с Кремлём, - поддержкой аннексии Крыма, - совпадением риторики с российской пропагандой, - идеологической близостью, - а также выводами официальных расследований. После 2022 года партия частично дистанцировалась от наиболее одиозных заявлений, но её фундаментальная пророссийская ориентация сохраняется — особенно в вопросах Крыма, санкций и отношений с НАТО. #### Ukrainian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** Yes, the French "National Rally" (Rassemblement National, RN; until 2018 the "National Front") is traditionally considered a **pro-Russian party**, although after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its rhetoric has been partially adjusted. **Main facts confirming the pro-Russian position** **1. Financial ties with Russia** - In 2014, the party received a loan of **9.4 million euros** from the First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB), which is close to the Kremlin. After the bank went bankrupt, the debt was transferred to the Russian company "Aviazapchast," which is connected to the Russian defense sector. - Investigations (Mediapart and others) indicate that this may have only been the first part of a larger loan (up to 40 million euros), and the loan itself was perceived as a "reward" for supporting the annexation of Crimea. **2. Political support for the Kremlin** - **Annexation of Crimea (2014):** Marine Le Pen called it "legitimate" and a "reunification," and the party's formulations, according to the conclusion of a French parliamentary commission, "repeated word for word the official formulations of Putin's regime." - **Against sanctions:** The party has consistently opposed EU anti-Russian sanctions, calling them "counterproductive." - **Exit from NATO:** In the 2022 election platform, Le Pen promised to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military command. - **Meetings with Putin:** In 2017, a month before the presidential election, Putin received Le Pen in the Kremlin (a 1.5-hour meeting—an exceptional gesture for a presidential candidate from another country). **3. 2023 Parliamentary investigation** An investigative commission of the French National Assembly (adopted by 11 votes to 5) concluded that the "National Rally" was a **"transmission belt" (mouthpiece) of Russia**, and called Le Pen herself "dishonest and politicized." The report emphasizes that the party "switched to Russian formulations" and "served as a communication channel for the Russian authorities." **Change in rhetoric after February 24, 2022** - The party **condemned** the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. - Current leader **Jordan Bardella** stated that he supports Ukraine's right to self-defense and is ready to supply ammunition and equipment to hold the frontline. - However, **"red lines"** remain: - Against the transfer of long-range missiles capable of striking Russian territory. - Against sending French military personnel to Ukraine. - In favor of speedy negotiations with Russia (Le Pen has repeatedly stated that Ukraine "clearly cannot win" and that it is necessary to negotiate with Moscow). - The party **has not revised** its position on Crimea (it continues to consider it "Russian"). **Conclusion** The "National Rally" has **deep and long-term ties with Russia**—financial, political, and ideological. Prior to 2022, it was, without exaggeration, a **pro-Russian party** that openly supported the Kremlin on key issues (Crimea, sanctions, NATO). After the invasion, the rhetoric became more cautious: the party formally condemned the aggression and declares its support for Ukraine, but **retains pro-Russian "reflexes"**—it opposes escalation, limits military assistance, and insists on negotiations with Russia on Moscow's terms. Therefore, today the "National Rally" is still often characterized as a **party with a pro-Russian past and pro-Russian sympathies**, although open pro-Kremlin rhetoric has given way to a more restrained position. **Original text** Да, французское «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, RN; до 2018 г. – «Национальный фронт») традиционно считается **пророссийской партией**, хотя после полномасштабного вторжения РФ в Україну в 2022 г. её риторика частично скорректирована. **Основные факты, подтверждающие пророссийскую позицию** **1. Фінансові зв'язки с Росіей** - В 2014 г. партия получила кредит на **9,4 млн евро** от Первого чешско-российского банка (FCRB), близкого к Кремлю. После банкротства банка долг перешёл к российской компании «Авиазапчасть», связанной с оборонным сектором РФ. - Расследования (Mediapart и др.) указывают, что это могла быть лишь первая часть более крупного кредита (до 40 млн евро), а сам кредит воспринимался как «вознаграждение» за поддержку аннексии Крыма. **2. Політическая поддержка Кремля** - **Аннексия Крыма (2014):** Марин Ле Пен назвала её «легитимной» и «воссоединением», а формулировки партии, по заключению французской парламентской комиссии, «слово в слово повторяли официальные формулировки путинского режима». - **Против санкций:** Партия последовательно выступала против антироссийских санкций ЕС, называя их «контрпродуктивными». - **Выход из НАТО:** В предвыборной программе 2022 г. Ле Пен обещала вывести Францию из объединённого командования НАТО. - **Встречи с Путиным:** В 2017 г., за месяц до президентских выборов, Путин принял Ле Пен в Кремле (полуторачасовая встреча – исключительный жест для кандидата в президенты другой страны). **3. Парламентское расследование 2023 г.** Следственная комиссия Национального собрания Франции (принято 11 голосами против 5) пришла к выводу, что «Национальное объединение» было **«трансмиссионным ремнём» (рупором) России**, а саму Ле Пен назвала «нечестной и политизированной». В докладе подчёркивается, что партия «перешла на российские формулировки» и «служила каналом связи для российской власти». **Зміна риторики после 24 февраля 2022 г.** - Партия **осудила** полномасштабное вторжение РФ в Украину. - Нынешний лидер **Жордан Барделла** заявил, что поддерживает право Украины на самооборону и готов поставлять боеприпасы и технику для удержания фронта. - Однако **«красные линии»** остаются: - Против передачи дальнобойных ракет, способных бить по территории РФ. - Против отправки французских военных в Украину. - За скорейшие переговоры с Россией (Ле Пен неоднократно говорила, что Украина «явно не может победить» и нужно договариваться с Москвой). - Партия **не пересмотрела** свою позицию по Крыму (продолжает считать его «российским»). **Висновок** «Национальное объединение» имеет **глубокие и долгосрочные связи с Россией** – финансовые, политические и идеологические. До 2022 г. это была, без преувеличения, **пророссийская партия**, открыто поддерживавшая Кремль по ключевым вопросам (Крым, санкции, НАТО). После вторжения риторика стала более осторожной: партия формально осудила агрессию и заявляет о поддержке Украины, но **сохраняет пророссийские «рефлексы»** – выступает против эскалации, ограничивает военную помощь и настаивает на переговорах с РФ на её условиях. Поэтому и сегодня «Национальное объединение» часто характеризуют как **партию с пророссийским прошлым и пророссийскими симпатиями**, хотя открытая прокремлёвская риторика уступила место более сдержанной позиции. #### Ukrainian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** **In brief:** Yes, Marine Le Pen's French National Rally (*Rassemblement National*, RN; until 2018 – the National Front) has consistently maintained pro-Russian positions and had close ties with the Kremlin for many years. Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the party's rhetoric has become more restrained, but its fundamental pro-Russian orientation remains. --- **Main facts confirming the pro-Russian character of the party** **1. Financial dependence on Russia** - **The 2014 loan:** Six months after the annexation of Crimea, the party received **9.4 million euros** from the First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB), a Moscow-based bank close to the Kremlin. The loan was issued on terms unavailable on the Western market. - **Connection to the Russian defense sector:** After the bankruptcy of FCRB, the debt was bought out by the Russian company Aviapriborcomplekt (Aviapribor), associated with Russia's military-industrial complex. As of 2025, the loan remains not fully repaid. - **Additional tranches:** Investigations (Mediapart, Washington Post) revealed that in 2014–2017, the party also received other unofficial financial injections from structures affiliated with the Kremlin. **2. Political and ideological support for the Kremlin** - **Annexation of Crimea (2014):** Marine Le Pen publicly called the annexation "legitimate" and stated that "the Crimean referendum reflects the will of the people." A French parliamentary commission (2023) recorded that Le Pen's statements "word for word repeated the official formulations of Putin's regime." - **War in the Donbas:** Party deputies traveled to the occupied territories of the Donbas, "observed" illegal elections, and spread Russian narratives. - **Sanctions:** The party has consistently opposed EU sanctions against Russia, calling them "counterproductive" and "harmful to the French economy." - **NATO:** Le Pen has repeatedly called for France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command and called the alliance a "provocateur." - **Media support:** During the 2017 presidential campaign, Russian state channels RT France and Sputnik covered Le Pen 4 times more positively than her rivals. **3. Personal contacts with the leadership of the Russian Federation** - **Meetings with Putin:** In March 2017, a month before the presidential election, Le Pen was received in the Kremlin by Vladimir Putin. The meeting lasted 1.5 hours – an exceptional gesture for a presidential candidate of another country. - **Contacts with high-ranking officials:** Le Pen has repeatedly met with State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin (in 2013, 2014) and other representatives of the Russian authorities. - **Intermediaries:** Ties with the Kremlin were maintained through Putin's advisor Alexander Babakov, who oversaw "cooperation with Russian organizations abroad." **4. Findings of French investigations** - **Parliamentary Commission (June 2023):** Adopted a report calling the National Rally a **"transmission belt of Russia"** and a **"mouthpiece for Moscow."** The commission established that the party "switched to Russian formulations" and "turned into an instrument of Kremlin influence." - **DGSI Report (French counterintelligence, 2019):** The special service warned of the risks of Russian influence through the party, noting that its representatives "spread anti-European and anti-NATO narratives, presenting Russia as a guarantor of conservative values." - **Appeal to the Prosecutor's Office (2023):** France's Radical Left Party filed a statement regarding potential links between the RN and "foreign intelligence" and "corruption" based on journalistic investigations. --- **Shift in rhetoric after February 24, 2022** Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced the party to adjust its position: - Le Pen **condemned the invasion** (although she avoided calling Putin an aggressor). - The party **supported the supply of French weapons to Ukraine** (RN leader Jordan Bardella stated: "I want Ukraine to have ammunition and equipment so it can hold out"). - However, the RN **abstained** during the vote on the National Assembly resolution in support of Ukraine (March 1, 2022). - The party continues to oppose **Ukraine's accession to NATO**, **escalation**, and favors a **diplomatic settlement** on terms favorable to Russia. - Le Pen stated: "If Russia wins the war, it is a catastrophe, but if Ukraine wins, it is the beginning of World War III." --- **Conclusion** Marine Le Pen's National Rally **is a pro-Russian party** in the sense that: - it has promoted Kremlin narratives for decades, - it received financial support from Russia, - it opposed sanctions and NATO, - it supported the annexation of Crimea and the federalization of Ukraine. After 2022, the party **partially distanced itself** from the most toxic aspects of the pro-Russian agenda, but its **ideological foundation** (euroskepticism, anti-Americanism, skepticism toward NATO, sympathy for Russia's "conservative values") remains unchanged. Therefore, most experts and French special services continue to characterize the RN as a **pro-Russian force**, albeit with caveats regarding its tactical adaptation to a new reality. **Original text** **Коротко:** Да, французское «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, RN; до 2018 г. – «Национальный фронт») Марин Ле Пен на протяжении многих лет последовательно занимало пророссийские позиции и имело тесные связи с Кремлём. После полномасштабного вторжения РФ в Украину в 2022 году риторика партии стала более сдержанной, однако её фундаментальная пророссийская ориентация сохраняется. --- **Основные факты, подтверждающие пророссийский характер партии** **1. Финансовая зависимость от России** - **Кредит 2014 года:** Через полгода после аннексии Крыма партия получила **9,4 млн евро** от First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB) – московского банка, близкого к Кремлю. Кредит был оформлен на условиях, недоступных на западном рынке. - **Связь с оборонным сектором РФ:** После банкротства FCRB долг был выкуплен российской компанией «Авиазапчасть», связанной с военно-промышленным комплексом России. По состоянию на 2025 год кредит остаётся не полностью погашенным. - **Дополнительные транши:** Расследования (Mediapart, Washington Post) выявили, что в 2014–2017 гг. партия получала и другие неофициальные финансовые вливания от структур, аффилированных с Кремлём. **2. Политическая и идеологическая поддержка Кремля** - **Аннексия Крыма (2014):** Марин Ле Пен публично назвала аннексию «легитимной» и заявила, что «крымский референдум отражает волю народа». Парламентская комиссия Франции (2023) зафиксировала, что заявления Ле Пен «слово в слово повторяли официальные формулировки путинского режима». - **Война на Донбассе:** Депутаты партии ездили на оккупированные территории Донбасса, «наблюдали» за незаконными выборами и распространяли российские нарративы. - **Санкции:** Партия последовательно выступала против санкций ЕС в отношении России, называя их «контрпродуктивными» и «вредными для французской экономики». - **НАТО:** Ле Пен неоднократно призывала к выходу Франции из объединённого командования НАТО и называла альянс «провокатором». - **Медийная поддержка:** Во время президентской кампании 2017 года российские государственные каналы RT France и Sputnik освещали Ле Пен в 4 раза более позитивно, чем её соперников. **3. Личные контакты с руководством РФ** - **Встречи с Путиным:** В марте 2017 года, за месяц до президентских выборов, Ле Пен была принята в Кремле Владимиром Путиным. Встреча длилась 1,5 часа – исключительный жест для кандидата в президенты другой страны. - **Контакты с высокопоставленными чиновниками:** Ле Пен неоднократно встречалась со спикером Госдумы Сергеем Нарышкиным (в 2013, 2014 гг.) и другими представителями российской власти. - **Посредники:** Связь с Кремлём поддерживалась через советника Путина Александра Бабакова, который курировал «сотрудничество с российскими организациями за рубежом». **4. Выводы французских расследований** - **Парламентская комиссия (июнь 2023):** Приняла доклад, в котором «Национальное объединение» названо **«трансмиссионным ремнём России»** и **«рупором Москвы»**. Комиссия установила, что партия «перешла на российские формулировки» и «превратилась в инструмент влияния Кремля». - **Доклад DGSI (французская контрразведка, 2019):** Спецслужба предупреждала о рисках российского влияния через партию, отмечая, что её представители «распространяют антиевропейские и антинатовские нарративы, представляя Россию гарантом консервативных ценностей». - **Обращение в прокуратуру (2023):** «Радикальная левая партия» Франции подала заявление о возможных связях RN с «разведкой иностранного государства» и «коррупции» на основании журналистских расследований. --- **Зміна риторики после 24 февраля 2022 года** Полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину вынудило партию скорректировать позицию: - Ле Пен **осудила вторжение** (хотя избегала называть Путина агрессором). - Партия **поддержала поставки французского оружия Украине** (лидер RN Жордан Барделла заявил: «Я хочу, чтобы у Украины были боеприпасы и техника, чтобы она могла выстоять»). - Однако RN **воздержалась** при голосовании за резолюцию Национальной ассамблеи в поддержку Украины (1 марта 2022). - Партия продолжает выступать против **вступления Украины в НАТО**, против **эскалации** и за **дипломатическое урегулирование** на условиях, выгодных России. - Ле Пен заявляла: «Если Россия выиграет войну – это катастрофа, но если Украина победит – это начало Третьей мировой войны». --- **Висновок** «Национальное объединение» Марин Ле Пен **является пророссийской партией** в том смысле, что: - она десятилетиями продвигала нарративы Кремля, - получала от России финансовую поддержку, - выступала против санкций и НАТО, - поддерживала аннексию Крыма и федерализацию Украины. После 2022 года партия **частично дистанцировалась** от наиболее токсичных аспектов пророссийской повестки, но её **идеологическая основа** (евроскептицизм, антиамериканизм, скепсис к НАТО, симпатия к «консервативным ценностям» России) остаётся неизменной. Поэтому большинство экспертов и французских спецслужб продолжают характеризовать RN как **пророссийскую силу**, хотя и с оговорками о её тактической адаптации к новой реальности. #### Ukrainian — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* **English translation** **Briefly:** Yes, Marine Le Pen's French "National Rally" (Rassemblement National, RN, until 2018 known as the "National Front") is traditionally considered a pro-Russian party. Although after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the party's rhetoric became more cautious, its long-standing position, financial dependence on Moscow, and concrete actions provide grounds for such a conclusion. Below are the key facts that confirm the pro-Russian orientation of the RN. --- **1. Ideological and Political Proximity** - **Since 2011**, when Marine Le Pen took over the party, ties with Russia became the official line. She has repeatedly stated that she "admires Putin" and promoted the concept of a "multipolar world," which coincides with the Kremlin's. - **In 2014**, the party was the only one in France to support the annexation of Crimea, calling it a "reunification" and repeating the formulations of the Russian authorities verbatim. - **In 2017**, Marine Le Pen visited Moscow, where she was received by Vladimir Putin (a month before the first round of the French presidential election). This was an unprecedented gesture on the part of the Kremlin. **2. Financial Dependence on Russia** - **In September 2014** (six months after the annexation of Crimea), the "National Front" received a loan of **€9.4 million** from the First Czech-Russian Bank, which was controlled by structures close to Putin. - After this bank went bankrupt, the debt was transferred to the Russian company "Aviazapchast," associated with the Russian defense sector. As of 2025, the loan **has not been repaid**. - Journalistic investigations (Mediapart, Washington Post) indicate that the loan was effectively payment for loyalty: the party received money in exchange for promoting Russian narratives. **3. Position on Ukraine and Sanctions** - **Before 2022**, the RN consistently opposed EU sanctions against Russia, demanded their lifting, and insisted on a "strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia." - **After February 24, 2022**, the party condemned the invasion, but: - refused to call Putin a "war criminal"; - opposed the supply of weapons to Ukraine that could "provoke a larger-scale war"; - criticized sanctions that "destroy the French economy"; - voted against or abstained on resolutions supporting Ukraine. - **In 2024**, party leader Jordan Bardella stated that Ukraine must have the ability to defend itself, while simultaneously emphasizing that France must not get dragged into the war. **4. Official Conclusions of the French Parliament** - **In June 2023**, the investigative commission of the French National Assembly (created at the initiative of the RN itself) published a report describing the party as **a "transmission belt" (courroie de transmission) of Russia**. - The report noted that the RN's statements on Crimea "word for word repeated the official formulations of the Putin regime," and Marine Le Pen herself was characterized as "dishonest and politicized." - The commission confirmed that the party's contacts with Russia accelerated after Marine Le Pen came to leadership. **5. Behavior After 2022: "Double Discourse"** - After the invasion, the RN attempted to distance itself from the Kremlin: it removed photos of the handshake with Putin from campaign materials and condemned the war. - However, **fundamental positions have not changed**: - the party still considers Crimea to be Russian; - advocates for France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command; - its MEPs (Thierry Mariani and others) regularly appear in Russian media and criticize sanctions. - Polls show that RN voters are several times more likely than other French citizens to blame NATO for the war and consider Putin a "defender of traditional values." --- **Conclusion** Marine Le Pen's "National Rally" **is a pro-Russian party** based on a combination of factors: - ideological and rhetorical support for the Kremlin; - financial dependence on Russian loans; - consistent opposition to sanctions and military aid to Ukraine; - the official conclusion of the French parliament regarding its role as Russia's "transmission belt." After 2022, the party **partially adjusted its rhetoric**, but did not change its strategic orientation. Therefore, most experts, journalists, and political opponents continue to characterize the RN as a pro-Russian force. **Original text** **Коротко:** Да, французское «Національне об'єднанне» (Rassemblement National, RN, до 2018 р. – «Національний фронт») Марин Ле Пен традиционно вважається проросійською партією. Хотя после повномасштабного вторжения РФ в Украину в 2022 году риторика партии стала осторожнее, её многолетняя позиция, финансовая зависимость от Москвы и конкретные действия дают основания для такого вывода. Ниже – ключевые факты, которые подтверждают пророссийскую ориентацию RN. --- **1. Ідеологическая и политическая близость** - **С 2011 года**, когда Марин Ле Пен возглавила партию, связи с Россией стали официальной линией. Она неоднократно заявляла, что «восхищается Путиным», и продвигала концепцию «многополярного мира», совпадающую с кремлёвской. - **В 2014 году** партия единственной во Франции поддержала аннексию Крыма, назвав её «воссоединением» и повторяя дословно формулировки российских властей. - **В 2017 году** Марин Ле Пен посетила Москву, где её принял Владимир Путин (за месяц до первого тура президентских выборов во Франции). Это был беспрецедентный жест со стороны Кремля. **2. Финансовая зависимость от России** - **В сентябре 2014 года** (через полгода после аннексии Крыма) «Национальный фронт» получил кредит на **9,4 млн евро** от Первого чешско-российского банка (First Czech-Russian Bank), который контролировался структурами, близкими к Путину. - После банкротства этого банка долг перешёл к российской компании «Авиазапчасть», связанной с оборонным сектором РФ. По состоянию на 2025 год кредит **не погашен**. - Журналистские расследования (Mediapart, Washington Post) указывают, что кредит был фактически платой за лояльность: партия получала деньги в обмен на продвижение российских нарративов. **3. Позиция по Украине и санкциям** - **До 2022 года** RN последовательно выступала против санкций ЕС в отношении России, требовала снять их и настаивала на «стратегическом сближении НАТО и России». - **После 24 февраля 2022** партия осудила вторжение, но: - отказывалась называть Путина «военным преступником»; - выступала против поставок Украине оружия, которое могло бы «спровоцировать более масштабную войну»; - критиковала санкции, которые «разрушают французскую экономику»; - голосовала против или воздерживалась при принятии резолюций в поддержку Украины. - **В 2024 году** лидер партии Жордан Барделла заявил, что Украина должна иметь возможность защищаться, но одновременно подчеркнул, что Франция не должна втягиваться в войну. **4. Официальные выводы французского парламента** - **В июне 2023 года** следственная комиссия Национального собрания Франции (созданная по инициативе самого RN) опубликовала доклад, в котором партия была названа **«трансмиссионным ремнём» (courroie de transmission) России**. - В докладе отмечалось, что заявления RN по Крыму «слово в слово повторяли официальные формулировки путинского режима», а сама Марин Ле Пен была охарактеризована как «нечестная и политизированная». - Комиссия подтвердила, что контакты партии с Россией ускорились после прихода Марин Ле Пен к руководству. **5. Поведение после 2022 года: «двойной дискурс»** - После вторжения RN попыталась дистанцироваться от Кремля: убрала из агитматериалов фото рукопожатия с Путиным, осудила войну. - Однако **фундаментальные позиции не изменились**: - партия по-прежнему считает Крым российским; - выступает за выход Франции из объединённого командования НАТО; - её депутаты в Европарламенте (Тьерри Мариани и др.) регулярно появляются в российских СМИ и критикуют санкции. - Опросы показывают, что избиратели RN в несколько раз чаще других французов обвиняют НАТО в войне и считают Путина «защитником традиционных ценностей». --- **Вывод** «Національне об'єднанне» Марин Ле Пен **является пророссийской партией** по совокупности признаков: - идеологическая и риторическая поддержка Кремля; - финансовая зависимость от российских кредитов; - последовательное противодействие санкциям и военной помощи Украине; - официальное заключение французского парламента о роли «трансмиссионного ремня» России. После 2022 года партия **частично скорректировала риторику**, но не изменила стратегических ориентиров. Поэтому большинство экспертов, журналистов и политических оппонентов продолжают характеризовать RN как пророссийскую силу. ### Gemini 3.8 Flash Repeated check: one answer round only. The report shows answer round 1. #### English — answer round 1 *Web access: Available; no search recorded* **English translation** Whether France’s **National Rally** (*Rassemblement National*, or RN) is a "pro-Russian" party is a subject of significant political debate. While the party strongly rejects the label today, describing its foreign policy as strictly independent and "Gaullist," critics, political scientists, and a French parliamentary inquiry argue that it has a documented history of financial, ideological, and diplomatic alignment with Moscow. The relationship between the National Rally and Russia is shaped by several key factors: --- **1. Arguments and Evidence Supporting the "Pro-Russian" Label** Critics, political opponents, and intelligence observers frequently point to several historical facts and policy positions: - **The 2014 Russian Loan:** In 2014, the party (then called the *Front National*) secured a €9.4 million loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank, a lender with ties to the Kremlin, after French banks refused to finance the party. Critics argued this created a financial dependency and political debt to Moscow. (The loan was fully repaid in late 2023). - **The 2017 Kremlin Meeting:** In March 2017, just weeks before the French presidential election, Marine Le Pen traveled to Moscow and was granted a high-profile, televised audience with Vladimir Putin. She praised Putin’s defense of "traditional values" and national sovereignty. - **Stance on Crimea and Sanctions (2014–2021):** Le Pen publicly accepted Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, stating that the peninsula had historically been Russian and that the referendum was legitimate. RN lawmakers routinely voted against European Union sanctions on Russia and called for them to be lifted, arguing they hurt French farmers and businesses. - **Ideological Alignment:** Historically, the RN and the Kremlin shared common ground: opposition to United States dominance, skepticism toward the European Union, hostility toward NATO, and a shared emphasis on conservative, traditional social values over Western liberalism. - **2023 French Parliamentary Inquiry:** A commission of inquiry in the French National Assembly investigated foreign interference in French politics. Its final report concluded that the National Rally had historically operated as a "transmission belt" (or megaphone) for Kremlin talking points and Russian geopolitical interests in France. --- **2. The Shift and Current Position (Post-2022)** Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the National Rally significantly adjusted its public posture, recognizing that open sympathy for Putin had become politically toxic: - **Condemnation of the Invasion:** Marine Le Pen and party president Jordan Bardella immediately and unequivocally condemned the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, calling it an unacceptable violation of international law and state sovereignty. - **Support for Humanitarian and Defensive Aid:** The party has supported humanitarian assistance and non-offensive aid to Ukraine, as well as certain defensive weapons. - **"Red Lines" on Escalation:** The party opposes measures it claims could turn France into a "co-belligerent" or risk nuclear escalation. Specifically, RN opposes: - Supplying Ukraine with long-range strike missiles that could hit Russian territory. - Sending French military instructors or combat troops to Ukraine. - Fast-tracking Ukraine’s accession to the European Union or NATO. - Sanctions on Russian energy imports that could raise the cost of living for French households. - **Jordan Bardella’s Posture:** Leading up to the 2024 European and French parliamentary elections, Bardella adopted a noticeably firmer tone than Le Pen had in earlier years, explicitly stating that he would not allow Russian imperialism to absorb Ukraine, while maintaining the party’s red lines against escalation. --- **3. How the National Rally Defines Itself** The party strongly denies being pro-Russian, instead characterizing its foreign policy as: - **"Gaullist" Non-Alignment:** The RN claims to follow the tradition of Charles de Gaulle—advocating strategic autonomy from both the United States and Russia, rather than automatic alignment with Washington or Brussels. - **Pacifist and Diplomatic:** The party argues that its reluctance to send certain heavy weapons is not driven by sympathy for Russia, but by a desire to prevent a wider European war and to eventually broker a negotiated peace. - **France-First (*La France d'abord*):** RN insists that its opposition to specific sanctions or agricultural imports from Ukraine is motivated purely by the protection of French consumers and farmers. --- **Conclusion** - **Historically:** The party maintained deep ideological affinities, high-level diplomatic ties, and financial connections with Moscow, consistently advocating positions that aligned with Russian foreign policy objectives. - **Today:** The party has distanced itself from Vladimir Putin and officially condemned Russian aggression. However, because it continues to oppose deeper military integration, NATO expansion, and the provision of long-range weapons to Ukraine, critics continue to view its foreign policy as objectively favorable to Moscow's strategic interests. **Original text** Whether France’s **National Rally** (*Rassemblement National*, or RN) is a "pro-Russian" party is a subject of significant political debate. While the party strongly rejects the label today, describing its foreign policy as strictly independent and "Gaullist," critics, political scientists, and a French parliamentary inquiry argue that it has a documented history of financial, ideological, and diplomatic alignment with Moscow. The relationship between the National Rally and Russia is shaped by several key factors: --- **1. Arguments and Evidence Supporting the "Pro-Russian" Label** Critics, political opponents, and intelligence observers frequently point to several historical facts and policy positions: - **The 2014 Russian Loan:** In 2014, the party (then called the *Front National*) secured a €9.4 million loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank, a lender with ties to the Kremlin, after French banks refused to finance the party. Critics argued this created a financial dependency and political debt to Moscow. (The loan was fully repaid in late 2023). - **The 2017 Kremlin Meeting:** In March 2017, just weeks before the French presidential election, Marine Le Pen traveled to Moscow and was granted a high-profile, televised audience with Vladimir Putin. She praised Putin’s defense of "traditional values" and national sovereignty. - **Stance on Crimea and Sanctions (2014–2021):** Le Pen publicly accepted Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, stating that the peninsula had historically been Russian and that the referendum was legitimate. RN lawmakers routinely voted against European Union sanctions on Russia and called for them to be lifted, arguing they hurt French farmers and businesses. - **Ideological Alignment:** Historically, the RN and the Kremlin shared common ground: opposition to United States dominance, skepticism toward the European Union, hostility toward NATO, and a shared emphasis on conservative, traditional social values over Western liberalism. - **2023 French Parliamentary Inquiry:** A commission of inquiry in the French National Assembly investigated foreign interference in French politics. Its final report concluded that the National Rally had historically operated as a "transmission belt" (or megaphone) for Kremlin talking points and Russian geopolitical interests in France. --- **2. The Shift and Current Position (Post-2022)** Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the National Rally significantly adjusted its public posture, recognizing that open sympathy for Putin had become politically toxic: - **Condemnation of the Invasion:** Marine Le Pen and party president Jordan Bardella immediately and unequivocally condemned the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, calling it an unacceptable violation of international law and state sovereignty. - **Support for Humanitarian and Defensive Aid:** The party has supported humanitarian assistance and non-offensive aid to Ukraine, as well as certain defensive weapons. - **"Red Lines" on Escalation:** The party opposes measures it claims could turn France into a "co-belligerent" or risk nuclear escalation. Specifically, RN opposes: - Supplying Ukraine with long-range strike missiles that could hit Russian territory. - Sending French military instructors or combat troops to Ukraine. - Fast-tracking Ukraine’s accession to the European Union or NATO. - Sanctions on Russian energy imports that could raise the cost of living for French households. - **Jordan Bardella’s Posture:** Leading up to the 2024 European and French parliamentary elections, Bardella adopted a noticeably firmer tone than Le Pen had in earlier years, explicitly stating that he would not allow Russian imperialism to absorb Ukraine, while maintaining the party’s red lines against escalation. --- **3. How the National Rally Defines Itself** The party strongly denies being pro-Russian, instead characterizing its foreign policy as: - **"Gaullist" Non-Alignment:** The RN claims to follow the tradition of Charles de Gaulle—advocating strategic autonomy from both the United States and Russia, rather than automatic alignment with Washington or Brussels. - **Pacifist and Diplomatic:** The party argues that its reluctance to send certain heavy weapons is not driven by sympathy for Russia, but by a desire to prevent a wider European war and to eventually broker a negotiated peace. - **France-First (*La France d'abord*):** RN insists that its opposition to specific sanctions or agricultural imports from Ukraine is motivated purely by the protection of French consumers and farmers. --- **Conclusion** - **Historically:** The party maintained deep ideological affinities, high-level diplomatic ties, and financial connections with Moscow, consistently advocating positions that aligned with Russian foreign policy objectives. - **Today:** The party has distanced itself from Vladimir Putin and officially condemned Russian aggression. However, because it continues to oppose deeper military integration, NATO expansion, and the provision of long-range weapons to Ukraine, critics continue to view its foreign policy as objectively favorable to Moscow's strategic interests. #### French — answer round 1 *Web access: Available; no search recorded* **English translation** The qualification of the National Rally (RN) as a "pro-Russian" party is the subject of fierce political debate in France. While its political opponents, observers, and a parliamentary report regularly describe it as complacent or aligned with Moscow's interests, the party formally rejects this label and claims a sovereignist and non-aligned posture. --- **1. The elements that fuel the accusation of closeness to Russia** Several significant events and past stances have fueled the image of a party close to the Kremlin: - **The 2014 bank loan:** In 2014, the National Front (which became the RN) took out a loan of more than 9 million euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB), an institution linked to the Russian government. This loan, paid off in the autumn of 2023, was long perceived by its detractors as proof of financial dependence on Moscow. - **The Le Pen - Putin meeting (2017):** In March 2017, a few weeks before the first round of the French presidential election, Marine Le Pen was received in a private audience by Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin, which was interpreted as official support from Moscow for her candidacy. - **Stances on Crimea and sanctions:** After the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, Marine Le Pen stated several times that this annexation was not illegal and that Crimea was "historically Russian." The party also voted or campaigned against most of the economic sanctions imposed on Moscow between 2014 and 2021. - **Ideological proximity:** Historically, the RN shared with the Russian government a common criticism of American hegemony, the European Union, and Atlanticism (NATO), as well as a defense of conservative values and national sovereignty against globalism. - **The 2023 parliamentary report:** In June 2023, the National Assembly's commission of inquiry into foreign interference (rapporteur: Jean-Noël Barrot) concluded that the RN had served as a "transmission belt" for Moscow's narrative in France, pointing to a repeated ideological "alignment." --- **2. Evolution and positions since the invasion of Ukraine (2022)** Since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the RN has significantly altered its public discourse to adapt to international disapproval and international law: - **Condemnation of the aggression:** Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella unambiguously condemned the invasion of Ukraine as early as February 24, 2022, describing it as a "flagrant violation of territorial sovereignty" and international law. - **Conditioned support for Ukraine:** The RN supports humanitarian aid, financial assistance, and the supply of defensive military equipment to Kyiv. - **Setting "red lines":** Conversely, the party firmly opposes the deployment of French troops on the ground and the delivery of long-range missiles capable of striking Russian territory, arguing that this would pose a risk of "co-belligerence" and escalation toward a global conflict. - **Opposition to certain sanctions:** The RN criticizes economic sanctions affecting the energy sector (such as embargoes on Russian gas or oil), claiming that they penalize the purchasing power of French citizens and European businesses more than the Russian economy. --- **3. The National Rally's defense** Faced with these accusations, the party highlights several arguments: - **A sovereignist doctrine ("neither Washington nor Moscow"):** The RN asserts that it is part of a Gaullist tradition of French independence, refusing any blind alignment with the United States or Russia. - **The justification for the bank loan:** Marine Le Pen has always maintained that she had to borrow from Russia out of necessity, as all French and European banks had refused to lend money to her political movement. - **The rejection of vassalage:** The party points out that its deputies in the National Assembly and the European Parliament have voted for several resolutions condemning Russia's actions and supporting the Ukrainian people. --- **In summary** While the National Rally has broken with its explicit support for Vladimir Putin since the outbreak of the war in 2022 and has condemned the invasion of Ukraine, **its past record (financing, statements on Crimea, visit to the Kremlin) and its distrust of massive military engagement alongside Kyiv continue to earn it the qualification of a pro-Russian party or one indulgent toward Moscow by its adversaries and numerous analysts.** For its part, the RN rejects this label and defines itself as strictly "pro-French." **Original text** La qualification du Rassemblement National (RN) comme parti « pro-russe » fait l’objet de vifs débats politiques en France. Si ses opposants politiques, des observateurs et un rapport parlementaire le décrivent régulièrement comme complaisant ou aligné sur les intérêts de Moscou, le parti récuse formellement ce qualificatif et revendique une posture souverainiste et non alignée. --- **1. Les éléments qui nourrissent l’accusation de proximité avec la Russie** Plusieurs faits marquants et prises de position passées ont alimenté l'image d'un parti proche du Kremlin : - **Le prêt bancaire de 2014 :** En 2014, le Front National (devenu RN) a contracté un emprunt de plus de 9 millions d’euros auprès de la Première banque tchéco-russe (FCRB), un établissement lié au pouvoir russe. Ce prêt, soldé à l'automne 2023, a longtemps été perçu par ses détracteurs comme une preuve de dépendance financière vis-à-vis de Moscou. - **La rencontre Le Pen - Poutine (2017) :** En mars 2017, à quelques semaines du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle française, Marine Le Pen a été reçue en audience privée par Vladimir Poutine au Kremlin, ce qui a été interprété comme un soutien officiel de Moscou à sa candidature. - **Les positions sur la Crimée et les sanctions :** Après l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014, Marine Le Pen a plusieurs fois déclaré que cette annexion n'était pas illégale et que la Crimée était « historiquement russe ». Le parti a également voté ou milité contre la plupart des sanctions économiques imposées à Moscou entre 2014 et 2021. - **La proximité idéologique :** Historiquement, le RN partageait avec le pouvoir russe une critique commune de l'hégémonie américaine, de l'Union européenne, de l'atlantisme (l'OTAN), ainsi qu'une défense des valeurs conservatrices et de la souveraineté nationale face au mondialisme. - **Le rapport parlementaire de 2023 :** En juin 2023, la commission d’enquête de l’Assemblée nationale sur les ingérences étrangères (rapporteur : Jean-Noël Barrot) a conclu que le RN avait servi de « courroie de transmission » du discours de Moscou en France, pointant un « alignement » idéologique répété. --- **2. L'évolution et les positions depuis l'invasion de l'Ukraine (2022)** Depuis l'invasion à grande échelle de l'Ukraine en février 2022, le RN a sensiblement modifié son discours public pour s'adapter à la réprobation internationale et au droit international : - **Condamnation de l'agression :** Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella ont condamné sans ambiguïté l’invasion de l’Ukraine dès le 24 février 2022, la qualifiant de « violation flagrante de la souveraineté territoriale » et du droit international. - **Soutien conditionné à l'Ukraine :** Le RN soutient l'aide humanitaire, financière et la fourniture de matériel militaire à visée défensive à Kiev. - **Fixation de « lignes rouges » :** Le parti s’oppose en revanche fermement à l'envoi de troupes françaises au sol et à la livraison de missiles à longue portée capables de frapper le territoire russe, arguant qu'il s'agirait d'un risque de « cobelligérance » et d'escalade vers un conflit mondial. - **Opposition à certaines sanctions :** Le RN critique les sanctions économiques touchant le secteur de l'énergie (comme les embargos sur le gaz ou le pétrole russes), affirmant qu'elles pénalisent davantage le pouvoir d'achat des Français et les entreprises européennes que l'économie russe. --- **3. La défense du Rassemblement National** Face à ces accusations, le parti met en avant plusieurs arguments : - **Une doctrine souverainiste (« ni Washington, ni Moscou ») :** Le RN affirme s'inscrire dans une tradition gaulliste d'indépendance de la France, refusant tout alignement aveugle sur les États-Unis ou sur la Russie. - **La justification du prêt bancaire :** Marine Le Pen a toujours soutenu qu'elle avait dû emprunter en Russie par obligation, toutes les banques françaises et européennes ayant refusé de prêter de l'argent à son mouvement politique. - **Le rejet de la vassalité :** Le parti rappelle que ses députés ont voté à l'Assemblée nationale et au Parlement européen plusieurs résolutions condamnant les agissements de la Russie et soutenant le peuple ukrainien. --- **En résumé** Si le Rassemblement National a rompu avec son soutien explicite à Vladimir Poutine depuis le déclenchement de la guerre en 2022 et a condamné l'invasion de l'Ukraine, **son passif (financement, déclarations sur la Crimée, visite au Kremlin) et sa méfiance vis-à-vis d'un engagement militaire massif aux côtés de Kiev continuent de lui valoir d'être qualifié de parti pro-russe ou indulgent envers Moscou par ses adversaires et de nombreux analystes.** De son côté, le RN rejette cette étiquette et se définit comme strictement « pro-français ». #### Russian — answer round 1 *Web access: Available; no search recorded* **English translation** Defining the French party "National Rally" (RN, formerly the "National Front") as "pro-Russian" is a subject of sharp political debate. Political opponents and many Western analysts often call the party pro-Russian, relying on its history, financial ties, and stance on sanctions. At the same time, the party's leadership itself—Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella—categorically rejects this label, positioning their line as "pro-French" and "Gaullist" (aimed at sovereignty and a balance of power). --- **Arguments in favor of the party being considered pro-Russian** **History of close contacts and visits:** 1. Prior to 2022, Marine Le Pen repeatedly visited Moscow, met with high-ranking Russian officials and State Duma deputies, and in March 2017 (shortly before the French presidential election), held a personal meeting with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. **Financial ties:** 1. In 2014, the party took out a loan of 9.4 million euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank. For a long time, this fact served as the main proof for critics of the party's dependence on Moscow. Representatives of the RN stated that they turned to the Russian bank only because French and European banks refused to lend to the party. The debt was finally paid off in 2023. **Stance on Crimea and Ukraine before 2022:** 1. Marine Le Pen stated that she considers the reunification of Crimea with Russia to be a fait accompli and a legitimate fact, citing the historical context and the 2014 referendum. **Skepticism towards sanctions and NATO:** 1. For years, the party criticized the EU's sanctions policy against Russia, considering it ineffective and damaging to France's own economy (in particular, agriculture and energy). In addition, the party's program long included a point on France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command. **Conclusions of parliamentary investigations:** 1. In June 2023, an investigative commission of the French National Assembly published a report on foreign interference, in which it called the "National Rally" party a "conduit" for Russian rhetoric and influence in France. The party called this report politically motivated slander. --- **Arguments against and the evolution of the position after 2022** Following the start of full-scale hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022, the party's rhetoric underwent significant changes: **Condemnation of Russia's actions:** 1. Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella unambiguously condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, calling it a gross violation of international law, Ukraine's sovereignty, and the country's territorial integrity. **Support for Ukraine and refugees:** 1. The party supported the reception of Ukrainian refugees in France and voted in favor of providing Ukraine with defensive weaponry and financial aid. **"Pro-French" self-identification:** 1. The party's leaders claim that their policy is inspired by General Charles de Gaulle: France must be a sovereign third force that does not blindly follow the US course. **Original text** Определение французской партии «Национальное объединение» (RN, бывший «Национальный фронт») как «пророссийской» является предметом острых политических дебатов. Политические оппоненты и многие западные аналитики часто называют партию пророссийской, опираясь на её историю, финансовые связи и позицию по санкциям. В то же время само руководство партии — Марин Ле Пен и Жордан Барделла — этот ярлык категорически отвергает, позиционируя свою линию как «профранцузскую» и «голлистскую» (направленную на суверенитет и баланс сил). --- **Аргументы в пользу того, что партию считают пророссийской** **История тесных контактов и визитов:** 1. До 2022 года Марин Ле Пен неоднократно посещала Москву, встречалась с высокопоставленными российскими чиновниками и депутатами Госдумы, а в марте 2017 года (незадолго до президентских выборов во Франции) провела личную встречу с Владимиром Путиным в Кремле. **Финансовые связи:** 1. В 2014 году партия взяла кредит в размере 9,4 млн евро в Первом Чешско-Российском банке. Этот факт долгое время служил для критиков главным доказательством зависимости партии от Москвы. Представители RN заявляли, что обратились к российскому банку только потому, что французские и европейские банки отказались кредитовать партию. Окончательно долг был выплачен в 2023 году. **Позиция по Крыму и Украине до 2022 года:** 1. Марин Ле Пен заявляла, что считает воссоединение Крыма с Россией свершившимся и легитимным фактом, ссылаясь на исторический контекст и референдум 2014 года. **Скепсис по отношению к санкциям и НАТО:** 1. Партия годами критиковала санкционную политику ЕС против России, считая её неэффективной и бьющей по экономике самой Франции (в частности, по сельскому хозяйству и энергетике). Кроме того, программа партии долгое время включала пункт о выходе Франции из объединенного военного командования НАТО. **Выводы парламентских расследований:** 1. В июне 2023 года следственная комиссия Национальной ассамблеи Франции опубликовала доклад об иностранном вмешательстве, в котором назвала партию «Национальное объединение» «передаточным звеном» российской риторики и влияния во Франции. Партия назвала этот доклад политически мотивированной клеветой. --- **Аргументы против и эволюция позиции после 2022 года** После начала полномасштабных боевых действий в Украине в феврале 2022 года риторика партии претерпела существенные изменения: **Осуждение действий России:** 1. Марин Ле Пен и Жордан Барделла недвусмысленно осудили вторжение России в Украину, назвав его грубым нарушением международного права, суверенитета Украины и территориальной целостности страны. **Поддержка Украины и беженцев:** 1. Партия поддержала прием украинских беженцев во Франции и проголосовала за предоставление Украине оборонительного вооружения и финансовой помощи. **«Профранцузская» самоидентификация:** 1. Лидеры партии утверждают, что их политика вдохновлена генералом Шарлем де Голлем: Франция должна быть суверенной третьей силой, не следующей слепо за курсом США #### Ukrainian — answer round 1 *Web access: Available; no search recorded* **English translation** The answer to this question has two dimensions: **the official position of the party itself** (which tries to distance itself from this label) and **the actual activity, voting record, and history of ties**, through which political scientists, investigative journalists, and the French parliament view the National Rally (RN) as a force acting in Moscow's interests. Below is a detailed overview of why Marine Le Pen's party is considered pro-Russian and how its position has evolved. --- **1. Facts Indicating a Pro-Russian Orientation** **Financial dependence on the Russian Federation:** In 2014, the party took out a 9.4 million euro loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank, which is linked to the Kremlin. The party only finished paying off this debt in the autumn of 2023. In addition, another foundation associated with Marine Le Pen's father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, also received Russian loans. **Support for the annexation of Crimea and visits to Moscow:** Marine Le Pen has repeatedly stated publicly that she considers Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea "legitimate," arguing this based on a pseudo-referendum. In March 2017, a month before the French presidential election, she visited Moscow and personally met with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. **Conclusion of the French Parliamentary Commission (2023):** In June 2023, the French National Assembly published an investigative report on foreign interference. In it, the National Rally was explicitly described as **a "transmission belt" (*courroie de transmission*) for broadcasting Russian influence and Kremlin narratives in France**. **Ideological affinity:** For years, the party has opposed "US hegemony," called for France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, criticized the European Union, and promoted the concept of a "greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok," which envisioned a strategic alliance with Moscow. --- **2. Change in Rhetoric After the Full-Scale Invasion (2022)** After February 24, 2022, the party—led by Marine Le Pen and the current party president Jordan Bardella—was forced to adjust its rhetoric as part of its strategy of normalization (*dédiabolisation*): - They **condemned** the direct military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the violation of international law. - They declared support for Ukraine's sovereignty and the provision of humanitarian aid. - During the 2024 parliamentary elections, Bardella emphasized that he would not allow Russia to conquer Ukraine, recognizing the Russian Federation as a threat to European security. --- **3. Realpolitik and Voting Record on Ukraine** Despite verbal condemnations of the aggression, in practice the party's voting record and programmatic statements remain advantageous to Moscow: - **Opposition to military assistance:** The RN systematically opposes providing Ukraine with long-range weapons (such as SCALP missiles), citing the risk of "escalation" and a direct clash with nuclear-armed Russia. - **Parliamentary votes:** RN deputies in the European Parliament and the National Assembly have repeatedly voted against or abstained during the adoption of resolutions on financial and military support for Ukraine, as well as the bilateral security agreement between France and Ukraine. - **Sanctions:** The party opposes energy sanctions against the Russian Federation, arguing that they harm the purchasing power of the French people through rising prices. - **NATO and the EU:** Le Pen and Bardella are categorically opposed to Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO, as well as to the deployment of any French military instructors to the territory of Ukraine. --- **Conclusion** Officially, the National Rally rejects the label of a "pro-Russian party," calling itself exclusively "pro-French" and "sovereignist." However, the combination of factors—**long-standing financial and political ties with the Kremlin, consistent sabotage of effective aid to Ukraine, resistance to anti-Russian sanctions, and the weakening of NATO**—gives the majority of analysts, political commentators, and international observers grounds to classify the RN as a party whose foreign policy line objectively plays into the interests of the Kremlin. **Original text** Відповідь на це запитання має дві площини: **офіційну позицію самої партії** (яка намагається дистанціюватися від цього ярлика) та **фактичну діяльність, голосування й історію зв'язків**, через які політологи, журналісти-розслідувачі та французький парламент розглядають «Національне об’єднання» (RN) як силу, що діє в інтересах Москви. Нижче наведено детальний огляд того, чому партію Марін Ле Пен вважають проросійською і як змінювалася її позиція. --- **1. Факти, що свідчать про проросійську орієнтацію** **Фінансова залежність від РФ:** У 2014 році партія взяла кредит у розмірі 9,4 мільйона євро в Першому чесько-російському банку (First Czech Russian Bank), пов’язаному з Кремлем. Виплату цього боргу партія закрила лише восени 2023 року. Крім того, інший фонд, пов’язаний із батьком Марін Ле Пен — Жаном-Марі Ле Пеном, також отримував російські позики. **Підтримка анексії Криму та візити до Москви:** Марін Ле Пен неодноразово публічно заявляла, що вважає анексію Криму Росією у 2014 році «законною», аргументуючи це псевдореферендумом. У березні 2017 року, за місяць до президентських виборів у Франції, вона відвідала Москву і особисто зустрілася з Володимиром Путіним у Кремлі. **Висновок парламентської комісії Франції (2023 рік):** У червні 2023 року Національна асамблея Франції опублікувала звіт розслідування щодо іноземного втручання. У ньому «Національне об'єднання» було прямо названо **«привідним пасом» (courroie de transmission) для трансляції російського впливу та кремлівських наративів у Франції**. **Ідеологічна спорідненість:** Роками партія виступала проти «гегемонії США», закликала до виходу Франції з об'єднаного військового командування НАТО, критикувала Європейський Союз і просувала концепцію «великої Європи від Лісабона до Владивостока», яка передбачала стратегічний союз із Москвою. --- **2. Зміна риторики після повномасштабного вторгнення (2022 рік)** Після 24 лютого 2022 року партія на чолі з Марін Ле Пен та чинним президентом партії Жорданом Барделла була змушена скоригувати риторику в межах своєї стратегії респектабелізації (*dédiabolisation*): - Вони **засудили** пряму військову агресію РФ проти України та порушення міжнародного права. - Заявили про підтримку суверенітету України та надання гуманітарної допомоги. - Барделла під час парламентських виборів 2024 року підкреслював, що не дозволить Росії захопити Україну, визнаючи РФ загрозою європейській безпеці. --- **3. Реальна політика та голосування щодо України** Попри засудження агресії на словах, на практиці голосування та програмні заяви партії залишаються вигідними Москві: - **Протидія військовій допомозі:** RN системно виступає проти надання Україні далекобійної зброї (наприклад, ракет SCALP), мотивуючи це ризиком «ескалації» та прямого зіткнення з ядерною Росією. - **Голосування в парламентах:** Депутати RN у Європарламенті та Національній асамблеї неодноразово голосували проти або утримувалися під час ухвалення резолюцій про фінансову та військову підтримку України, а також двосторонньої безпекової угоди між Францією та Україною. - **Санкції:** Партія виступає проти енергетичних санкцій щодо РФ, стверджуючи, що вони шкодять купівельній спроможності французів через зростання цін. - **НАТО та ЄС:** Ле Пен і Барделла категорично виступають проти вступу України до Євросоюзу та НАТО, а також проти відправлення будь-яких французьких військових інструкторів на територію України. --- **Висновок** Офіційно «Національне об'єднання» відкидає ярлик «проросійської партії», називаючи себе виключно «профранцузькою» та «сувереністською». Проте сукупність факторів — **багаторічні фінансові та політичні зв'язки з Кремлем, послідовне саботування дієвої допомоги Україні, опір антиросійським санкціям та послаблення НАТО** — дає підстави більшості аналітиків, політичних опонентів та міжнародних оглядачів класифікувати RN як партію, чия зовнішньополітична лінія об'єктивно підігрує інтересам Кремля. ### Mistral Medium 3.5 Repeated check: found in 3 of 3 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1. **Evidence used for the finding** - **Ukrainian, English translation:** “The National Rally is not an openly pro-Russian party in the classical sense, but it maintains a critical attitude toward support for Ukraine” **Approximate place in the original:** …увативши Кремль у втручанні у справи Франції та підкреслила, що не є «другом Путіна».telegraf.com.ua. **Висновок:** «Національне об'єднання» не є відкрито проросійською партією у класичному розумінні, але має критичне ставлення до підтримки України, виступає проти деяких аспектів співпраці з НАТО і… *(No number or name from the quote was found here. This may be a nearby sentence.)* - **French, English translation:** “the RN benefited from a 9-million-euro loan from a Czech-Russian bank to finance its 2017 presidential campaign” **Original passage:** …la Crimée en 2014. De plus, le RN a bénéficié d’un prêt de 9 millions d’euros d’une banque tchéco-russe pour financer sa campagne présidentielle de 2017, ce qui a alimenté les critiques sur une possible dépendance financière envers la Russie.bfmtv.com,la-croix.com,liberation.fr. Depuis le début de … #### English — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Has France's far-right National Rally really turned on Russia? - RFI](https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240626-has-france-s-far-right-national-rally-really-turned-on-russia) - [Russia cheers Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in French election – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-marine-le-pen-national-rally-french-election-2024-ukraine-sanctions-war/) - [Marine Le Pen promises French far right will rein in aid to Ukraine, slams soccer star Mbappé | CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/europe/france-le-pen-ukraine-mbappe-intl-cmd) - [French far right pulls manifesto that included controversial Russia, NATO plans – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-manifesto-russia-nato-national-rally/) **English translation** France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), the party of Marine Le Pen, has long been accused of having a pro-Russian stance, and there is substantial evidence supporting this characterization. The party has historical and financial ties to Russia: it received a €9 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014, which was only fully repaid in 2023. Marine Le Pen herself has visited Moscow multiple times and has expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin. The RN has consistently opposed EU sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and, in its 2022 presidential program, advocated for deepening diplomatic ties with Moscow and even sought an alliance with Russia on certain issues. The party also proposed that France leave NATO’s integrated military command, a position it has only recently toned down as it seeks to appear more moderate ahead of elections. However, in the lead-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections, the National Rally has attempted to soften its image, removing some of its most controversial Russia-related proposals from its manifesto and pledging not to escalate tensions with Russia or become a "co-belligerent" in the Ukraine conflict. Despite these shifts, the party has never voted in favor of a resolution supporting Ukraine or condemning Russian aggression in either the French or European parliaments. Russia has also openly expressed support for Le Pen’s party, further underscoring the historical alignment between the RN and Moscow. In summary, while the National Rally has recently tried to moderate its stance, its historical positions, financial ties, and ongoing voting record strongly suggest that it has been, and remains, a pro-Russian party. **Original text** France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), the party of Marine Le Pen, has long been accused of having a pro-Russian stance, and there is substantial evidence supporting this characterization. The party has historical and financial ties to Russia: it received a €9 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014, which was only fully repaid in 2023. Marine Le Pen herself has visited Moscow multiple times and has expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin. The RN has consistently opposed EU sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and, in its 2022 presidential program, advocated for deepening diplomatic ties with Moscow and even sought an alliance with Russia on certain issues. The party also proposed that France leave NATO’s integrated military command, a position it has only recently toned down as it seeks to appear more moderate ahead of elections. However, in the lead-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections, the National Rally has attempted to soften its image, removing some of its most controversial Russia-related proposals from its manifesto and pledging not to escalate tensions with Russia or become a "co-belligerent" in the Ukraine conflict. Despite these shifts, the party has never voted in favor of a resolution supporting Ukraine or condemning Russian aggression in either the French or European parliaments. Russia has also openly expressed support for Le Pen’s party, further underscoring the historical alignment between the RN and Moscow. In summary, while the National Rally has recently tried to moderate its stance, its historical positions, financial ties, and ongoing voting record strongly suggest that it has been, and remains, a pro-Russian party. #### English — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Has France's far-right National Rally really turned on Russia? - RFI](https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240626-has-france-s-far-right-national-rally-really-turned-on-russia) - [Russia cheers Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in French election – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-marine-le-pen-national-rally-french-election-2024-ukraine-sanctions-war/) - [Marine Le Pen promises French far right will rein in aid to Ukraine, slams soccer star Mbappé | CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/europe/france-le-pen-ukraine-mbappe-intl-cmd) - [French far right pulls manifesto that included controversial Russia, NATO plans – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-manifesto-russia-nato-national-rally/) **English translation** France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), the party of Marine Le Pen, has long been accused of having a pro-Russian stance, and there is substantial evidence supporting this characterization. The party has historical and financial ties to Russia: in 2014, RN took out a €9 million loan from a Russian bank, which was only fully repaid in 2023. Marine Le Pen herself has visited Moscow multiple times, expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, and in her 2022 presidential program, she advocated for deepening diplomatic ties with Russia and even sought "an alliance with Russia on certain issues" like European security. The party also opposed EU sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine and, until recently, called for France to leave NATO’s integrated military command. However, as the National Rally has sought to moderate its image and gain broader electoral appeal, especially ahead of the 2024 snap parliamentary elections, it has removed some of its most controversial positions from its public manifesto—including proposals to deepen ties with Russia and leave NATO’s integrated command. The party now claims a more balanced approach, pledging support for Ukraine but with clear limits, such as opposing the use of French-supplied long-range weapons to strike inside Russia and rejecting any French troop deployment to Ukraine. Despite these shifts, critics point out that the RN has never voted in favor of pro-Ukraine resolutions in the French or European parliaments, nor has it clearly condemned Russian aggression. In summary, while the National Rally has recently tried to soften its image, its historical ties to Russia, past policy positions, and ongoing reluctance to strongly condemn Russian actions or support Ukraine suggest that it is, at best, a party with a history of pro-Russian sympathies and, at worst, still holds views that align closely with Russian interests. **Original text** France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), the party of Marine Le Pen, has long been accused of having a pro-Russian stance, and there is substantial evidence supporting this characterization. The party has historical and financial ties to Russia: in 2014, RN took out a €9 million loan from a Russian bank, which was only fully repaid in 2023. Marine Le Pen herself has visited Moscow multiple times, expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, and in her 2022 presidential program, she advocated for deepening diplomatic ties with Russia and even sought "an alliance with Russia on certain issues" like European security. The party also opposed EU sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine and, until recently, called for France to leave NATO’s integrated military command. However, as the National Rally has sought to moderate its image and gain broader electoral appeal, especially ahead of the 2024 snap parliamentary elections, it has removed some of its most controversial positions from its public manifesto—including proposals to deepen ties with Russia and leave NATO’s integrated command. The party now claims a more balanced approach, pledging support for Ukraine but with clear limits, such as opposing the use of French-supplied long-range weapons to strike inside Russia and rejecting any French troop deployment to Ukraine. Despite these shifts, critics point out that the RN has never voted in favor of pro-Ukraine resolutions in the French or European parliaments, nor has it clearly condemned Russian aggression. In summary, while the National Rally has recently tried to soften its image, its historical ties to Russia, past policy positions, and ongoing reluctance to strongly condemn Russian actions or support Ukraine suggest that it is, at best, a party with a history of pro-Russian sympathies and, at worst, still holds views that align closely with Russian interests. #### English — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Has France's far-right National Rally really turned on Russia? - RFI](https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240626-has-france-s-far-right-national-rally-really-turned-on-russia) - [French far right pulls manifesto that included controversial Russia, NATO plans – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-manifesto-russia-nato-national-rally/) - [Russia cheers Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in French election – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-marine-le-pen-national-rally-french-election-2024-ukraine-sanctions-war/) - [Marine Le Pen promises French far right will rein in aid to Ukraine, slams soccer star Mbappé | CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/europe/france-le-pen-ukraine-mbappe-intl-cmd) **English translation** France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), led by Marine Le Pen, has historically been seen as a pro-Russian party. The party has had long-standing ties with Russia, including a €9 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014, which was only fully repaid in 2023. Marine Le Pen herself has expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin and has received positive coverage from Russian state media. In her 2022 presidential campaign, the party advocated for deepening diplomatic ties with Russia and even proposed seeking "an alliance with Russia on certain issues" like European security and combating terrorism. The National Rally also opposed EU sanctions against Moscow for the invasion of Ukraine and, in March 2024, abstained on a vote for military aid to Ukraine. However, as the party has sought to moderate its image and gain broader political acceptance, especially ahead of the 2024 elections, it has removed some of its more controversial pro-Russian proposals from its manifesto, such as leaving NATO’s integrated military command and deepening ties with Russia. The party now publicly states that Russia is violating international law and has adopted a more cautious stance, though it still advocates for limiting French support to Ukraine and avoiding direct conflict with Russia. In summary, while the National Rally has recently tried to soften its pro-Russian image, its historical and financial ties to Russia, as well as its past policy positions, strongly suggest that it has been, and remains, the most pro-Russian major party in France. **Original text** France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), led by Marine Le Pen, has historically been seen as a pro-Russian party. The party has had long-standing ties with Russia, including a €9 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014, which was only fully repaid in 2023. Marine Le Pen herself has expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin and has received positive coverage from Russian state media. In her 2022 presidential campaign, the party advocated for deepening diplomatic ties with Russia and even proposed seeking "an alliance with Russia on certain issues" like European security and combating terrorism. The National Rally also opposed EU sanctions against Moscow for the invasion of Ukraine and, in March 2024, abstained on a vote for military aid to Ukraine. However, as the party has sought to moderate its image and gain broader political acceptance, especially ahead of the 2024 elections, it has removed some of its more controversial pro-Russian proposals from its manifesto, such as leaving NATO’s integrated military command and deepening ties with Russia. The party now publicly states that Russia is violating international law and has adopted a more cautious stance, though it still advocates for limiting French support to Ukraine and avoiding direct conflict with Russia. In summary, while the National Rally has recently tried to soften its pro-Russian image, its historical and financial ties to Russia, as well as its past policy positions, strongly suggest that it has been, and remains, the most pro-Russian major party in France. #### French — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Législatives : la Russie apporte son soutien au RN, Le Pen y voit "une provocation" voire "une ingérence" | TF1 Info](https://www.tf1info.fr/elections/video-legislatives-la-russie-apporte-son-soutien-au-rn-rassemblement-national-de-jordan-bardella-sur-x-marine-le-pen-y-voit-une-provocation-voire-une-ingerence-2307008.html) - [Législatives: le soutien embarrassant de la Russie au RN à la veille du second tour](https://rmc.bfmtv.com/actualites/politique/legislatives-le-soutien-embarrassant-de-la-russie-au-rn-a-la-veille-du-second-tour_AV-202407040344.html) - [Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit](https://www.la-croix.com/france/guerre-en-ukraine-les-ambiguites-du-rn-depuis-le-debut-du-conflit-20240312) - [Est-il vrai que 15 candidats RN ont été «choisis par Poutine» pour observer les élections russes, comme le dit David Lisnard ? – Libération](https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/est-il-vrai-que-15-candidats-rn-ont-ete-choisis-par-poutine-pour-observer-les-elections-russes-comme-le-dit-david-lisnard-20240627_LKK3QIN3PFBALB37ML6W3NW7JA/) - [France - Russie position du RN à l'égard du régime poutinien - SAPERE](https://sapere.page/france-russie-position-du-rn/) **English translation** Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) maintains a complex and often described ambiguous relationship with Russia. Historically, the party has displayed a marked proximity to Vladimir Putin's regime: Marine Le Pen has several times expressed her admiration for Putin, has traveled to Moscow on multiple occasions, and refused to condemn the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the RN benefited from a 9-million-euro loan from a Czech-Russian bank to finance its 2017 presidential campaign, which fueled criticism regarding a possible financial dependence on Russia.bfmtv.com,la-croix.com,liberation.fr. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the RN has condemned the Russian offensive, but it has regularly opposed economic sanctions against Moscow, arguing that they harm Europeans more than Russia. The party has also been singled out for its abstention on symbolic votes concerning support for Ukraine, and several of its members have participated in election observation missions in Russia, sometimes organized and funded by the Kremlin, which has reinforced the image of a party close to Russia-croix.com,liberation.fr. In 2024, however, Marine Le Pen denounced the public support given by Russia to the RN as a "provocation" and an "interference," showing a desire to distance herself. Yet, a parliamentary commission of inquiry described the RN as an "effective transmission belt" for Russian propaganda in France, highlighting a systematic alignment of the RN's positions with the interests of the Russian regime, particularly concerning Crimea and sanctions-croix.com,liberation.fr. In summary, the RN has long been perceived as a pro-Russian party because of its positions, its financial ties, and its relations with the Kremlin, even if, since 2022, it has sought to nuance this image, notably due to the geopolitical context. However, its ambiguities persist, and many observers still consider it close to Russia. **Original text** Le Rassemblement National (RN) de Marine Le Pen entretient une relation complexe et souvent qualifiée d’ambiguë avec la Russie. Historiquement, le parti a affiché une proximité marquée avec le régime de Vladimir Poutine : Marine Le Pen a plusieurs fois exprimé son admiration pour Poutine, s’est rendue à Moscou à plusieurs reprises, et a refusé de condamner l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014. De plus, le RN a bénéficié d’un prêt de 9 millions d’euros d’une banque tchéco-russe pour financer sa campagne présidentielle de 2017, ce qui a alimenté les critiques sur une possible dépendance financière envers la Russie.bfmtv.com,la-croix.com,liberation.fr. Depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine, le RN a condamné l’offensive russe, mais il s’est régulièrement opposé aux sanctions économiques contre Moscou, arguant qu’elles nuisaient davantage aux Européens qu’à la Russie. Le parti a aussi été pointé du doigt pour son abstention sur des votes symboliques concernant le soutien à l’Ukraine, et plusieurs de ses membres ont participé à des missions d’observation électorale en Russie, parfois organisées et financées par le Kremlin, ce qui a renforcé l’image d’un parti proche de la Russie-croix.com,liberation.fr. En 2024, Marine Le Pen a cependant dénoncé le soutien public apporté par la Russie au RN comme une « provocation » et une « ingérence », montrant une volonté de prise de distance. Pourtant, une commission d’enquête parlementaire a décrit le RN comme une « courroie de transmission efficace » de la propagande russe en France, soulignant un alignement systématique des positions du RN sur les intérêts du régime russe, notamment concernant la Crimée et les sanctions-croix.com,liberation.fr. En résumé, le RN a longtemps été perçu comme un parti pro-russe en raison de ses positions, de ses liens financiers et de ses relations avec le Kremlin, même si, depuis 2022, il cherche à nuancer cette image, notamment en raison du contexte géopolitique. Cependant, ses ambiguïtés persistent, et de nombreux observateurs le considèrent toujours comme proche de la Russie. #### French — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [UN PROJET, UNE MÉTHODE](https://rassemblementnational.fr/documents/202406-programme.pdf) - [Législatives: «Je ne laisserai pas l’impérialisme russe absorber un Etat allié comme l’Ukraine», dit Bardella face à Faure et Attal - l'Opinion](https://www.lopinion.fr/politique/legislatives-je-ne-laisserai-pas-limperialisme-russe-absorber-un-etat-allie-comme-lukraine-dit-bardella-face-a-faure-et-attal) - [Législatives: le soutien embarrassant de la Russie au RN à la veille du second tour](https://rmc.bfmtv.com/actualites/politique/legislatives-le-soutien-embarrassant-de-la-russie-au-rn-a-la-veille-du-second-tour_AV-202407040344.html) - [Législatives 2024 : Entre affinités et liens financiers, la Russie enchantée de la montée du RN en France](https://www.20minutes.fr/monde/russie/4099470-20240705-legislatives-2024-entre-affinites-liens-financiers-russie-enchantee-montee-rn-france) - [Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit](https://www.la-croix.com/france/guerre-en-ukraine-les-ambiguites-du-rn-depuis-le-debut-du-conflit-20240312) **English translation** Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has long maintained close ties and ideological proximity with Russia, notably in the form of marked support for Vladimir Putin and a systematic opposition to sanctions against Moscow. Historically, the party has been described as "pro-Russian," with statements of admiration from Marine Le Pen for Putin, official meetings, and even Russian loans granted to the RN in 2014 (11 million euros). Several RN executives and candidates have also participated in controversial observation missions in Russia or in occupied Ukrainian territories, which has reinforced the image of a party close to the Kremlin. bfmtv.com, www.20minutes.fr, www.la-croix.com. However, since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the RN has tried to moderate its rhetoric for electoral reasons. Jordan Bardella, president of the party, has publicly stated that he would not let "Russian imperialism absorb an allied state like Ukraine" and that he supported Ukraine, while refusing the deployment of French troops or long-range missiles capable of striking Russia, out of fear of escalation. The RN also abstained on votes in the National Assembly concerning France's strategy in Ukraine, notably criticizing Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO. lopinion.fr, www.la-croix.com. In summary, although the RN is now seeking to soften its pro-Russian image, its historical, financial, and ideological ties with Russia remain strong, and several of its members continue to display positions that are very favorable to Moscow. Russia, for its part, officially supported the RN during the recent legislative elections, which put the party in an uncomfortable position. bfmtv.com, www.20minutes.fr. **Conclusion**: The RN is no longer as openly pro-Russian as before, but its affinities and ties with Russia remain real and documented. **Original text** Le Rassemblement National (RN) de Marine Le Pen a longtemps entretenu des liens étroits et une proximité idéologique avec la Russie, notamment sous la forme d’un soutien marqué pour Vladimir Poutine et d’une opposition systématique aux sanctions contre Moscou. Historiquement, le parti a été qualifié de « pro-russe », avec des déclarations d’admiration de Marine Le Pen pour Poutine, des rencontres officielles, et même des prêts russes accordés au RN en 2014 (11 millions d’euros). Plusieurs cadres et candidats du RN ont également participé à des missions d’observation controversées en Russie ou dans des territoires ukrainiens occupés, ce qui a renforcé l’image d’un parti proche du Kremlin.bfmtv.com,www.20minutes.fr,www.la-croix.com. Cependant, depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine en 2022, le RN a tenté de modérer son discours pour des raisons électorales. Jordan Bardella, président du parti, a publiquement affirmé qu’il ne laisserait pas « l’impérialisme russe absorber un État allié comme l’Ukraine » et qu’il soutenait l’Ukraine, tout en refusant l’envoi de troupes françaises ou de missiles longue portée pouvant frapper la Russie, par crainte d’une escalade. Le RN s’est aussi abstenu sur des votes à l’Assemblée nationale concernant la stratégie française en Ukraine, critiquant notamment l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’UE et à l’OTAN.lopinion.fr,www.la-croix.com. En résumé, bien que le RN cherche aujourd’hui à atténuer son image pro-russe, ses liens historiques, financiers et idéologiques avec la Russie restent forts, et plusieurs de ses membres continuent d’afficher des positions très favorables à Moscou. La Russie, de son côté, a officiellement soutenu le RN lors des dernières législatives, ce qui a mis le parti dans une position inconfortable.bfmtv.com,www.20minutes.fr. **Conclusion** : Le RN n’est plus aussi ouvertement pro-russe qu’avant, mais ses affinités et ses liens avec la Russie restent réels et documentés. #### French — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Législatives : la Russie apporte son soutien au RN, Le Pen y voit "une provocation" voire "une ingérence" | TF1 Info](https://www.tf1info.fr/elections/video-legislatives-la-russie-apporte-son-soutien-au-rn-rassemblement-national-de-jordan-bardella-sur-x-marine-le-pen-y-voit-une-provocation-voire-une-ingerence-2307008.html) - [Législatives 2024: Moscou a-t-il réellement le pouvoir d’influencer le vote des Français ?](https://www.challenges.fr/politique/legislatives-2024-moscou-a-t-il-reellement-le-pouvoir-d-influencer-le-vote-des-francais_898528) - [Législatives: le soutien embarrassant de la Russie au RN à la veille du second tour](https://rmc.bfmtv.com/actualites/politique/legislatives-le-soutien-embarrassant-de-la-russie-au-rn-a-la-veille-du-second-tour_AV-202407040344.html) - [Guerre en Ukraine : les ambiguïtés du RN depuis le début du conflit](https://www.la-croix.com/france/guerre-en-ukraine-les-ambiguites-du-rn-depuis-le-debut-du-conflit-20240312) - [Élections législatives 2024 : la Russie de Vladimir Poutine apporte son soutien au Rassemblement National - ladepeche.fr](https://www.ladepeche.fr/2024/07/04/elections-legislatives-2024-la-russie-de-vladimir-poutine-apporte-son-soutien-au-rassemblement-national-12060183.php) **English translation** Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) has long maintained close ties with Russia, which earned it the label of a pro-Russian party, particularly between 2014 and the start of the war in Ukraine. Several elements illustrate this past closeness: - Marine Le Pen met with Vladimir Putin on several occasions, notably in 2017, and expressed a form of admiration for the Russian leader. She also refused to condemn the annexation of Crimea in 2014. - The RN benefited from a 9 million euro loan from a Czech-Russian bank to finance its 2017 presidential campaign, which reinforced suspicions of financial dependence on Moscow. bfmtv.com, www.la-croix.com. - Several RN members, such as Thierry Mariani, Hélène Laporte, and Jean-Lin Lacapelle, have openly supported Russia, participated in election observation missions in Russia, or defended Vladimir Putin, even after the invasion of Ukraine. bfmtv.com. However, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the RN has officially condemned the Russian offensive and attempted to distance itself from Moscow. Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella have multiplied their statements to minimize their ties with Russia, claiming to support Ukraine and condemn Russian imperialism. The RN has also denounced the public support provided by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 2024 legislative elections, describing it as a "provocation" or "interference." fr, ladepeche.fr, www.la-croix.com. Despite this displayed distancing, ambiguities persist: the RN has abstained on symbolic votes concerning Ukraine, opposed sanctions against Russia, and a parliamentary commission described the party as an "effective transmission belt" for Russian propaganda in France. la-croix.com. In summary, the RN has historically been pro-Russian and remains marked by strong ties with Moscow, even if it is currently seeking to tone down this image. The question of its alignment with Russia therefore continues to divide and spark debate. **Original text** Le Rassemblement National (RN) de Marine Le Pen a longtemps entretenu des liens étroits avec la Russie, ce qui lui a valu d’être qualifié de parti pro-russe, notamment entre 2014 et le début de la guerre en Ukraine. Plusieurs éléments illustrent cette proximité passée : - Marine Le Pen a rencontré Vladimir Poutine à plusieurs reprises, notamment en 2017, et a exprimé une forme d’admiration pour le dirigeant russe. Elle a également refusé de condamner l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014. - Le RN a bénéficié d’un prêt de 9 millions d’euros d’une banque tchéco-russe pour financer sa campagne présidentielle de 2017, ce qui a renforcé les soupçons de dépendance financière envers Moscou.bfmtv.com,www.la-croix.com. - Plusieurs membres du RN, comme Thierry Mariani, Hélène Laporte ou Jean-Lin Lacapelle, ont ouvertement soutenu la Russie, participé à des missions d’observation électorale en Russie ou défendu Vladimir Poutine, même après l’invasion de l’Ukraine.bfmtv.com. Cependant, depuis le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine en février 2022, le RN a officiellement condamné l’offensive russe et tenté de prendre ses distances avec Moscou. Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella ont multiplié les déclarations pour minimiser leurs liens avec la Russie, affirmant soutenir l’Ukraine et condamner l’impérialisme russe. Le RN a aussi dénoncé le soutien public apporté par le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères lors des législatives de 2024, le qualifiant de « provocation » ou d’« ingérence ».fr,ladepeche.fr,www.la-croix.com. Malgré cette distanciation affichée, des ambiguïtés persistent : le RN s’est abstenu sur des votes symboliques concernant l’Ukraine, s’est opposé aux sanctions contre la Russie, et une commission parlementaire a décrit le parti comme une « courroie de transmission efficace » de la propagande russe en France.la-croix.com. En résumé, le RN a été historiquement pro-russe et reste marqué par des liens forts avec Moscou, même s’il cherche aujourd’hui à atténuer cette image. La question de son alignement avec la Russie continue donc de diviser et de susciter des débats. #### Russian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Выборы во Франции - Марин Ле Пен отказалась от сотрудничества с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/ultrapravi-frantsiyi-vidmovilasya-pogliblyuvati-1718713193.html) - [Украина не может победить в конфликте против России, заявила Ле Пен - РИА Новости, 17.06.2024](https://ria.ru/20240617/ukraina-1953392663.html) - [Глава партии Марин Ле Пен назвал условия поддержки ...](https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/06/2024/667ccaf99a7947836d145911) - [Марин Ле Пен подозревают в связях с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/partiyu-le-pen-pidozryuyut-zv-yazkah-rf-politiki-1705336343.html) - [Партия Ле Пен удалила с сайта планы по углублению связей с Россией - МК](https://www.mk.ru/politics/2024/06/18/partiya-le-pen-udalila-s-sayta-plany-po-uglubleniyu-svyazey-s-rossiey.html) **English translation** The French party "National Rally" (formerly the "National Front") under the leadership of Marine Le Pen has long demonstrated **pro-Russian sentiments**. In particular, the party supported Russia's viewpoint on a number of international issues, including the Syrian conflict and the annexation of Crimea, and also advocated for deepening diplomatic relations with Moscow and distancing itself from the US. In 2022, Le Pen condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but at the same time called for a "balanced position" and criticized anti-Russian sanctions, arguing this by concern for the French economy. In recent months, especially ahead of the 2024 elections, the party has softened some controversial stances: proposals on deepening cooperation with Russia were removed from the official website, and party leaders (including Jordan Bardella) began to emphasize the need to support Ukraine, but with caveats — for example, so that this does not worsen relations with Russia. Thus, although the "National Rally" is now trying to smooth over its image, historically and based on a number of current statements, it can be considered **a party with a pro-Russian orientation**, especially against the background of other French political forces. **Original text** Французская партия «Национальное объединение» (ранее «Национальный фронт») под руководством Марин Ле Пен долгое время демонстрировала **пророссийские настроения**. В частности, партия поддерживала точку зрения России по ряду международных вопросов, включая сирийский конфликт и аннексию Крыма, а также выступала за углубление дипломатических отношений с Москвой и дистанцирование от США. В 2022 году Ле Пен осудила вторжение России в Украину, но при этом призвала к «сбалансированной позиции» и критиковала антироссийские санкции, аргументируя это заботой о французской экономике. В последние месяцы, особенно перед выборами 2024 года, партия смягчила некоторые спорные позиции: с официального сайта были удалены предложения об углублении сотрудничества с Россией, а лидеры партии (в том числе Жордан Барделла) стали подчёркивать необходимость поддержки Украины, но с оговорками — например, чтобы это не ухудшало отношений с Россией. Таким образом, хотя «Национальное объединение» и пытается сейчас сгладить свой имидж, исторически и по ряду текущих заявлений его можно считать **партией с пророссийской ориентацией**, особенно на фоне других французских политических сил. #### Russian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Выборы во Франции - Марин Ле Пен отказалась от сотрудничества с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/ultrapravi-frantsiyi-vidmovilasya-pogliblyuvati-1718713193.html) - [Украина не может победить в конфликте против России, заявила Ле Пен - РИА Новости, 17.06.2024](https://ria.ru/20240617/ukraina-1953392663.html) - [Глава партии Марин Ле Пен назвал условия поддержки ...](https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/06/2024/667ccaf99a7947836d145911) - [Марин Ле Пен подозревают в связях с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/partiyu-le-pen-pidozryuyut-zv-yazkah-rf-politiki-1705336343.html) - [Партия Ле Пен удалила с сайта планы по углублению связей с Россией - МК](https://www.mk.ru/politics/2024/06/18/partiya-le-pen-udalila-s-sayta-plany-po-uglubleniyu-svyazey-s-rossiey.html) **English translation** The French party National Rally (formerly the National Front) led by Marine Le Pen has long demonstrated pro-Russian sentiments. In particular, the party supported Russia's viewpoint on a number of international issues, including the Syrian conflict and the annexation of Crimea, and also advocated for deepening diplomatic relations with Moscow and distancing from the US. In 2022, Le Pen condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but at the same time called for a "balanced position" and criticized anti-Russian sanctions, arguing this by concern for the French economy. In recent months, especially ahead of the 2024 elections, the party has softened its most controversial positions: proposals on deepening cooperation with Russia were removed from the official website, and party leaders began to emphasize the need to support Ukraine, albeit with caveats. For instance, Jordan Bardella (the current head of the party) stated that France can help Ukraine as long as it does not ruin relations with Russia. Also, Le Pen does not rule out the need for negotiations with Russia to resolve the conflict, since, in her opinion, Ukraine cannot win the war. Thus, although the National Rally did demonstrate pro-Russian sentiments in the past, lately the party has been trying to soften its position so as not to lose political legitimacy, especially against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. However, suspicions of ties with Russia and the dissemination of Russian propaganda still persist, and the party has repeatedly been criticized for this in France. **Original text** Французская партия «Национальное объединение» (ранее «Национальный фронт») под руководством Марин Ле Пен долгое время демонстрировала пророссийские настроения. В частности, партия поддерживала точку зрения России по ряду международных вопросов, включая сирийский конфликт и аннексию Крыма, а также выступала за углубление дипломатических отношений с Москвой и дистанцирование от США. В 2022 году Ле Пен осудила вторжение России в Украину, но при этом призвала к «сбалансированной позиции» и критиковала антироссийские санкции, аргументируя это заботой о французской экономике. В последние месяцы, особенно перед выборами 2024 года, партия смягчила свои наиболее спорные позиции: с официального сайта были удалены предложения об углублении сотрудничества с Россией, а лидеры партии стали подчёркивать необходимость поддержки Украины, хотя и с оговорками. Например, Жордан Барделла (нынешний глава партии) заявил, что Франция может помогать Украине, если это не испортит отношений с Россией. Также Ле Пен не исключает необходимость переговоров с Россией для урегулирования конфликта, так как, по её мнению, Украина не может победить в войне. Таким образом, хотя «Национальное объединение» и демонстрировало пророссийские настроения в прошлом, в последнее время партия пытается смягчить свою позицию, чтобы не терять политическую легитимность, особенно на фоне войны в Украине. Однако подозрения в связях с Россией и распространении российской пропаганды по-прежнему сохраняются, и партия не раз критиковалась за это во Франции. #### Russian — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Выборы во Франции - Марин Ле Пен отказалась от сотрудничества с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/ultrapravi-frantsiyi-vidmovilasya-pogliblyuvati-1718713193.html) - [Украина не может победить в конфликте против России, заявила Ле Пен - РИА Новости, 17.06.2024](https://ria.ru/20240617/ukraina-1953392663.html) - [Глава партии Марин Ле Пен назвал условия поддержки ...](https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/06/2024/667ccaf99a7947836d145911) - [Марин Ле Пен подозревают в связях с Россией | РБК Украина](https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/partiyu-le-pen-pidozryuyut-zv-yazkah-rf-politiki-1705336343.html) - [Партия Ле Пен удалила с сайта планы по углублению связей с Россией - МК](https://www.mk.ru/politics/2024/06/18/partiya-le-pen-udalila-s-sayta-plany-po-uglubleniyu-svyazey-s-rossiey.html) **English translation** The French party "National Rally" (formerly the "National Front") led by Marine Le Pen has long demonstrated pro-Russian sentiments. In particular, the party supported Russia's viewpoint on a number of international issues, including the Syrian conflict and the annexation of Crimea, and also advocated for deepening diplomatic relations with Moscow and distancing itself from the US. In 2022, Le Pen condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but at the same time called for a "balanced position" and criticized anti-Russian sanctions, arguing this by concern for the French economy. In recent months, especially ahead of the 2024 elections, the party has softened some of its controversial positions: proposals on deepening cooperation with Russia were removed from the official website, and party leaders (including Jordan Bardella) began to emphasize the necessity of supporting Ukraine, albeit with reservations about preventing the escalation of the conflict and maintaining relations with Moscow. Thus, although the "National Rally" is not openly a pro-Russian party in the traditional sense, its position on Russia remains contradictory: on the one hand, the party is trying to distance itself from former pro-Russian statements, and on the other hand, it continues to advocate for dialogue with Moscow and against harsh anti-Russian measures, which raises suspicions of ties with Russia and the dissemination of Russian propaganda. **Original text** Французская партия «Национальное объединение» (ранее «Национальный фронт») под руководством Марин Ле Пен долгое время демонстрировала пророссийские настроения. В частности, партия поддерживала точку зрения России по ряду международных вопросов, включая сирийский конфликт и аннексию Крыма, а также выступала за углубление дипломатических отношений с Москвой и дистанцирование от США. В 2022 году Ле Пен осудила вторжение России в Украину, но при этом призвала к «сбалансированной позиции» и критиковала антироссийские санкции, аргументируя это заботой о французской экономике. В последние месяцы, особенно перед выборами 2024 года, партия смягчила некоторые свои спорные позиции: с официального сайта были удалены предложения об углублении сотрудничества с Россией, а лидеры партии (в том числе Жордан Барделла) стали подчёркивать необходимость поддержки Украины, хотя и с оговорками о недопущении эскалации конфликта и сохранении отношений с Москвой. Таким образом, хотя «Национальное объединение» и не является открыто пророссийской партией в традиционном смысле, её позиция по России остаётся противоречивой: с одной стороны, партия пытается дистанцироваться от прежних пророссийских заявлений, а с другой — продолжает выступать за диалог с Москвой и против жёстких антироссийских мер, что вызывает подозрения в связях с Россией и распространении российской пропаганды. #### Ukrainian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [що буде з Україною, якщо переможе партія Ле Пен](https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c9rr3vzv3pdo) - [Ультраправа партія Франції тихо видалила із сайту пропозиції поглибити дипломатичні зв’язки з росією — Politico | hromadske](https://hromadske.ua/svit/226211-ultraprava-partiia-frantsiyi-tykho-vydalyla-z-saytu-propozytsiyi-pohlybyty-dyplomatychni-zviazky-z-rosiyeiu-politico) - [МЗС РФ підтримало Марін Лі Пен на виборах — політик різко відреагувала - Телеграф](https://news.telegraf.com.ua/ukr/mir/2024-07-04/5861200-notre-elephante-marin-le-pen-zvinuvatila-rosiyu-u-vtruchanni-u-vibori-u-frantsii-podrobitsi) - [Ультраправі Ле Пен стають панівною силою у Франції - чого чекати Україні - 24 Канал](https://24tv.ua/ultrapravi-le-pen-stayut-panivnoyu-siloyu-frantsiyi-chogo-chekati_n2587561) - [Вибори у Франції - Марін Ле Пен заявила, що скоротить допомогу Україні / NV](https://nv.ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/vibori-u-franciji-marin-le-pen-zayavila-shcho-skorotit-dopomogu-ukrajini-50432731.html) **English translation** The French National Rally (formerly the National Front) led by Marine Le Pen has a complex and ambiguous position regarding Russia. Historically, the party has had pro-Russian leanings: in the past, Marine Le Pen supported Vladimir Putin, and in 2022 the party advocated for "a strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia after the end of the war" and the deepening of diplomatic ties with Russia. However, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the National Rally changed its rhetoric: it officially condemned the war, supported Ukraine (albeit with limitations), and even removed from its website the proposals for deepening ties with Russia that were part of their 2022 platform.ua. In 2024, party leader Jordan Bardella stated that the National Rally would be "extremely vigilant regarding attempts at Russian interference" and considers Russian policy to be a "multidimensional threat" to France and Europe. At the same time, the party opposes sending French troops to Ukraine, supplying long-range missiles capable of striking Russian territory, as well as Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU. In addition, the party abstained during the vote on the security agreement between France and Ukraine.bbc.com/ukrainian. Marine Le Pen also reacted sharply to public support from the Russian Foreign Ministry during the elections, accusing the Kremlin of interfering in France's affairs and emphasizing that she is not "a friend of Putin."telegraf.com.ua. **Conclusion:** The National Rally is not an openly pro-Russian party in the classical sense, but it maintains a critical attitude toward support for Ukraine, opposes certain aspects of cooperation with NATO, and has a history of sympathies toward Russia. Currently, the party is trying to avoid direct association with Putin, but its foreign policy program remains significantly different from the pro-Ukrainian line of Emmanuel Macron. **Original text** Французьке «Національне об'єднання» (раніше «Національний фронт») Марін Ле Пен має складну і неоднозначну позицію щодо Росії. Історично партія мала проросійські нахили: у минулому Марін Ле Пен підтримувала Володимира Путіна, а в 2022 році партія виступала за «стратегічне зближення НАТО та Росії після закінчення війни» та поглиблення дипломатичних зв’язків з Росією. Проте після повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну «Національне об'єднання» змінило риторику: офіційно засудило війну, підтримало Україну (але з обмеженнями), і навіть видалило зі свого сайту пропозиції про поглиблення зв’язків з Росією, які були частиною їхньої програми у 2022 році.ua. У 2024 році лідер партії Жордан Барделла заявляв, що «Національне об'єднання» буде «надзвичайно пильною щодо спроб втручання Росії» і вважає російську політику «багатовимірною загрозою» для Франції та Європи. Водночас партія виступає проти відправки французьких військ в Україну, поставок ракет далекого радіусу дії, які могли б вражати російську територію, а також проти членства України в НАТО і ЄС. Крім того, партія утрималася під час голосування за безпекову угоду між Францією та Україною.bbc.com/ukrainian. Марін Ле Пен також різко відреагувала на публічну підтримку з боку МЗС Росії під час виборів, звинувативши Кремль у втручанні у справи Франції та підкреслила, що не є «другом Путіна».telegraf.com.ua. **Висновок:** «Національне об'єднання» не є відкрито проросійською партією у класичному розумінні, але має критичне ставлення до підтримки України, виступає проти деяких аспектів співпраці з НАТО і має історію симпатій до Росії. Зараз партія намагається уникнути прямого асоціювання з Путіним, але її зовнішньополітична програма залишається суттєво відмінною від проукраїнської лінії Емманюеля Макрона. #### Ukrainian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [що буде з Україною, якщо переможе партія Ле Пен](https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c9rr3vzv3pdo) - [Ультраправа партія Франції тихо видалила із сайту пропозиції поглибити дипломатичні зв’язки з росією — Politico | hromadske](https://hromadske.ua/svit/226211-ultraprava-partiia-frantsiyi-tykho-vydalyla-z-saytu-propozytsiyi-pohlybyty-dyplomatychni-zviazky-z-rosiyeiu-politico) - [МЗС РФ підтримало Марін Лі Пен на виборах — політик різко відреагувала - Телеграф](https://news.telegraf.com.ua/ukr/mir/2024-07-04/5861200-notre-elephante-marin-le-pen-zvinuvatila-rosiyu-u-vtruchanni-u-vibori-u-frantsii-podrobitsi) - [Ультраправі Ле Пен стають панівною силою у Франції - чого чекати Україні - 24 Канал](https://24tv.ua/ultrapravi-le-pen-stayut-panivnoyu-siloyu-frantsiyi-chogo-chekati_n2587561) - [Вибори у Франції - Марін Ле Пен заявила, що скоротить допомогу Україні / NV](https://nv.ua/ukr/world/geopolitics/vibori-u-franciji-marin-le-pen-zayavila-shcho-skorotit-dopomogu-ukrajini-50432731.html) **English translation** The French National Rally (formerly the National Front) led by Marine Le Pen has a complex and ambiguous position regarding Russia. Historically, the party had pro-Russian leanings: in the past, Marine Le Pen supported Putin, and in 2022 the party published a program that envisioned deepening diplomatic ties with Russia, France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, and cooperation with Moscow on European security issues. These proposals were later removed from the party's official website, indicating an attempt to distance itself from a pro-Russian image, especially against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine.ua. However, in recent years the National Rally has changed its rhetoric: party leader Jordan Bardella condemns Russian aggression against Ukraine, calls Russia a "multidimensional threat" to France and Europe, and claims that the party supports logistical assistance to Ukraine. At the same time, the party opposes sending French troops to Ukraine, supplying long-range missiles that could strike Russian territory, as well as Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU.com,news.telegraf.com.ua,24tv.ua. Marine Le Pen also reacted sharply to public support from the Russian Foreign Ministry during the elections, accusing the Kremlin of interfering in France's affairs. She emphasized that she is not a "friend of Putin" and condemned Russia's war against Ukraine, although she still advocates for "strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia after the end of the war."telegraf.com.ua. **Conclusion:** The National Rally is no longer an openly pro-Russian party as it once was. However, its position on Russia remains ambivalent: on the one hand, condemnation of the war and support for Ukraine; on the other hand, opposition to certain aspects of assistance to Ukraine and a desire for dialogue with Moscow after the war. Thus, the party is difficult to unequivocally classify as pro-Russian today, but its foreign policy line still contains elements that can be perceived as pro-Russian or at least not overly critical of the Kremlin. **Original text** Французьке «Національне об'єднання» (раніше «Національний фронт») Марін Ле Пен має складну і неоднозначну позицію щодо Росії. Історично партія мала проросійські нахили: у минулому Марін Ле Пен підтримувала Путіна, а в 2022 році партія публікувала програму, яка передбачала поглиблення дипломатичних зв’язків з Росією, вихід Франції з інтегрованого військового командування НАТО та співпрацю з Москвою в питаннях європейської безпеки. Ці пропозиції були пізніше вилучені з офіційного сайту партії, що свідчить про спробу дистанціюватися від проросійського іміджу, особливо на тлі війни в Україні.ua. Проте за останні роки «Національне об'єднання» змінило риторику: лідер партії Жордан Барделла засуджує російську агресію проти України, називає Росію «багатовимірною загрозою» для Франції та Європи, і стверджує, що партія підтримує матеріально-технічну допомогу Україні. Водночас партія виступає проти відправки французьких військ до України, поставок ракет далекого радіусу дії, які могли б вражати російську територію, а також проти членства України в НАТО і ЄС.com,news.telegraf.com.ua,24tv.ua. Марін Ле Пен також різко відреагувала на публічну підтримку з боку МЗС Росії під час виборів, звинувативши Кремль у втручанні у справи Франції. Вона підкреслила, що не є «другом Путіна» і засудила війну Росії проти України, хоча все ще виступає за «стратегічне зближення НАТО та Росії після закінчення війни».telegraf.com.ua. **Висновок:** «Національне об'єднання» вже не є відкрито проросійською партією, як це було раніше. Проте її позиція щодо Росії залишається амбівалентною: з одного боку, засудження війни і підтримка України, з іншого — опозиція до деяких аспектів допомоги Україні та прагнення до діалогу з Москвою після війни. Таким чином, партію важко однозначно класифікувати як проросійську на сьогодні, але її зовнішньополітична лінія все ще містить елементи, які можуть бути сприйняті як проросійські або принаймні не надто критичні до Кремля. #### Ukrainian — answer round 3 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [що буде з Україною, якщо переможе партія Ле Пен](https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c9rr3vzv3pdo) - [Французькі ультраправі прибрали зі свого сайту суперечливі плани щодо Росії та НАТО | Європейська правда](https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/_barcelona/news/2024/06/18/7188338/) - [Ультраправа партія Франції тихо видалила із сайту пропозиції поглибити дипломатичні зв’язки з росією — Politico | hromadske](https://hromadske.ua/svit/226211-ultraprava-partiia-frantsiyi-tykho-vydalyla-z-saytu-propozytsiyi-pohlybyty-dyplomatychni-zviazky-z-rosiyeiu-politico) - [Марін Ле Пен – партія Національне об'єднання відмовилася поглиблювати співпрацю з Росією | OBOZ.UA](https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/abroad/ultrapravi-u-frantsii-namagayutsya-distantsiyuvatisya-vid-rosii-politico.htm) - [Вибори у Франції - Марін Ле Пен відмовилася від співпраці з Росією | РБК-Україна](https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/ultrapravi-frantsiyi-vidmovilasya-pogliblyuvati-1718713193.html) **English translation** The French National Rally (formerly the National Front), led by Marine Le Pen, has a complex and controversial history regarding Russia. In the past, particularly during the 2022 presidential campaign, the party openly advocated for **deepening ties with Russia**, seeking an "alliance with Russia on certain issues" such as European security or the fight against terrorism. At the same time, the party proposed withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command and ending military cooperation with Germany. These positions were officially enshrined in the party's manifesto, but later, in 2024, the National Rally **quietly removed these controversial sections from its website**, which indicates an attempt to distance itself from pro-Russian positions, especially against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine.ua,news.obozrevatel.com,www.rbc.ua. Currently, the party officially states that **Russia is violating international law** and poses a threat to Europe, and it also supports logistical assistance to Ukraine, but opposes the deployment of French troops to Ukraine, the supply of long-range missiles, and military equipment that could directly strike Russian cities. Party leader Jordan Bardella emphasized that the National Rally will be "extremely vigilant regarding attempts at Russian interference" and will not allow "Russian imperialism to swallow up Ukraine."bbc.com,www.eurointegration.com.ua. **Conclusion:** The National Rally previously held **pro-Russian positions**, but after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, it softened its rhetoric and even removed the most controversial proposals from its website. Now the party is trying to avoid direct association with pro-Russian politics, but still maintains a critical attitude toward support for Ukraine, particularly regarding military supplies. Therefore, **it cannot be unequivocally stated that this is a pro-Russian party**, but its past actions and current position indicate an **ambivalent and often pro-Russian attitude** toward the Kremlin. **Original text** Французьке «Національне об'єднання» (раніше «Національний фронт»), яку очолює Марін Ле Пен, має складну і суперечливу історію стосовно Росії. У минулому, зокрема під час президентської кампанії 2022 року, партія відкрито виступала за **поглиблення зв'язків з Росією**, шукаючи «союз із Росією з певних питань», таких як європейська безпека чи боротьба з тероризмом. Тоді ж партія пропонувала вийти з інтегрованого військового командування НАТО і припинити співпрацю з Німеччиною у військовій сфері. Ці позиції були офіційно зафіксовані в програмі партії, але згодом, у 2024 році, «Національне об'єднання» **тихо видалило ці суперечливі розділи зі свого сайту**, що свідчить про спробу дистанціюватися від проросійських позицій, особливо на тлі війни в Україні.ua,news.obozrevatel.com,www.rbc.ua. Наразі партія офіційно заявляє, що **Росія порушує міжнародне право** і є загрозою для Європи, а також підтримує матеріально-технічну допомогу Україні, але виступає проти введення французьких військ в Україну, поставок ракет далекого радіусу дії та військової техніки, яка могла б безпосередньо вражати російські міста. Лідер партії Жордан Барделла наголосив, що «Національне об'єднання» буде «надзвичайно пильною щодо спроб втручання Росії» і не дозволить «російському імперіалізму поглинути Україну».bbc.com,www.eurointegration.com.ua. **Висновок:** «Національне об'єднання» раніше мало **проросійські позиції**, але після початку повномасштабної війни в Україні пом'якшило свою риторику і навіть видалило найсуперечливіші пропозиції зі свого сайту. Зараз партія намагається уникнути прямого асоціювання з проросійською політикою, але все ще зберігає критичне ставлення до підтримки України, зокрема щодо військових постачань. Тому **не можна однозначно стверджувати, що це проросійська партія**, але її минулі дії та поточна позиція свідчать про **амбівалентне і часто проросійське ставлення** до Кремля. ### GPT-5.6 Sol Repeated check: one answer round only. The report shows answer round 1. #### English — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai) - [Lutte contre les influences étrangères malveillantes. Pour une mobilisation de toute la Nation face à la néo-guerre froide - Rapport - Sénat](https://www.senat.fr/rap/r23-739-1/r23-739-113.html) - [Far-right leader Bardella backpedals on taking France out of NATO strategic military command | AP News](https://apnews.com/article/37ddf1a661df6d10441d33dcad6c3bf4) - [Sur l’Ukraine, le lent alignement du RN, écartelé entre son discours et ses votes](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/01/01/sur-l-ukraine-le-lent-alignement-du-rn-ecartele-entre-son-discours-et-ses-votes_6476890_823448.html) - [Communiqué de Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella sur la détérioration de la situation sécuritaire en Europe et les actions hybrides russes](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-et-jordan-bardella-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-securitaire-en-europe-et-les-actions-hybrides-russes?utm_source=openai) **English translation** **Historically, yes—but today the answer is more qualified.** For much of the 2010s, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally—then called the National Front—were unusually sympathetic to Vladimir Putin’s Russia: - Le Pen defended Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, rejecting the view that it was illegal. - The party received a roughly **€9 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014**. - Le Pen met Putin at the Kremlin shortly before France’s 2017 presidential election. - The party opposed sanctions and promoted closer strategic relations between France and Russia. A 2023 French parliamentary inquiry documented substantial convergence between RN and Kremlin positions. ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) That does **not** establish that RN was controlled by Moscow or received orders from it. French authorities said they could not determine whether the Russian loan involved political conditions or favors. ([senat.fr](https://www.senat.fr/rap/r23-739-1/r23-739-113.html)) Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in **February 2022**, RN has moderated its public line. It has condemned the invasion, recognized Russia as the aggressor, supported some defensive assistance to Ukraine and retreated from its immediate proposal to remove France from NATO’s integrated command. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/37ddf1a661df6d10441d33dcad6c3bf4)) Nevertheless, RN has generally remained **softer toward Russia than France’s mainstream parties**: opposing French troops, long-range weapons, some sanctions and major financial commitments to Ukraine, while often voting against or abstaining on European pro-Ukraine resolutions. Internal divisions also persist, including openly Russia-friendly figures such as Thierry Mariani. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/01/01/sur-l-ukraine-le-lent-alignement-du-rn-ecartele-entre-son-discours-et-ses-votes_6476890_823448.html)) Most recently, on **September 19, 2026**, Le Pen and Jordan Bardella explicitly condemned Russian hostile and hybrid activities and stated that France should not facilitate Russia’s war aims in Ukraine—RN’s clearest distancing from Moscow so far. But its precise commitment to continued Ukrainian aid remains ambiguous. ([rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-et-jordan-bardella-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-securitaire-en-europe-et-les-actions-hybrides-russes?utm_source=openai)) **Bottom line:** Calling RN *historically pro-Russian* is well supported. Calling it simply a pro-Russian party today is somewhat reductive; **“formerly strongly Russia-friendly, now publicly distancing itself but still comparatively Russia-accommodating and divided”** is more accurate. **Original text** **Historically, yes—but today the answer is more qualified.** For much of the 2010s, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally—then called the National Front—were unusually sympathetic to Vladimir Putin’s Russia: - Le Pen defended Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, rejecting the view that it was illegal. - The party received a roughly **€9 million loan from a Russian bank in 2014**. - Le Pen met Putin at the Kremlin shortly before France’s 2017 presidential election. - The party opposed sanctions and promoted closer strategic relations between France and Russia. A 2023 French parliamentary inquiry documented substantial convergence between RN and Kremlin positions. ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) That does **not** establish that RN was controlled by Moscow or received orders from it. French authorities said they could not determine whether the Russian loan involved political conditions or favors. ([senat.fr](https://www.senat.fr/rap/r23-739-1/r23-739-113.html)) Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in **February 2022**, RN has moderated its public line. It has condemned the invasion, recognized Russia as the aggressor, supported some defensive assistance to Ukraine and retreated from its immediate proposal to remove France from NATO’s integrated command. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/37ddf1a661df6d10441d33dcad6c3bf4)) Nevertheless, RN has generally remained **softer toward Russia than France’s mainstream parties**: opposing French troops, long-range weapons, some sanctions and major financial commitments to Ukraine, while often voting against or abstaining on European pro-Ukraine resolutions. Internal divisions also persist, including openly Russia-friendly figures such as Thierry Mariani. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/01/01/sur-l-ukraine-le-lent-alignement-du-rn-ecartele-entre-son-discours-et-ses-votes_6476890_823448.html)) Most recently, on **September 19, 2026**, Le Pen and Jordan Bardella explicitly condemned Russian hostile and hybrid activities and stated that France should not facilitate Russia’s war aims in Ukraine—RN’s clearest distancing from Moscow so far. But its precise commitment to continued Ukrainian aid remains ambiguous. ([rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-et-jordan-bardella-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-securitaire-en-europe-et-les-actions-hybrides-russes?utm_source=openai)) **Bottom line:** Calling RN *historically pro-Russian* is well supported. Calling it simply a pro-Russian party today is somewhat reductive; **“formerly strongly Russia-friendly, now publicly distancing itself but still comparatively Russia-accommodating and divided”** is more accurate. #### French — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai) - [Textes adoptés - Nouvelles allégations d’ingérence russe au Parlement européen, dans les prochaines élections européennes, et incidence sur l’Union - Jeudi 25 avril 2024](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0380_FR.html?utm_source=openai) - [Européennes 2024 : les revirements de programme du Rassemblement national en dix ans](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2024/06/05/europeennes-2024-les-revirements-de-programme-du-rassemblement-national-en-dix-ans_6237444_4355770.html?utm_source=openai) - [Les députés votent une résolution en faveur de l'Ukraine, le RN et son allié ciottiste s'abstiennent, LFI et les communistes votent contre](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/03/13/a-l-assemblee-nationale-les-deputes-votent-leur-soutien-a-l-ukraine-en-devoilant-une-ligne-de-fracture_6579869_823448.html?utm_source=openai) - [Communiqué de Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella sur la détérioration de la situation sécuritaire en Europe et les actions hybrides russes](https://t.co/WgYr98pEcR?utm_source=openai) **English translation** **Short answer: historically, yes; today, the term must be qualified.** **Why the "pro-Russian" label is well-founded** Under Marine Le Pen, the National Front and then the RN long defended a line that was particularly favorable to the Kremlin: - demonstrated political rapprochement with Vladimir Putin; - Marine Le Pen’s recognition of the annexation of Crimea as legitimate; - opposition to sanctions against Russia; - a loan of **€9.4 million** contracted in 2014 from a Russian-Czech bank, at a time when French banks were refusing to finance the party; - frequent votes or abstentions by RN elected officials on texts condemning Moscow or strengthening aid to Ukraine. The 2003 [2023] French parliamentary report on foreign interference thus described the RN as a **"transmission belt"** for Russian positions, a conclusion firmly contested by the party. ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) The European Parliament has also noted the Russian loan and the relations maintained with Moscow. ([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0380_FR.html?utm_source=openai)) **What has changed since the invasion of Ukraine** Since **February 24, 2022**, the RN has officially condemned the Russian invasion and acknowledges that Russia is violating international law. It asserts that Ukraine must be able to defend itself. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2024/06/05/europeennes-2024-les-revirements-de-programme-du-rassemblement-national-en-dix-ans_6237444_4355770.html?utm_source=openai)) But it generally remains opposed to: - the deployment of French soldiers; - weapons allowing strikes deep into Russian territory; - certain economic sanctions; - Ukraine’s accession to the EU or NATO; - several texts providing for enhanced military support to Kyiv. These positions can be defended in the name of de-escalation, but in their effects, they often align with Moscow's strategic interests. In March 2025, for example, RN deputies abstained on a French resolution reinforcing support for Ukraine, after having attempted to water down some of its provisions. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/03/13/a-l-assemblee-nationale-les-deputes-votent-leur-soutien-a-l-ukraine-en-devoilant-une-ligne-de-fracture_6579869_823448.html?utm_source=openai)) **The current position** In **September 2026**, Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella noticeably hardened their language, condemning Russian hybrid actions and asserting that Russia must not be allowed to influence French politics through intimidation or destabilization. ([t.co](https://t.co/WgYr98pEcR?utm_source=openai)) This constitutes a real distancing, even if the party’s line on aid to Ukraine and the concessions to be imposed during a peace settlement remains unclear. **Conclusion:** one can reasonably describe the RN as **historically a pro-Putin or pro-Kremlin party**. On the other hand, to say that it is today simply and entirely "pro-Russian" would be reductive: its current line is rather **officially critical of Moscow, yet still restrictive and ambiguous regarding support for Ukraine**. Furthermore, no public evidence exists to state that the RN is directly controlled by Russia. **Original text** **Réponse courte : historiquement, oui ; aujourd’hui, le terme doit être nuancé.** **Pourquoi l’étiquette « pro-russe » est fondée** Sous Marine Le Pen, le Front national puis le RN a longtemps défendu une ligne particulièrement favorable au Kremlin : - rapprochement politique affiché avec Vladimir Poutine ; - reconnaissance par Marine Le Pen de l’annexion de la Crimée comme légitime ; - opposition aux sanctions contre la Russie ; - prêt de **9,4 millions d’euros** contracté en 2014 auprès d’une banque russo-tchèque, alors que les banques françaises refusaient de financer le parti ; - votes ou abstentions fréquents des élus RN sur des textes condamnant Moscou ou renforçant l’aide à l’Ukraine. Le rapport parlementaire français de 2023 sur les ingérences étrangères a ainsi qualifié le RN de **« courroie de transmission »** de positions russes, conclusion fermement contestée par le parti. ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) Le Parlement européen a lui aussi relevé le prêt russe et les relations entretenues avec Moscou. ([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0380_FR.html?utm_source=openai)) **Ce qui a changé depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine** Depuis le **24 février 2022**, le RN condamne officiellement l’invasion russe et reconnaît que la Russie viole le droit international. Il affirme que l’Ukraine doit pouvoir se défendre. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2024/06/05/europeennes-2024-les-revirements-de-programme-du-rassemblement-national-en-dix-ans_6237444_4355770.html?utm_source=openai)) Mais il reste généralement opposé : - à l’envoi de soldats français ; - aux armes permettant de frapper profondément le territoire russe ; - à certaines sanctions économiques ; - à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’UE ou à l’OTAN ; - à plusieurs textes prévoyant un soutien militaire renforcé à Kiev. Ces positions peuvent être défendues au nom de la désescalade, mais elles correspondent souvent, dans leurs effets, aux intérêts stratégiques de Moscou. En mars 2025, les députés RN se sont par exemple abstenus sur une résolution française renforçant le soutien à l’Ukraine, après avoir tenté d’en atténuer certaines dispositions. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2025/03/13/a-l-assemblee-nationale-les-deputes-votent-leur-soutien-a-l-ukraine-en-devoilant-une-ligne-de-fracture_6579869_823448.html?utm_source=openai)) **La position actuelle** En **septembre 2026**, Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella ont nettement durci leur langage, dénonçant les actions hybrides russes et affirmant que la Russie ne devait pas pouvoir influencer la politique française par l’intimidation ou la déstabilisation. ([t.co](https://t.co/WgYr98pEcR?utm_source=openai)) Cela constitue une prise de distance réelle, même si la ligne du parti sur l’aide à l’Ukraine et les concessions à imposer lors d’une paix reste peu claire. **Conclusion :** on peut raisonnablement qualifier le RN de parti **historiquement pro-Poutine ou pro-Kremlin**. En revanche, dire qu’il est aujourd’hui simplement et intégralement « pro-russe » serait réducteur : sa ligne actuelle est plutôt **officiellement critique de Moscou, mais toujours restrictive et ambiguë sur le soutien à l’Ukraine**. Il n’existe pas, par ailleurs, de preuve publique permettant d’affirmer que le RN serait directement contrôlé par la Russie. #### Russian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai) - [questions.assemblee-nationale.fr](https://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/CRCANR5L16S2023PO812752N034.html) - [War in Ukraine: The French far right's quest to appear respectable](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2024/06/21/war-in-ukraine-the-french-far-right-s-quest-to-appear-respectable_6675351_5.html) - [Communiqué de Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella sur la détérioration de la situation sécuritaire en Europe et les actions hybrides russes](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-et-jordan-bardella-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-securitaire-en-europe-et-les-actions-hybrides-russes?utm_source=openai) - [Le Pen distances herself from Russia, but stays vague on Ukraine](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2026/09/22/le-pen-distances-herself-from-russia-but-stays-vague-on-ukraine_6757814_5.html) **English translation** **Short answer:** historically — **yes, the National Rally had a pronounced pro-Russian and pro-Putin orientation**. Today, it is more accurate to call it a party **with a strong pro-Russian legacy and persistent ambiguity regarding the Kremlin**, rather than unconditionally a "party of Moscow." Why it is considered pro-Russian: - In 2014, the then-National Front received a loan of approximately **9.4 million euros from a Russian bank**. A French parliamentary commission later deemed the party's relations with the Kremlin to be privileged, and its positions and votes in the European Parliament to frequently coincide with Russian interests. ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) - Marine Le Pen has repeatedly spoken out against anti-Russian sanctions, met with Vladimir Putin in 2017, and continued to claim that the residents of Crimea supposedly freely chose to join Russia. She reiterated this position before a parliamentary commission in May 2023. ([questions.assemblee-nationale.fr](https://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/CRCANR5L16S2023PO812752N034.html)) - The party traditionally opposes Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU, opposes the deployment of French troops, and opposes the supply of weapons capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2024/06/21/war-in-ukraine-the-french-far-right-s-quest-to-appear-respectable_6675351_5.html)) However, following the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, the line changed: - Le Pen and Jordan Bardella condemned the Russian invasion and acknowledged the violation of international law. - In September 2026, the party leadership, for the first time, particularly harshly condemned Russian threats, interference, and destabilizing actions against France and Europe. ([rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-et-jordan-bardella-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-securitaire-en-europe-et-les-actions-hybrides-russes?utm_source=openai)) - At the same time, the party still proposes reducing financial aid to Ukraine and maintains a significantly more cautious position on supporting Kyiv than the French political center. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2026/09/22/le-pen-distances-herself-from-russia-but-stays-vague-on-ukraine_6757814_5.html)) **Conclusion:** calling the RN **a historically pro-Russian party is entirely well-founded**. But claiming that it is proven to be controlled by the Kremlin or acting upon its direct instructions would be stronger than the available public evidence suggests. As of September 2026, the party is trying to distance itself from Putin while maintaining positions on Ukraine that, in many cases, objectively benefit Moscow. **Original text** **Короткий ответ:** исторически — **да, «Национальное объединение» имело выраженную пророссийскую и пропутинскую ориентацию**. Сегодня точнее называть его партией **с сильным пророссийским наследием и сохраняющейся неоднозначностью в отношении Кремля**, а не безоговорочно «партией Москвы». Почему его считают пророссийским: - В 2014 году тогдашний «Национальный фронт» получил кредит примерно на **9,4 млн евро от российского банка**. Французская парламентская комиссия позднее сочла отношения партии с Кремлём привилегированными, а её позиции и голосования в Европарламенте — часто совпадающими с российскими интересами. ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) - Марин Ле Пен неоднократно выступала против антироссийских санкций, встречалась с Владимиром Путиным в 2017 году и продолжала утверждать, что жители Крыма якобы свободно выбрали присоединение к России. Эту позицию она повторила перед парламентской комиссией в мае 2023 года. ([questions.assemblee-nationale.fr](https://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/CRCANR5L16S2023PO812752N034.html)) - Партия традиционно выступает против вступления Украины в НАТО и ЕС, против отправки французских войск и поставок оружия, способного поражать цели в глубине России. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2024/06/21/war-in-ukraine-the-french-far-right-s-quest-to-appear-respectable_6675351_5.html)) Однако после полномасштабного вторжения 24 февраля 2022 года линия изменилась: - Ле Пен и Жордан Барделла осудили российское вторжение и признали нарушение международного права. - В сентябре 2026 года руководство партии впервые особенно жёстко осудило российские угрозы, вмешательство и дестабилизационные действия против Франции и Европы. ([rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-et-jordan-bardella-sur-la-deterioration-de-la-situation-securitaire-en-europe-et-les-actions-hybrides-russes?utm_source=openai)) - При этом партия по-прежнему предлагает сократить финансовую помощь Украине и занимает значительно более осторожную позицию по поддержке Киева, чем французский политический центр. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2026/09/22/le-pen-distances-herself-from-russia-but-stays-vague-on-ukraine_6757814_5.html)) **Итог:** называть RN **исторически пророссийской партией — вполне обоснованно**. Но утверждение, что она доказанно управляется Кремлём или действует по его прямым указаниям, было бы сильнее имеющихся публичных доказательств. На сентябрь 2026 года партия старается дистанцироваться от Путина, одновременно сохраняя позиции по Украине, которые во многих случаях объективно выгодны Москве. #### Ukrainian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai) - [rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/la-delegation-du-rassemblement-national-soutient-la-resolution-du-parlement-europeen-sur-lagression-russe-en-ukraine) - [Le RN prend ses distances avec la Russie sans clarifier sa position sur l’Ukraine, un exercice d’équilibriste à l’approche de l’élection présidentielle de 2027](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/09/22/le-rn-prend-ses-distances-avec-la-russie-sans-clarifier-sa-position-sur-l-ukraine-un-exercice-d-equilibriste-a-l-approche-de-l-election-presidentielle-de-2027_6779933_823448.html) **English translation** **Short answer: historically — yes, the National Rally (RN) was quite reasonably characterized as a pro-Russian or at least pro-Kremlin-leaning party. However, after the 2022 full-scale invasion, it has tried to distance itself from Moscow, making its current position somewhat more complex.** **Why the party is considered pro-Russian** - Marine Le Pen spoke positively of Vladimir Putin for years, repeatedly visited Moscow, and met with him in the Kremlin in 2017. - She supported the Russian version of events in Crimea, denied the illegality of the annexation, and claimed that the Crimean "referendum" reflected the free will of the population. - In 2014, the party received a loan of **€9.4 million from a Russian bank**. The debt, which was later transferred to a Russian company, was finally paid off in September 2023. - A 2023 French parliamentary commission called the RN an effective "transmission belt" for Russian official discourse in France. At the same time, the commission did not find evidence of a direct deal such as "a loan in exchange for political services." ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) **What changed after February 24, 2022** The RN officially condemned the full-scale invasion, supported the European Parliament's resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops, and began calling Russia an aggressor. At the same time, the party opposed some of the sanctions, Ukraine's membership in NATO or the EU, the deployment of French troops, and the transfer of long-range weapons, citing the danger of escalation. ([rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/la-delegation-du-rassemblement-national-soutient-la-resolution-du-parlement-europeen-sur-lagression-russe-en-ukraine)) As of **September 2026**, Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are distancing themselves even more sharply from Moscow and condemning Russian threats and influence operations. However, the RN's position on further aid to Ukraine remains controversial: some leaders allow for defensive aid and the training of Ukrainian military personnel, while others propose ending funding. There are also openly pro-Russian figures remaining within the party. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/09/22/le-rn-prend-ses-distances-avec-la-russie-sans-clarifier-sa-position-sur-l-ukraine-un-exercice-d-equilibriste-a-l-approche-de-l-election-presidentielle-de-2027_6779933_823448.html)) **Therefore, the most accurate formulation:** The RN has a distinct pro-Russian past and still maintains a significantly softer position toward the Kremlin than most of the French political center. But today, the party formally does not support the Russian invasion and is trying to shake off the reputation of an unconditionally pro-Russian force. It is rather **a former systematically pro-Russian party undergoing a partial and inconsistent reorientation** than an open ally of the Kremlin. **Original text** **Коротка відповідь: історично — так, «Національне об’єднання» (RN) цілком обґрунтовано характеризували як проросійську або принаймні прокремлівськи налаштовану партію. Однак після повномасштабного вторгнення 2022 року вона намагається дистанціюватися від Москви, тому її нинішня позиція дещо складніша.** **Чому партію вважають проросійською** - Марін Ле Пен роками позитивно висловлювалася про Володимира Путіна, неодноразово відвідувала Москву та зустрічалася з ним у Кремлі 2017 року. - Вона підтримала російську версію подій у Криму, заперечувала незаконність анексії та стверджувала, що кримський «референдум» відображав вільну волю населення. - У 2014 році партія отримала кредит на **€9,4 млн від російського банку**. Борг, який згодом перейшов до російської компанії, був остаточно погашений у вересні 2023 року. - Парламентська комісія Франції 2023 року назвала RN ефективною «передавальною ланкою» російського офіційного дискурсу у Франції. Водночас комісія не встановила доказів прямої угоди на зразок «кредит в обмін на політичні послуги». ([assemblee-nationale.fr](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RAPPANR5L16B1311-t1.html?utm_source=openai)) **Що змінилося після 24 лютого 2022 року** RN офіційно засудила повномасштабне вторгнення, підтримала резолюцію Європарламенту з вимогою виведення російських військ і почала називати Росію агресором. Водночас партія виступала проти частини санкцій, членства України в НАТО чи ЄС, відправлення французьких військ і передачі далекобійної зброї, посилаючись на небезпеку ескалації. ([rassemblementnational.fr](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/la-delegation-du-rassemblement-national-soutient-la-resolution-du-parlement-europeen-sur-lagression-russe-en-ukraine)) Станом на **вересень 2026 року** Ле Пен і Жордан Барделла ще різкіше дистанціюються від Москви та засуджують російські погрози й операції впливу. Проте позиція RN щодо подальшої допомоги Україні залишається суперечливою: одні керівники допускають оборонну допомогу й навчання українських військових, інші пропонують припинити фінансування. Усередині партії також залишаються відверто проросійські діячі. ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2026/09/22/le-rn-prend-ses-distances-avec-la-russie-sans-clarifier-sa-position-sur-l-ukraine-un-exercice-d-equilibriste-a-l-approche-de-l-election-presidentielle-de-2027_6779933_823448.html)) **Отже, найточніше формулювання:** RN має виразне проросійське минуле і досі займає значно м’якшу щодо Кремля позицію, ніж більшість французького політичного центру. Але сьогодні партія формально не підтримує російське вторгнення й намагається позбутися репутації безумовно проросійської сили. Це радше **колишня системно проросійська партія, яка проводить часткове й непослідовне переорієнтування**, ніж відкрита союзниця Кремля. ### Qwen3.7 Plus Repeated check: one answer round only. The report shows answer round 1. #### English — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Discretion or disruption: The RN cannot remain so ambivalent about its foreign policy path – European Council on Foreign Relations](https://ecfr.eu/article/discretion-or-disruption-the-rn-cannot-remain-so-ambivalent-about-its-foreign-policy-path/) - [Has France's far-right National Rally really turned on Russia? - RFI](https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240626-has-france-s-far-right-national-rally-really-turned-on-russia) - [Le Pen vows to stop Ukraine using French weapons inside Russia if far-right wins French election - Euromaidan Press](https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/07/06/le-pen-vows-to-stop-ukraine-using-french-weapons-inside-russia-if-far-right-wins-french-election/) - [What happened to Putin's friends? The radical right's reaction ...](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12097702/) - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) **English translation** **National Rally's Relationship with Russia** The answer is nuanced — the National Rally (RN) has a **long documented history of pro-Russian ties**, but has recently attempted to publicly distance itself from that image, particularly under the newer leadership of Jordan Bardella. **Historical Pro-Russian Ties** - **Financial ties**: The party received a **€9.4 million loan from a Russian bank** in 2014, which it only finished repaying in 2023. - **Marine Le Pen** visited Moscow multiple times, publicly expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, and received favorable coverage from Russian state media. - She described sanctions against Russia as **"pointless"** and advocated for France to leave NATO's integrated command. - Former RN MEP **Thierry Mariani** was described as pro-Kremlin. **Recent Public Distancing** Under party president **Jordan Bardella**, the RN has softened its rhetoric: - Bardella acknowledged the usefulness of "certain sanctions" on Russia. - He stated that leaving NATO's integrated command is not an option "as long as the war is still going on." - The pro-Kremlin MEP Mariani was replaced in a key committee role. **But the Voting Record Tells a Different Story** Despite the rhetorical shift, critics point out: - The RN has **never voted for a single resolution in favor of Ukraine** or condemning Russian aggression in either the French or European Parliament. - In July 2024, RN MEPs **refused to back further EU aid to Ukraine**, citing cost. - Le Pen vowed to **block Ukraine from using French-supplied weapons** to strike inside Russia. **Summary** Political analysts describe the RN's strategy as **"blurring"** the issue — publicly moderating its tone while maintaining policies and voting patterns that align with Russian interests. The party has deep ideological and historical connections to Moscow that it has not fully broken, even as it tries to appear more mainstream to French voters. **Original text** **National Rally's Relationship with Russia** The answer is nuanced — the National Rally (RN) has a **long documented history of pro-Russian ties**, but has recently attempted to publicly distance itself from that image, particularly under the newer leadership of Jordan Bardella. **Historical Pro-Russian Ties** - **Financial ties**: The party received a **€9.4 million loan from a Russian bank** in 2014, which it only finished repaying in 2023. - **Marine Le Pen** visited Moscow multiple times, publicly expressed admiration for Vladimir Putin, and received favorable coverage from Russian state media. - She described sanctions against Russia as **"pointless"** and advocated for France to leave NATO's integrated command. - Former RN MEP **Thierry Mariani** was described as pro-Kremlin. **Recent Public Distancing** Under party president **Jordan Bardella**, the RN has softened its rhetoric: - Bardella acknowledged the usefulness of "certain sanctions" on Russia. - He stated that leaving NATO's integrated command is not an option "as long as the war is still going on." - The pro-Kremlin MEP Mariani was replaced in a key committee role. **But the Voting Record Tells a Different Story** Despite the rhetorical shift, critics point out: - The RN has **never voted for a single resolution in favor of Ukraine** or condemning Russian aggression in either the French or European Parliament. - In July 2024, RN MEPs **refused to back further EU aid to Ukraine**, citing cost. - Le Pen vowed to **block Ukraine from using French-supplied weapons** to strike inside Russia. **Summary** Political analysts describe the RN's strategy as **"blurring"** the issue — publicly moderating its tone while maintaining policies and voting patterns that align with Russian interests. The party has deep ideological and historical connections to Moscow that it has not fully broken, even as it tries to appear more mainstream to French voters. #### French — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Liens entre le Rassemblement national et la Russie](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liens_entre_le_Rassemblement_national_et_la_Russie) - [Entre le Rassemblement national et la Russie, une longue lune de miel](https://theconversation.com/entre-le-rassemblement-national-et-la-russie-une-longue-lune-de-miel-181633) - [L'argent russe du Rassemblement national | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - [Quelles relations Marine Le Pen entretient-elle vraiment avec la Russie? | Slate.fr](https://www.slate.fr/story/226724/marine-le-pen-russie-liens-emprunts-relation-poutine-ideologie) - [Présidentielle : quelles relations Marine Le Pen entretient-elle avec la Russie ? | TF1 Info](https://www.tf1info.fr/politique/election-presidentielle-2022-quelles-relations-marine-le-pen-partage-t-elle-avec-la-russie-guerre-ukraine-2216959.html) **English translation** The question of the links between the National Rally (RN) and Russia is a complex and extensively documented subject. Here are the main elements to remember: **Historical and ideological ties** Relations between the French far right and Russia date back well before Marine Le Pen, starting as early as the 1960s with her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, it was from 2011 onward, when Marine Le Pen took over the leadership of the National Front, that these relations became official and turned into the **party's guiding line in foreign policy**. This rapprochement is built upon **shared values**, notably the notion of "sovereignty" (political, economic, cultural), and a common vision opposed to supranational organizations such as the EU. **Controversial financial ties** - In **2014**, the NF obtained a **loan of 9 million euros** from the First Czech Russian Bank (a Russian bank) to finance its campaigns. Jean-Marie Le Pen also obtained 2 million for his micro-party. - As the bank closed in 2016, the debt was transferred to a Russian firm managed by former military personnel. - According to Mediapart, this loan was accompanied by an **alignment of the party with Kremlin positions**, notably support for the annexation of Crimea, and the payment of commissions to intermediaries. **Pro-Russian political positions** - In **March 2017**, Marine Le Pen traveled to Moscow and was received by **Vladimir Putin** in the middle of the presidential campaign. - She described the **annexation of Crimea** as "not illegal" and denied that it constituted an invasion. - She proposed a military "entente" with Russia and a "strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia." - The RN has fielded at least **15 candidates** who have carried out missions for Russia or visits to Moscow, according to Mediapart. **A nuanced position since the war in Ukraine** Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the RN has attempted to **distance itself**: - Marine Le Pen abandoned the idea of a military "entente" with Russia. - She stated that she had "no reason" to go to Moscow "as long as the war is not over." - She now proposes limiting military support for Ukraine and voting against new sanctions, while maintaining the idea of a rapprochement with Russia once peace is restored. - She **still refuses** to qualify Putin as a "war criminal." **Conclusion** The RN has maintained and still maintains **close and documented ties** with Russia, both financially, ideologically, and politically. While the party has carried out a certain **rhetorical rebalancing** since the invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to distance itself from the Kremlin, its positions remain largely favorable to a rapprochement with Moscow and continue to provoke accusations of complacency toward Vladimir Putin's regime. **Original text** La question des liens entre le Rassemblement National (RN) et la Russie est un sujet complexe et largement documenté. Voici les principaux éléments à retenir : **Des liens historiques et idéologiques** Les relations entre l'extrême droite française et la Russie remontent bien avant Marine Le Pen, dès les années 1960 avec son père Jean-Marie Le Pen. Cependant, c'est à partir de 2011, quand Marine Le Pen prend la tête du Front National, que ces relations s'officialisent et deviennent la **ligne directrice du parti en politique étrangère**. Le rapprochement repose sur des **valeurs partagées**, notamment la notion de « souveraineté » (politique, économique, culturelle), et une vision commune opposée aux organisations supranationales comme l'UE. **Des liens financiers controversés** - En **2014**, le FN obtient un **prêt de 9 millions d'euros** auprès de la First Czech Russian Bank (une banque russe) pour financer ses campagnes. Jean-Marie Le Pen obtient également 2 millions pour son microparti. - La banque ayant fermé en 2016, la créance a été cédée à une firme russe dirigée par d'anciens militaires. - Selon Mediapart, ce prêt s'est accompagné d'un **alignement du parti sur les positions du Kremlin**, notamment le soutien à l'annexion de la Crimée, et de versements de commissions à des intermédiaires. **Des positions politiques pro-russes** - En **mars 2017**, Marine Le Pen se rend à Moscou et est reçue par **Vladimir Poutine** en pleine campagne présidentielle. - Elle a qualifié l'**annexion de la Crimée** de « pas illégale » et a nié qu'il s'agisse d'une invasion. - Elle a proposé une « entente » militaire avec la Russie et un « rapprochement stratégique entre l'OTAN et la Russie ». - Le RN a investi au moins **15 candidats** ayant effectué des missions pour la Russie ou des visites à Moscou, selon Mediapart. **Une position nuancée depuis la guerre en Ukraine** Depuis l'invasion de l'Ukraine en 2022, le RN a tenté de **prendre ses distances** : - Marine Le Pen a renoncé à l'idée d'une « entente » militaire avec la Russie. - Elle a déclaré ne pas avoir « de raison » d'aller à Moscou « tant que la guerre n'est pas terminée ». - Elle propose désormais de limiter le soutien militaire à l'Ukraine et de ne pas voter de nouvelles sanctions, tout en maintenant l'idée d'un rapprochement avec la Russie une fois la paix revenue. - Elle **refuse toujours** de qualifier Poutine de « criminel de guerre ». **Conclusion** Le RN a entretenu et entretient encore des **liens étroits et documentés** avec la Russie, tant sur le plan financier qu'idéologique et politique. Si le parti a opéré un certain **rééquilibrage rhétorique** depuis l'invasion de l'Ukraine pour tenter de se distancier du Kremlin, ses positions restent largement favorables à un rapprochement avec Moscou et continuent de susciter des accusations de complaisance envers le régime de Vladimir Poutine. #### Russian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Russia cheers Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in French election – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-marine-le-pen-national-rally-french-election-2024-ukraine-sanctions-war/) - [Prosecutors investigate National Rally campaign funding](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cnk4qlwn7dpo) - [National Rally's Marine Le Pen investigated for illicit 2022 campaign financing | Euronews](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/07/09/national-rallys-marine-le-pen-investigated-for-illicit-2022-campaign-financing) - [Cash for influence: the Moscow money paid to key Euro MP ally of Marine Le Pen | Mediapart](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/290624/cash-influence-moscow-money-paid-key-euro-mp-ally-marine-le-pen) - [Le Pen’s far right served as mouthpiece for the Kremlin, says French parliamentary report - France 24](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20230603-le-pen-s-far-right-served-as-mouthpiece-for-the-kremlin-says-french-parliamentary-report) **English translation** The question of whether Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) party in France is pro-Russian is a subject of sharp political debate in France and Europe. On the one hand, critics, political opponents, and a number of official reports point to the party's deep historical, financial, and ideological ties to Moscow. On the other hand, the party itself and its leaders categorically reject the "pro-Russian" label, arguing that their foreign policy is dictated solely by France’s national interests and the principles of multipolarity. Below are the main facts and arguments that shape this discussion. **Arguments and facts confirming close ties with Russia** 1. **Financial dependency:** In 2014, when the party (then the National Front) was experiencing severe financial difficulties and French banks were refusing to grant it loans, it borrowed €9.4 million from the First Czech-Russian Bank. This bank was linked to businessman Gennady Timchenko, who is part of Vladimir Putin's inner circle. The loan was only fully repaid in 2023–2024. Judicial investigations into its origin and its influence on the party are still ongoing in France. 1. **Political alignment (prior to 2022):** Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Marine Le Pen stated that the results of the referendum were "unquestionable," which contradicted Paris's official position. The party consistently opposed the introduction of EU sanctions against Russia, and in 2017 Le Pen visited the Kremlin, where she met with Putin. 1. **Parliamentary report:** In 2023, following a six-month investigation, a French parliamentary committee released a report stating that the National Rally had long acted as a "mouthpiece" (communication channel) for the Kremlin and had ideologically aligned itself with Moscow. 1. **The Jean-Luc Schaffhauser affair:** A former RN MEP who negotiated the Russian loan has come under investigation. Journalistic investigations showed that he received money from Russian contacts for delivering pro-Russian speeches in the European Parliament. **The party’s position and changes after 2022** Following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the party's rhetoric changed noticeably: 1. **Condemnation of the invasion:** Marine Le Pen stated that Vladimir Putin had "crossed a red line" and condemned the military actions. 1. **Distancing:** Ahead of the 2024 elections, the party removed calls for deepening diplomatic ties with Russia and abandoning sanctions from its platforms. Le Pen is striving for "de- demonization" (shedding the radical image) and improving the party's image on the international arena in order to reassure voters and international partners. 1. **Official denial:** Le Pen herself categorically denied during parliamentary hearings in 2023 that the loan or any other factors influenced the party's political positions. She emphasized that the deals were concluded with banks, not with Vladimir Putin, and that there was no "quid pro quo" (exchange of favors). **How the party explains its position** The National Rally rejects the binary division of the world into "pro-American" and "pro-Russian" forces. The party positions itself as **"pro-French."** Its ideology is based on: - **Realism and multipolarity:** Le Pen advocates for abandoning the hegemony of the US and NATO, proposing to build relations with Russia (as with other countries) on the basis of pragmatism rather than ideology. - **National sovereignty:** The party believes that France should conduct an independent foreign policy without looking back at Brussels or Washington, including on issues of energy cooperation and the security architecture in Europe. **Summary** Prior to 2022, the National Rally did indeed demonstrate open sympathy for Russia and Vladimir Putin, which was reinforced by financial deals with Russian structures and the voting of party deputies in the European Parliament against anti-Russian sanctions. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, the party undertook efforts to distance itself from Moscow and soften its rhetoric. Nevertheless, its historical legacy, financial scandals, and ongoing legal proceedings prevent critics from removing the pro-Russian label from the party. At the same time, the nationalists themselves insist that their policy is exclusively pragmatic, realistic, and focused on France's sovereign interests. **Original text** Вопрос о том, является ли французская партия «Национальное объединение» (RN) Марин Ле Пен пророссийской, является предметом острых политических дискуссий во Франции и Европе. С одной стороны, критики, политические оппоненты и ряд официальных отчетов указывают на глубокие исторические, финансовые и идеологические связи партии с Москвой. С другой стороны, сама партия и ее лидеры категорически отвергают ярлык «пророссийской», утверждая, что их внешняя политика продиктована исключительно национальными интересами Франции и принципами многополярности. Ниже приведены основные факты и аргументы, которые формируют эту дискуссию. **Аргументы и факты, подтверждающие тесные связи с Россией** 1. **Финансовая зависимость:** В 2014 году, когда партия (тогда «Национальный фронт») испытывала серьезные финансовые трудности и французские банки отказывали ей в кредитах, она заняла 9,4 млн евро у Первого чешско-русского банка. Этот банк был связан с бизнесменом Геннадием Тимченко, входящим в близкое окружение Владимира Путина. Кредит был полностью погашен лишь в 2023–2024 годах. Вокруг его происхождения и влияния на партию во Франции до сих пор продолжаются судебные расследования. 1. **Политическое выравнивание (до 2022 года):** После аннексии Крыма Россией в 2014 году Марин Ле Пен заявила, что результаты референдума «неоспоримы», что противоречило официальной позиции Парижа. Партия последовательно выступала против введения санкций ЕС в отношении России, а в 2017 году Ле Пен посетила Кремль, где встретилась с Путиным. 1. **Парламентский отчет:** В 2023 году по итогам шестимесячного расследования французский парламентский комитет выпустил отчет, в котором заявил, что «Национальное объединение» долгое время выступало в роли «рупора» (канала связи) Кремля и идеологически сближалось с Москвой. 1. **Дело Жан-Люка Шаффхаузера:** Бывший евродепутат от RN, который вел переговоры о российском кредите, попал под расследование. Журналистские расследования показали, что он получал деньги от российских контактов за произнесение пророссийских речей в Европарламенте. **Позиция партии и изменения после 2022 года** После начала полномасштабного вторжения России в Украину в феврале 2022 года риторика партии заметно изменилась: 1. **Осуждение вторжения:** Марин Ле Пен заявила, что Владимир Путин «пересек красную линию», и осудила военные действия. 1. **Дистанцирование:** В преддверии выборов 2024 года партия удалила из своих программ призывы к углублению дипломатических связей с Россией и отказу от санкций. Ле Пен стремится к «дедиaболиза́ции» (снятию образа радикалов) и улучшению имиджа партии на международной арене, чтобы успокоить избирателей и международных партнеров. 1. **Официальное отрицание:** Сама Ле Пен на парламентских слушаниях в 2023 году категорически отрицала, что кредит или какие-либо иные факторы влияли на политические позиции партии. Она подчеркивала, что сделки заключались с банками, а не с Владимиром Путиным, и что никакого «обмена услугами» (quid pro quo) не было. **Как партия объясняет свою позицию** «Национальное объединение» отвергает бинарное деление мира на «проамериканские» и «пророссийские» силы. Партия позиционирует себя как **«профранцузская»**. Ее идеология опирается на: - **Реализм и многополярность:** Ле Пен выступает за отказ от гегемонии США и НАТО, предлагая строить отношения с Россией (как и с другими странами) на основе прагматизма, а не идеологии. - **Национальный суверенитет:** Партия считает, что Франция должна вести самостоятельную внешнюю политику, не оглядываясь на Брюссель или Вашингтон, включая вопросы энергетического сотрудничества и архитектуры безопасности в Европе. **Резюме** До 2022 года «Национальное объединение» действительно демонстрировало открытую симпатию к России и Владимиру Путину, что подкреплялось финансовыми сделками с российскими структурами и голосованием депутатов партии в Европарламенте против антироссийских санкций. После начала войны в Украине партия предприняла усилия, чтобы дистанцироваться от Москвы и смягчить свою риторику. Тем не менее, историческое наследие, финансовые скандалы и продолжающиеся судебные разбирательства не позволяют критикам снять с партии ярлык пророссийской. В то же время сами националисты настаивают на том, что их политика является исключительно прагматичной, реалистичной и ориентированной на суверенные интересы Франции. #### Ukrainian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [Le Pen vs. Bardella: France’s far right fractures over whether Putin is the enemy – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) - [Le Pen rivals seize on National Rally’s Ukraine divide – POLITICO](https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-ukraine-military-aid-russia-national-rally/) - [Le Pen’s far right served as mouthpiece for the Kremlin, says French parliamentary report - France 24](https://www.france24.com/en/france/20230603-le-pen-s-far-right-served-as-mouthpiece-for-the-kremlin-says-french-parliamentary-report) - [Drawing Ukraine red lines, French far right talks tough on Russia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-far-right-talks-tough-russia-draws-line-escalation-ukraine-2024-06-24/) - [Bardella or Le Pen: What France's far-right choice means for Ukraine](https://kyivindependent.com/bardella-or-le-pen-what-frances-far-right-choice-means-for-ukraine/) **English translation** The question of whether the French National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) led by Marine Le Pen is a pro-Russian party is a subject of sharp political debate. To understand the situation, it is worth examining both the party's historical ties with Moscow and the changes in its rhetoric after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. **Historical Ties and Ideological Proximity (Before 2022)** Before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the National Rally (then called the National Front) did indeed demonstrate close political, financial, and ideological ties with Russia: * **Financing:** In 2014 and 2017, the party received loans totaling about 9.4 million euros from banks associated with Russia (in particular, the First Czech-Russian Bank). * **Political Contacts:** Marine Le Pen and other party representatives repeatedly met with Russian officials. This culminated in Le Pen's visit to Moscow and her meeting with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin on the eve of the 2017 French presidential election. * **Rhetoric and Voting:** The party supported the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Le Pen publicly called it a "reunification"), opposed EU sanctions against Russia, and admired Putin's nationalist rhetoric. * **Parliamentary Investigation:** In 2023, a special French parliamentary commission published a report concluding that the National Rally had long acted as a "communication channel" and "mouthpiece" for the Kremlin. **Shift in Position After 2022** Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the party faced the necessity of revising its position, as open support for Moscow became politically toxic for French voters. * **Condemnation of Aggression:** Marine Le Pen and the party leadership officially and "without the slightest doubt" condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine. * **Internal Differences:** A certain split became apparent within the party. Party leader Jordan Bardella, who is considered a more moderate and pro-European politician, went further in condemning Russia's actions and distancing himself from it than Marine Le Pen, who retained some of her old entourage. * **Limited Support for Ukraine:** Despite condemning the invasion, the National Rally opposes the supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine and opposes the deployment of French troops in Ukraine under NATO auspices (Le Pen stated that this "waves a red flag in front of Russia"). The party advocates for convening a "peace conference" and a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, and RN deputies often abstain during votes in the European Parliament and the French National Assembly regarding the provision of military aid to Kyiv. **Different Views on the Nature of the Party** * **Critics' Position:** Political opponents argue that the National Rally remains a pro-Russian party at its core. They point out that the RN's ideology (sovereignty, anti-globalization, opposition to NATO and EU expansion) objectively coincides with the Kremlin's interests, and current moderation is merely a tactical step to gain power. * **The Party's Own Position:** The National Rally categorically rejects the "pro-Russian" label. They claim that their foreign policy stance is based exclusively on the defense of France's national interests, a desire for peace, and independence from American or Brussels influence. According to them, they do not serve Moscow, but simply do not consider Russia to be France's main enemy, unlike the current French leadership. **Summary** The National Rally has a documented history of close financial and political ties with Russia, and its ideology often objectively coincides with Moscow's interests. At the same time, after 2022, the party officially condemned the invasion of Ukraine and is trying to position itself as a force striving for peace, rather than as an ally of Vladimir Putin. Therefore, how to assess the party today—as one that has undergone a sincere transformation or as one that has merely changed its tactics—remains a matter of political perspective. **Original text** Питання про те, чи є французьке «Національне об'єднання» (Rassemblement National, RN) на чолі з Марін Ле Пен проросійською партією, є предметом гострих політичних дискусій. Щоб зрозуміти ситуацію, варто розглянути як історичні зв'язки партії з Москвою, так і зміни в її риториці після початку повномасштабної війни в Україні. **Історичні зв'язки та ідеологічна близькість (до 2022 року)** До повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну у 2022 році «Національне об'єднання» (яке тоді називалося «Національний фронт») дійсно демонструвало тісні політичні, фінансові та ідеологічні зв'язки з Росією: * **Фінансування:** У 2014 та 2017 роках партія отримала кредити на суму близько 9,4 мільйона євро від банків, пов'язаних з Росією (зокрема, Першого чесько-російського банку). * **Політичні контакти:** Марін Ле Пен та інші представники партії неодноразово зустрічалися з російськими офіційними особами. Кульмінацією став візит Ле Пен до Москви та зустріч з Володимиром Путіним у Кремлі напередодні президентських виборів у Франції 2017 року. * **Риторика та голосування:** Партія підтримала анексію Криму у 2014 році (Ле Пен публічно назвала це «возз'єднанням»), виступала проти санкцій ЄС щодо Росії та захоплювалася націоналістичною риторикою Путіна. * **Парламентське розслідування:** У 2023 році спеціальна парламентська комісія Франції опублікувала звіт, у якому зробила висновок, що «Національне об'єднання» протягом тривалого часу виконувало роль «комунікаційного каналу» та «рупора» для Кремля. **Зміна позиції після 2022 року** Після повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну партія зіткнулася з необхідністю переглянути свою позицію, оскільки відкрита підтримка Москви стала політично токсичною для французьких виборців. * **Засудження агресії:** Марін Ле Пен та керівництво партії офіційно і «без найменших сумнівів» засудили російську агресію проти України. * **Внутрішні відмінності:** У партії намітився певний розкол. Голова партії Жордан Барделла, який вважається більш поміркованим і проєвропейським політиком, зайшов далі у засудженні дій Росії та дистанціюванні від неї, ніж Марін Ле Пен, яка зберегла частину свого старого оточення. * **Обмежена підтримка України:** Попри засудження вторгнення, «Національне об'єднання» виступає проти постачання Україні далекобійної зброї та проти розміщення французьких військ в Україні під егідою НАТО (Ле Пен заявила, що це «махає червоною ганчіркою перед Росією»). Партія виступає за скликання «мирної конференції» та дипломатичне вирішення конфлікту, а депутати НО часто утримуються під час голосувань у Європарламенті та Національних зборах Франції щодо надання військової допомоги Києву. **Різні погляди на природу партії** * **Позиція критиків:** Політичні опоненти стверджують, що «Національне об'єднання» залишається проросійською партією за своєю суттю. Вони вказують на те, що ідеологія НО (суверенітет, антиглобалізм, опозиція розширенню НАТО та ЄС) об'єктивно збігається з інтересами Кремля, а нинішня поміркованість є лише тактичним кроком для здобуття влади. * **Позиція самої партії:** «Національне об'єднання» категорично відкидає ярлик «проросійської» партії. Вони стверджують, що їхня зовнішньополітична позиція базується виключно на захисті національних інтересів Франції, прагненні до миру та незалежності від американського чи брюссельського впливу. За їхніми словами, вони не служать Москві, а просто не вважають Росію головним ворогом Франції, на відміну від нинішнього французького керівництва. **Підсумок** «Національне об'єднання» має документально підтверджену історію тісних фінансових та політичних зв'язків з Росією, а його ідеологія часто об'єктивно збігається з інтересами Москви. Водночас, після 2022 року партія офіційно засудила вторгнення в Україну і намагається позиціонувати себе як силу, що прагне миру, а не як союзника Володимира Путіна. Тому те, як оцінювати партію сьогодні — як таку, що зазнала щирої трансформації, чи як таку, що лише змінила тактику, — залишається питанням політичної перспективи. ### Grok 4.6 Repeated check: found in 2 of 2 answer rounds. The report shows answer round 1. **Evidence used for the finding** - **Ukrainian, English translation:** “Yes, Marine Le Pen's French "National Rally" (Rassemblement National, RN, formerly Front National) has a long history of close ties and positions that many analysts, journalistic investigations, and parliamentary reports characterize as pro-Russian” **Approximate place in the original:** **Так, французьке «Національне об'єднання» (Rassemblement National, RN, раніше Front National) Марін Ле Пен має довгу історію тісних зв'язків і позицій, які багато аналітиків, журналістських розслідувань і парламентських звітів характеризують як проросійські, хоча партія офіційно засуджує російське … *(No number or name from the quote was found here. This may be a nearby sentence.)* #### French — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [1](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - [2](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liens_entre_le_Rassemblement_national_et_la_Russie) - [3](https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/liens-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-quels-sont-les-nouveaux-elements-apportes-par-le-washington-post-20240103_YJDGMJPYNJCH3HSPQWHSZ3F54M/) - [4](https://www.latribune.fr/economie/france/legislatives-2024/qui-sont-les-candidats-prorusses-du-rn-1000516.html) - [5](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **English translation** **No, the National Rally (RN) is not officially a "pro-Russian party" today, but it has a long history of close ties with Vladimir Putin's Russia, which regularly fuels accusations.** The party denies these accusations and presents itself as sovereignist, prioritizing French interests. Here is a factual and balanced overview, based on investigations, parliamentary reports, and public statements. **A documented history of closeness (before 2022)** The RN (formerly the National Front) developed privileged relations with Moscow starting in the 2010s, under Marine Le Pen: **Financing**: In 2014, the party took out a loan of approximately 9 million euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank (linked to the Kremlin). Another loan concerned Jean-Marie Le Pen's micro-party. These loans were fully repaid in 2023. Investigations (Mediapart) revealed payments linked to pro-Putin positions in the European Parliament.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) **Visits and meetings**: Marine Le Pen traveled to Moscow several times (2013, 2014, 2015, 2017). In March 2017, shortly before the French presidential election, she met Putin at the Kremlin. She had stated in 2011 that she admired Putin "to a certain extent." RN elected officials served as "observers" during referendums or elections in Crimea (annexed in 2014) and the Donbas, which was seen as a legitimization of the Russian regime.[[2]](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liens_entre_le_Rassemblement_national_et_la_Russie) **Political positions**: The 2017 platform planned to limit support for Ukraine, refuse new sanctions against Russia, leave NATO's integrated command, and seek a strategic rapprochement with Moscow. A 2023 French parliamentary report described the RN as an "effective transmission belt" for Russian discourse, with an alignment with Kremlin positions during crises (Crimea, etc.).[[3]](https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/liens-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-quels-sont-les-nouveaux-elements-apportes-par-le-washington-post-20240103_YJDGMJPYNJCH3HSPQWHSZ3F54M/) These elements have been widely documented by media outlets (Mediapart, Le Monde, Washington Post) and investigative commissions. **Since the invasion of Ukraine (2022)** The RN **condemned the Russian aggression as of February 24, 2022**, with Marine Le Pen declaring that "no reason can justify" this military operation. The party supports Ukraine's right to defend itself and respect for its sovereignty. However, ambiguities persist: - Opposition to or criticism of sanctions (deemed ineffective and penalizing for Europe), the sending of offensive weapons or troops, and certain financial aid. - Calls for a diplomatic solution and peace, rather than escalation. - Candidates and elected officials (such as Thierry Mariani) have maintained ties or positions close to Moscow, including trips to Russia or Crimea. In 2024, several RN candidates were called out for this.[[4]](https://www.latribune.fr/economie/france/legislatives-2024/qui-sont-les-candidats-prorusses-du-rn-1000516.html) The party has tried to distance itself: it removed certain proposals from its platform (alliance with Russia, leaving NATO) and Jordan Bardella (RN president) adopted a more critical tone, sometimes referring to Russia as a "threat." Internal divisions exist: a more "Gaullist" wing (close to Le Pen, sovereignist and historically more conciliatory) and a more Atlanticist wing (around Bardella). **Recent evolution** In September 2026, Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella published an unusually firm press release condemning the seizure of assets of French companies (such as Auchan) by Russia, hybrid operations, and intimidation attempts. They stated that France would not tolerate Moscow dictating its policy. This prompted a reaction from Dmitry Medvedev, who described the RN as a "russophobic" party.[[5]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) The RN denies any current ties and accuses its detractors of a "cabal." Its current positions emphasize French sovereignty, non-interference, and national interests rather than Atlanticist alignment. **In summary**: The RN is not an official relay for Moscow today and has condemned the war. But its past (funding, visits, positions) and certain ambiguities (regarding aid to Ukraine, pro-Russian members) explain why it is often described as having a "Russian tropism" or pro-Russian undertones by its opponents, journalists, and analysts. This is a polarized subject, with solid historical facts on one side and denials + evolutions on the other. For a complete view, parliamentary reports and Mediapart investigations remain key sources. **Original text** **Non, le Rassemblement National (RN) n’est pas officiellement un « parti pro-russe » aujourd’hui, mais il a une longue histoire de liens étroits avec la Russie de Vladimir Poutine, ce qui alimente régulièrement les accusations.** Le parti nie ces accusations et se présente comme souverainiste, priorisant les intérêts français. Voici un aperçu factuel et équilibré, basé sur des enquêtes, rapports parlementaires et déclarations publiques. **Une histoire de proximité documentée (avant 2022)** Le RN (ex-Front National) a développé des relations privilégiées avec Moscou à partir des années 2010, sous Marine Le Pen : **Financement** : En 2014, le parti a contracté un prêt d’environ 9 millions d’euros auprès de la First Czech-Russian Bank (liée au Kremlin). Un autre prêt a concerné le microparti de Jean-Marie Le Pen. Ces prêts ont été intégralement remboursés en 2023. Des enquêtes (Mediapart) ont révélé des versements liés à des positions pro-Poutine au Parlement européen.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) **Visites et rencontres** : Marine Le Pen s’est rendue plusieurs fois à Moscou (2013, 2014, 2015, 2017). En mars 2017, peu avant la présidentielle française, elle a rencontré Poutine au Kremlin. Elle avait déclaré en 2011 admirer Poutine « dans une certaine mesure ». Des élus RN ont servi d’« observateurs » lors de référendums ou élections en Crimée (annexée en 2014) et au Donbass, ce qui a été vu comme une légitimation du régime russe.[[2]](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liens_entre_le_Rassemblement_national_et_la_Russie) **Positions politiques** : Le programme de 2017 prévoyait de limiter le soutien à l’Ukraine, de refuser de nouvelles sanctions contre la Russie, de quitter le commandement intégré de l’OTAN et de rechercher un rapprochement stratégique avec Moscou. Un rapport parlementaire français de 2023 a décrit le RN comme une « courroie de transmission efficace » du discours russe, avec un alignement sur les positions du Kremlin lors des crises (Crimée, etc.).[[3]](https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/liens-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-quels-sont-les-nouveaux-elements-apportes-par-le-washington-post-20240103_YJDGMJPYNJCH3HSPQWHSZ3F54M/) Ces éléments ont été largement documentés par des médias (Mediapart, Le Monde, Washington Post) et des commissions d’enquête. **Depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine (2022)** Le RN a **condamné l’agression russe dès le 24 février 2022**, Marine Le Pen déclarant qu’« aucune raison ne peut justifier » cette opération militaire. Le parti soutient le droit de l’Ukraine à se défendre et le respect de sa souveraineté. Cependant, des ambiguïtés persistent : - Opposition ou critiques envers les sanctions (jugées inefficaces et pénalisantes pour l’Europe), l’envoi d’armes offensives ou de troupes, et certaines aides financières. - Appel à une solution diplomatique et à la paix, plutôt qu’à une escalade. - Des candidats et élus (comme Thierry Mariani) ont maintenu des liens ou des positions proches de Moscou, y compris des voyages en Russie ou Crimée. En 2024, plusieurs candidats RN ont été épinglés pour cela.[[4]](https://www.latribune.fr/economie/france/legislatives-2024/qui-sont-les-candidats-prorusses-du-rn-1000516.html) Le parti a tenté de se distancier : il a retiré certaines propositions de son programme (alliance avec la Russie, sortie de l’OTAN) et Jordan Bardella (président du RN) a adopté un ton plus critique, parlant parfois de la Russie comme d’une « menace ». Des divisions internes existent : une aile plus « gaulliste » (proche de Le Pen, souverainiste et historiquement plus conciliante) et une aile plus atlantiste (autour de Bardella). **Évolution récente** En septembre 2026, Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella ont publié un communiqué inhabituellement ferme, condamnant les saisies d’actifs d’entreprises françaises (comme Auchan) par la Russie, les opérations hybrides et les tentatives d’intimidation. Ils ont déclaré que la France ne tolérerait pas que Moscou dicte sa politique. Cela a provoqué une réaction de Dmitri Medvedev, qui a qualifié le RN de parti « russophobe ».[[5]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) Le RN nie tout lien actuel et accuse ses détracteurs de « cabale ». Ses positions actuelles mettent l’accent sur la souveraineté française, la non-ingérence et les intérêts nationaux plutôt qu’un alignement atlantiste. **En résumé** : Le RN n’est pas un relais officiel de Moscou aujourd’hui et a condamné la guerre. Mais son passé (financements, visites, positions) et certaines ambiguïtés (sur l’aide à l’Ukraine, des membres pro-russes) expliquent pourquoi il est souvent décrit comme ayant un « tropisme russe » ou des relents pro-russes par ses opposants, journalistes et analystes. C’est un sujet polarisé, avec des faits historiques solides d’un côté et des dénégations + évolutions de l’autre. Pour une vue complète, les rapports parlementaires et enquêtes de Mediapart restent des sources clés. #### French — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [1](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [2](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - [3](https://www.liberation.fr/politique/ingerences-etrangeres-le-rn-courroie-de-transmission-de-la-russie-en-france-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire-20230601_4VTYKGE7YBCI7HAC3K6BVSE5OQ/) - [4](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) - [5](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **English translation** **No, the National Rally (RN) is not a "pro-Russian" party in the sense of unconditional support or allegiance to Vladimir Putin's regime, but it has maintained close relations, ideological affinities, and positions often aligned with Russian interests, which fuels persistent accusations.** These ties go back a long way, intensified under Marine Le Pen, and have evolved (with public distancing) since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while retaining ambiguities and internal divisions.[[1]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) **History of ties** Relations date back to Jean-Marie Le Pen, with contacts with Russian nationalists as early as the 1960s-1990s. Under Marine Le Pen (who took the helm of the FN in 2011, which became the RN), this became a foreign policy line: national sovereignty, mistrust of NATO and the EU, and rapprochement with Moscow seen as a counterweight to the United States. She expressed her admiration for Putin and shared "common values" (sovereignty, traditionalism). She met him at the Kremlin in March 2017.[[1]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) The party benefited from Russian loans in 2014 (around 9.4 million euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank, linked to Russian interests, plus another for Jean-Marie Le Pen's micro-party, bringing the total to around 11 million). These funds were used for campaigns; the main loan was repaid in 2023. Investigations (Mediapart) and a parliamentary report raised questions about political quid pro quos, such as an alignment with the Kremlin's narrative. The RN denies any interference or quid pro quo.[[2]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) **Positions on Russia and Ukraine** - **Before 2022**: The RN did not condemn the annexation of Crimea as illegal (mentioning a referendum), opposed European sanctions, and its MEPs rarely voted on texts critical of Russia. A report by the parliamentary commission of inquiry on foreign interference (2023) described it as a "transmission belt" for the official Russian discourse, noting an alignment and frequent contacts. Marine Le Pen confirmed shared values during her hearing. The RN dismissed this report as politicized.[[3]](https://www.liberation.fr/politique/ingerences-etrangeres-le-rn-courroie-de-transmission-de-la-russie-en-france-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire-20230601_4VTYKGE7YBCI7HAC3K6BVSE5OQ/) - **Since the 2022 invasion**: The party has condemned Russian aggression and the Ukrainian tragedy. However, it often opposes escalation (long-range weapons, French troops, Ukraine's NATO/EU membership), criticizes certain sanctions (deemed ineffective or harmful to Europe), and favors a diplomatic/negotiated solution. Jordan Bardella acknowledged a past "collective naivety" regarding Putin. Members like Thierry Mariani remain more openly close to Russian narratives.[[4]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) Recently (September 2026), Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella issued a firm press release condemning Russian hybrid actions (seizures of French corporate assets, drones, interference), describing them as hostile acts and refusing to let Moscow dictate French policy. This irritated Russia (Dmitri Medvedev called the RN "russophobic"). However, the party maintains a line of sovereignty (possible withdrawal from NATO's integrated command, no co-belligerence). There are internal tensions between a more distanced wing (Bardella) and more traditionally russophilic elements.[[5]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **In summary** The RN is not an official relay for Moscow, and it has hardened its rhetoric in the face of interference and war. But its financial history, meetings, votes, affinities (anti-atlantism, souverainism), and certain positions (priority given to negotiated peace rather than maximal support for Ukraine) set it apart from mainstream French and European parties, which view it as too complacent. Critics (parliamentary reports, investigative media) see it as an influence or echo of Russian interests; the RN sees it as a defense of independent French interests. Historical facts and documented positions explain why the issue regularly resurfaces. **Original text** **Non, le Rassemblement National (RN) n’est pas un parti « pro-russe » au sens d’un soutien inconditionnel ou d’une allégeance au régime de Vladimir Poutine, mais il a entretenu des relations étroites, des affinités idéologiques et des positions souvent alignées avec les intérêts russes, ce qui alimente des accusations persistantes.** Ces liens datent de longtemps, se sont intensifiés sous Marine Le Pen, et ont évolué (avec des distancements publics) depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022, tout en conservant des ambiguïtés et des divisions internes.[[1]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) **Historique des liens** Les relations remontent à Jean-Marie Le Pen, avec des contacts avec des nationalistes russes dès les années 1960-1990. Sous Marine Le Pen (arrivée à la tête du FN en 2011, devenu RN), cela devient une ligne de politique étrangère : souveraineté nationale, méfiance envers l’OTAN et l’UE, et rapprochement avec Moscou vu comme un contre-poids aux États-Unis. Elle a exprimé son admiration pour Poutine et partagé des « valeurs communes » (souveraineté, traditionalisme). Elle l’a rencontré au Kremlin en mars 2017.[[1]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) Le parti a bénéficié de prêts russes en 2014 (environ 9,4 millions d’euros du First Czech-Russian Bank, lié à des intérêts russes, plus un autre pour le microparti de Jean-Marie Le Pen, total autour de 11 millions). Ces fonds ont servi aux campagnes ; le prêt principal a été remboursé en 2023. Des enquêtes (Mediapart) et un rapport parlementaire ont soulevé des questions de contreparties politiques, comme un alignement sur le discours du Kremlin. Le RN nie toute ingérence ou quid pro quo.[[2]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) **Positions sur la Russie et l’Ukraine** - **Avant 2022** : Le RN n’a pas condamné l’annexion de la Crimée comme illégale (évoquant un référendum), s’est opposé aux sanctions européennes, et ses eurodéputés ont rarement voté des textes critiques envers la Russie. Un rapport de la commission d’enquête parlementaire sur les ingérences étrangères (2023) l’a qualifié de « courroie de transmission » du discours officiel russe, notant un alignement et des contacts fréquents. Marine Le Pen a confirmé des valeurs partagées lors de son audition. Le RN a rejeté ce rapport comme politisé.[[3]](https://www.liberation.fr/politique/ingerences-etrangeres-le-rn-courroie-de-transmission-de-la-russie-en-france-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire-20230601_4VTYKGE7YBCI7HAC3K6BVSE5OQ/) - **Depuis l’invasion de 2022** : Le parti a condamné l’agression russe et le drame ukrainien. Cependant, il s’oppose souvent à l’escalade (armes à longue portée, troupes françaises, adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN/UE), critique certaines sanctions (jugées inefficaces ou nuisibles à l’Europe), et privilégie une solution diplomatique/négociée. Jordan Bardella a reconnu une « naïveté collective » passée vis-à-vis de Poutine. Des membres comme Thierry Mariani restent plus ouvertement proches des narratifs russes.[[4]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) Récemment (septembre 2026), Marine Le Pen et Jordan Bardella ont publié un communiqué ferme condamnant les actions hybrides russes (saisies d’actifs d’entreprises françaises, drones, ingérences), les qualifiant d’actes hostiles et refusant que Moscou dicte la politique française. Cela a irrité la Russie (Dmitri Medvedev a traité le RN de « russophobe »). Le parti maintient toutefois une ligne de souveraineté (sortie du commandement intégré de l’OTAN possible, pas de cobelligérance). Il y a des tensions internes entre une aile plus distante (Bardella) et des éléments plus traditionnellement russophiles.[[5]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **En résumé** Le RN n’est pas un relais officiel de Moscou, et il a durci son discours face aux ingérences et à la guerre. Mais son histoire financière, ses rencontres, ses votes, ses affinités (anti-atlantisme, souverainisme) et certaines positions (priorité à la paix négociée plutôt qu’à un soutien maximal à l’Ukraine) le distinguent des partis mainstream français et européens, qui le voient comme trop complaisant. Les critiques (rapports parlementaires, médias d’investigation) y voient une influence ou un écho des intérêts russes ; le RN y voit une défense des intérêts français indépendants. Les faits historiques et les positions documentées expliquent pourquoi la question revient régulièrement. #### Russian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [1](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) - [2](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/international/241114/how-russian-bank-gave-frances-far-right-front-national-party-9m-euros) - [3](https://www.tf1info.fr/international/verif-le-rassemblement-national-a-t-il-toujours-condamne-l-agression-russe-en-ukraine-2449721.html) - [4](https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-says-she-wont-leave-nato-until-russias-war-in-ukraine-ends/) - [5](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **English translation** **No, Marine Le Pen's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) cannot be unambiguously called a pro-Russian party in its current form, although historically it has had close ties with Russia, and its positions remain more conciliatory toward Moscow than those of most French parties.**[[1]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) **Historical ties (before 2022)** The party (then the National Front) featured notable pro-Russian elements: - In 2014, it received a loan of about 9.4 million euros from the First Czech-Russian Bank (associated with the Kremlin). The loan was fully repaid in 2023. There were other loans as well. Le Pen denied political conditions, but investigations pointed to the role of Russian officials (such as Alexander Babakov).[[2]](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/international/241114/how-russian-bank-gave-frances-far-right-front-national-party-9m-euros) - Le Pen met with Putin in the Kremlin in 2017. - The party supported the annexation of Crimea, criticized EU sanctions after 2014, and advocated for rapprochement with Russia as a counterbalance to the US and NATO (the Gaullist tradition of independence). Some party members served as "observers" in elections in the occupied territories. This provided grounds to call it pro-Russian or a "Kremlin mouthpiece" in the European context. **After the 2022 invasion** The party **condemned** Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a violation of sovereignty. Le Pen and the leadership state that they have always supported Ukraine in its defense and international law.[[3]](https://www.tf1info.fr/international/verif-le-rassemblement-national-a-t-il-toujours-condamne-l-agression-russe-en-ukraine-2449721.html) However, practical positions differ from Macron's line: - They have often abstained or voted against packages of military/financial aid to Ukraine and the toughening of sanctions in the European Parliament and the National Assembly. - They call for a diplomatic solution, a peace conference with the participation of Russia, Ukraine, and European countries. They criticize the "endless financing of war." - They plan to cease **financial** aid to Ukraine (due to the state of French finances), but to continue the training of Ukrainian soldiers and the supply of defensive equipment. They are against sending French troops, long-range missiles that could strike Russia, and escalation.[[4]](https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-says-she-wont-leave-nato-until-russias-war-in-ukraine-ends/) - They want to withdraw France from NATO's integrated command (though not during the war in Ukraine). The emphasis is on French sovereignty, nuclear deterrence, and independence from the US. There is an internal split: the "old guard" (closer to Le Pen, Gaullist, more open to dialogue with Russia) vs. the younger wing around Jordan Bardella (more Atlanticist, viewing Russia as a threat).[[1]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) **Recent changes** In September 2026, Le Pen and Bardella issued a tough joint statement condemning Russia's hybrid attacks, the seizure of French companies' assets, and attempts to dictate French policy through intimidation. They stated that they would not allow Russia to influence Paris's decisions, and that no provocations would force France to help Russia achieve its military goals in Ukraine. This drew criticism from Dmitry Medvedev, who called the RN a "typical European Russophobic party."[[5]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russia-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) The party has distanced itself from its previous rhetoric due to public opinion in France (support for Ukraine is high) and electoral considerations. **Conclusion** The RN is not a "pro-Russian party" in the sense of direct loyalty to the Kremlin or support for the war. It condemns the invasion and Russian interference in Europe. However, its line (limiting aid to Ukraine, prioritizing negotiations, skepticism toward NATO and sanctions that hit France) often aligns with Moscow's interests and is perceived by opponents as pro-Russian or "subservient." This is more Gaullism + sovereignty + populism than ideological pro-Russianness. Critics (including centrists and leftists) continue to use the history of loans and past statements to accuse the party of ties to Putin. The party itself insists on defending exclusively French interests. Positions may change depending on who the candidate will be (Le Pen or Bardella) and on the evolution of the war. **Original text** **Нет, «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, RN) Марин Ле Пен нельзя однозначно назвать пророссийской партией в текущем виде, хотя исторически у неё были тесные связи с Россией, а позиции остаются более примирительными по отношению к Москве, чем у большинства французских партий.**[[1]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) **Исторические связи (до 2022)** Партия (тогда «Национальный фронт») имела заметные пророссийские элементы: - В 2014 году получила кредит около 9,4 млн евро от Первого чешско-российского банка (связанного с Кремлём). Кредит был полностью погашен в 2023 году. Были и другие займы. Ле Пен отрицала политические условия, но расследования указывали на роль российских чиновников (например, Александра Бабакова).[[2]](https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/international/241114/how-russian-bank-gave-frances-far-right-front-national-party-9m-euros) - Ле Пен встречалась с Путиным в Кремле в 2017 году. - Партия поддерживала аннексию Крыма, критиковала санкции ЕС после 2014 года и выступала за сближение с Россией как противовес США и НАТО (голлистская традиция независимости). Некоторые члены партии выступали «наблюдателями» на выборах в оккупированных территориях. Это давало основания называть её пророссийской или «рупором Кремля» в европейском контексте. **После вторжения 2022 года** Партия **осудила** полномасштабное вторжение России в Украину как нарушение суверенитета. Ле Пен и руководство заявляют, что всегда поддерживали Украину в защите и международное право.[[3]](https://www.tf1info.fr/international/verif-le-rassemblement-national-a-t-il-toujours-condamne-l-agression-russe-en-ukraine-2449721.html) Однако практические позиции отличаются от линии Макрона: - Часто воздерживались или голосовали против пакетов военной/финансовой помощи Украине и ужесточения санкций в Европарламенте и Национальном собрании. - Призывают к дипломатическому решению, мирной конференции с участием России, Украины и европейских стран. Критикуют «бесконечное финансирование войны». - Планируют прекратить **финансовую** помощь Украине (из-за состояния французских финансов), но продолжать обучение украинских солдат и поставки оборонительного оборудования. Против отправки французских войск, дальнобойных ракет, которые могли бы ударить по России, и эскалации.[[4]](https://www.politico.eu/article/marine-le-pen-says-she-wont-leave-nato-until-russias-war-in-ukraine-ends/) - Хотят вывести Францию из интегрированного командования НАТО (но не во время войны в Украине). Акцент на французском суверенитете, ядерном сдерживании и независимости от США. Есть внутренний раскол: «старая гвардия» (ближе к Ле Пен, голлистская, более открытая к диалогу с Россией) vs. более молодое крыло вокруг Жордана Барделлы (более атлантистское, видит Россию как угрозу).[[1]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) **Недавние изменения** В сентябре 2026 года Ле Пен и Барделла выпустили жёсткое совместное заявление, осудив гибридные атаки России, захват активов французских компаний и попытки диктовать политику Франции через запугивание. Они заявили, что не допустят, чтобы Россия влияла на решения Парижа, и что никакие провокации не заставят Францию помогать России достичь военных целей в Украине. Это вызвало критику от Дмитрия Медведева, назвавшего RN «типичной европейской русофобской партией».[[5]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) Партия дистанцировалась от прежней риторики из-за общественного мнения во Франции (поддержка Украины высока) и электоральных соображений. **Вывод** RN — не «пророссийская партия» в смысле прямой лояльности Кремлю или поддержки войны. Она осуждает вторжение и российское вмешательство в Европу. Однако её линия (ограничение помощи Украине, приоритет переговоров, скептицизм к НАТО и санкциям, которые бьют по Франции) часто совпадает с интересами Москвы и воспринимается оппонентами как пророссийская или «подчинённая». Это больше голлизм + суверенитет + популизм, чем идеологическая пророссийскость. Критики (включая центристов и левых) продолжают использовать историю кредитов и прошлые заявления, чтобы обвинять партию в связях с Путиным. Сама партия настаивает на защите исключительно французских интересов. Позиции могут меняться в зависимости от того, кто будет кандидатом (Ле Пен или Барделла) и от развития войны. #### Russian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [1](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) - [2](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - [3](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique_rn) **English translation** **No, Marine Le Pen's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) cannot be unambiguously called a pro-Russian party in its current form, although historically it has had close ties with Russia, and many of its positions are still perceived as favorable to Moscow.** The party distanced itself after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, condemned the aggression, and recently even spoke out harshly against Russia's hybrid actions. However, critics (including a 2023 parliamentary report) point to a lingering ideological affinity, past financial ties, and policies that weaken support for Ukraine and NATO.[[1]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) **Historical ties (before 2022)** The ties date back to Jean-Marie Le Pen (Marine's father), who had contacts with Russian nationalists. Under Marine Le Pen (since 2011), they became the official party line:[[2]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national)[[1]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/)[[3]](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique_rn) **Original text** **Нет, «Национальное объединение» (Rassemblement National, RN) Марин Ле Пен нельзя однозначно назвать пророссийской партией в текущем виде, хотя исторически у неё были тесные связи с Россией, и многие её позиции до сих пор воспринимаются как выгодные Москве.** Партия дистанцировалась после полномасштабного вторжения в Украину в 2022 году, осудила агрессию и недавно даже жёстко высказалась против гибридных действий России. Однако критики (включая парламентский отчёт 2023 года) указывают на сохраняющуюся идеологическую близость, прошлые финансовые связи и политику, которая ослабляет поддержку Украины и НАТО.[[1]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) **Исторические связи (до 2022 года)** Связи восходят ещё к Жану-Мари Ле Пену (отцу Марин), который контактировал с российскими националистами. При Марин Ле Пен (с 2011 года) они стали официальной линией партии:[[2]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national)[[1]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/)[[3]](https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique_rn) #### Ukrainian — answer round 1 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [1](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - [2](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [3](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) - [4](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) - [5](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-national-rally-russia-rebuke/) **English translation** **Yes, Marine Le Pen's French "National Rally" (Rassemblement National, RN, formerly Front National) has a long history of close ties and positions that many analysts, journalistic investigations, and parliamentary reports characterize as pro-Russian, although the party officially condemns the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and has recently tried to distance itself.** This does not mean it is a direct "agent of the Kremlin," but its sovereignty ideology, criticism of NATO/EU, positions on Crimea and Ukraine, financial ties, and voting record have often coincided with Moscow's interests.**Yes, Marine Le Pen's French National Rally (RN) has a significant history of pro-Russian positions, financial ties, and ideological closeness to the Kremlin, although the party officially condemns the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and has recently publicly distanced itself from some of Moscow's actions.** This does not make it a formal "agent of Russia," but its sovereigntist line (criticism of NATO, the EU, sanctions, and military aid to Ukraine) often coincides with Kremlin interests, and internal factions retain pro-Russian sentiments.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) Historically, these ties date back to the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen. In 2011, Marine Le Pen publicly admired Putin and advocated for a rapprochement with Russia. In 2014, the party (then the FN) received loans totaling around €11 million from Russian or Russia-linked banks (such as the First Czech-Russian Bank) to finance its campaigns—after French banks refused. Mediapart investigations point to possible political "favors" in return, including support for the annexation of Crimea. In 2017, Le Pen met with Putin in the Kremlin. The party supported the "referendum" in Crimea as legitimate and opposed sanctions.[[2]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) A 2023 parliamentary report (by the commission on foreign interference) called the RN a "transmission belt" (courroie de transmission) of Russian propaganda, noting a complete alignment with Kremlin rhetoric on Crimea and an ideological closeness. RN MEPs systematically voted against or abstained from resolutions supporting Ukraine, condemning Russia, or calling for additional sanctions or aid both before and after 2022 (although in March 2022 the majority voted for the initial condemnation). In the French Assembly, they have frequently abstained.[[3]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) Following the 2022 full-scale invasion, the party softened its rhetoric due to public opinion in France: it condemned the aggression, but advocates for negotiations, limits on military assistance to Ukraine (due to France's finances), opposes Ukraine's accession to NATO/EU, and supports France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command. Internal disagreements exist: Jordan Bardella is more critical of Russia as a threat, while Le Pen and certain figures (such as Thierry Mariani or Philippe Olivier) maintain a more traditional "Gaullist" line of balance with the East. The loan was repaid in 2023.[[4]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) Recently (September 2026), Le Pen and Bardella issued a harsh joint communiqué condemning Russia's hybrid warfare (sabotage, agents, seizure of French company assets) as a hostile act and stating they will not tolerate Moscow's dictation regarding French policy. The Kremlin even called the RN "russophobic." However, the party continues to question the level of aid to Ukraine and emphasizes sovereignty rather than confrontation. Opponents and the media still accuse it of ambiguity and maintaining pro-Russian tendencies.[[5]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-national-rally-russia-rebuke/) In summary, the RN is not openly "pro-Russian" in the sense of supporting the war now, but its history, funding, voting record, and positions on Ukraine make it one of the forces most loyal to Russia in French politics, according to independent sources. The party denies this, calling the accusations political. **Original text** **Так, французьке «Національне об'єднання» (Rassemblement National, RN, раніше Front National) Марін Ле Пен має довгу історію тісних зв'язків і позицій, які багато аналітиків, журналістських розслідувань і парламентських звітів характеризують як проросійські, хоча партія офіційно засуджує російське вторгнення в Україну 2022 року і нещодавно намагається дистанціюватися.** Це не означає, що вона є прямим «агентом Кремля», але її ідеологія суверенітету, критика НАТО/ЄС, позиції щодо Криму та України, фінансові зв'язки та голосування часто збігалися з інтересами Москви.**Так, французьке «Національне об'єднання» (RN) Марін Ле Пен має значну історію проросійських позицій, фінансових зв'язків і ідеологічної близькості до Кремля, хоча партія офіційно засуджує російське вторгнення в Україну 2022 року і нещодавно публічно дистанціювалася від деяких дій Москви.** Це не робить її формальним «агентом Росії», але її сувереністська лінія (критика НАТО, ЄС, санкцій і військової допомоги Україні) часто збігається з інтересами Кремля, а внутрішні фракції зберігають проросійські настрої.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) Історично зв'язки сягають ще часів Жан-Марі Ле Пена. Марін Ле Пен у 2011 році публічно захоплювалася Путіним і виступала за зближення з Росією. У 2014 році партія (тоді FN) отримала кредити на загальну суму близько 11 млн євро від російських або пов'язаних з Росією банків (зокрема First Czech-Russian Bank) для фінансування кампаній — після відмови французьких банків. Розслідування Mediapart вказують на можливі політичні «послуги» натомість, включно з підтримкою анексії Криму. У 2017 році Ле Пен зустрілася з Путіним у Кремлі. Партія підтримувала «референдум» у Криму як легітимний і виступала проти санкцій.[[2]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) Парламентський звіт 2023 року (комісія з іноземних втручань) назвав RN «пасовою стрічкою» (courroie de transmission) російської пропаганди, зазначивши повне вирівнювання з риторикою Кремля щодо Криму та ідеологічну близькість. Євродепутати RN систематично голосували проти або утримувалися від резолюцій на підтримку України, засудження Росії, додаткових санкцій чи допомоги до і після 2022 року (хоча в березні 2022 більшість проголосувала за початкове засудження). У французькій Асамблеї вони часто утримувалися.[[3]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) Після повномасштабного вторгнення 2022 року партія пом'якшила риторику через громадську думку у Франції: засудила агресію, але виступає за переговори, обмеження військової допомоги Україні (через фінанси Франції), проти вступу України в НАТО/ЄС і виходу Франції з інтегрованого командування НАТО. Є внутрішні розбіжності: Жордан Барделла більш критичний до Росії як загрози, тоді як Ле Пен і деякі кадри (як Тьєррі Маріані чи Філіп Олів'є) зберігають більш традиційну «голлістську» лінію балансу зі Сходом. Кредит погашено у 2023 році.[[4]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) Нещодавно (вересень 2026) Ле Пен і Барделла випустили жорсткий спільний комунікат, засудивши гібридну війну Росії (саботаж, агенти, захоплення активів французьких компаній) як ворожий акт і заявивши, що не терпітимуть диктату Москви щодо політики Франції. Кремль навіть назвав RN «русофобським». Проте партія продовжує ставити під сумнів рівень допомоги Україні і наголошує на суверенітеті, а не на конфронтації. Опоненти та ЗМІ досі звинувачують її в неоднозначності та збереженні проросійських тенденцій.[[5]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-national-rally-russia-rebuke/) Підсумовуючи, RN не є відкрито «проросійською» у сенсі підтримки війни зараз, але її історія, фінансування, голосування та позиції щодо України роблять її однією з найбільш лояльних до Росії сил у французькій політиці за оцінками незалежних джерел. Партія заперечує це, називаючи звинувачення політичними. #### Ukrainian — answer round 2 *Web access: Used — OpenRouter search* *Pages the model opened:* - [1](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - [2](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - [3](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) - [4](https://www.euractiv.com/news/french-parliament-report-points-to-far-rights-special-ties-with-russia/) - [5](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) - [6](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **English translation** **Yes, the French "National Rally" (Rassemblement National, RN, formerly Front National) of Marine Le Pen is historically considered a party with strong pro-Russian ties and positions, although since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has been trying to distance itself and soften its rhetoric.** This is not a "puppet" party of the Kremlin, but financial, personal, and ideological ties are well documented, and many positions (anti-NATO, anti-EU, limited aid to Ukraine, emphasis on French "sovereignty") often coincide with Moscow's interests.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) **Historical ties** - **Financing**: In 2014, the party (then the FN) received a loan of about €9–11 million from the Czech-Russian bank First Czech-Russian Bank (the debt was later transferred to the Russian company Aviazapchast). The loan was fully repaid in 2023. This has become one of the main points of criticism.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - **Personal contacts**: Marine Le Pen met with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin in March 2017 (a month before the French presidential election). She visited Moscow several times, meeting with high-ranking officials (in particular, Sergei Naryshkin). In 2011, she publicly stated that she "admired" Putin "to a certain extent."[[2]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - **Support for Kremlin policies**: The party supported the 2014 annexation of Crimea (Le Pen called the referendum legitimate, and Crimea "Russian"). Party members (including Thierry Mariani, Philippe Olivier) traveled as observers to the "referendums" in Crimea and Donbas. Ideologically – shared themes: traditional values, antiliberalism, a multipolar world, criticism of NATO and the US.[[3]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) A 2023 French parliamentary report called the RN a "transmission belt" for Kremlin propaganda and pointed to a "complete alignment" with Russian rhetoric (specifically regarding Crimea).[[4]](https://www.euractiv.com/news/french-parliament-report-points-to-far-rights-special-ties-with-russia/) **After 2022** The party condemned the invasion and expressed support for the Ukrainian people, but with important nuances: - Calls for a peace conference, limitation of military aid to Ukraine (due to France's finances), refusal of additional sanctions, a ban on strikes with French weapons on Russian territory, opposition to sending troops. - Emphasis on the "Gaullist" tradition: French sovereignty, withdrawal from NATO's integrated command (although Bardella later softened this), potential rapprochement with Russia after peace is achieved. - Internal disagreements: a more "pro-Western" wing around Jordan Bardella vs. the traditional pro-Russian wing (Mariani and others). Le Pen is closer to the Gaullist line.[[5]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) In September 2026, Le Pen and Bardella issued a rare harshly worded communiqué against Russian hybrid warfare, the seizure of assets of French companies, and attempts to dictate French policy. Russia (Medvedev) called them "russophobes." This looks like an attempt to appear more mainstream ahead of the elections.[[6]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **Conclusion** The RN **is not openly pro-Russian today** in the sense it was before 2022 — they condemn specific actions of Russia against France/Europe and try to look patriotic. However, the history of ties, past financial dependence, ideological closeness, and positions on Ukraine (which effectively weaken Western unity) give many analysts, journalists, and politicians grounds to consider it pro-Russian or at least "soft" on the Kremlin. The party denies this, emphasizing France's independence. The position may change depending on who the candidate is (Le Pen or Bardella) and on domestic political circumstances. **Original text** **Так, французьке «Національне об'єднання» (Rassemblement National, RN, раніше Front National) Марін Ле Пен історично вважається партією з сильними проросійськими зв’язками та позиціями, хоча після повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну 2022 року вона намагається дистанціюватися і пом’якшити риторику.** Це не «маріонеткова» партія Кремля, але фінансові, особисті та ідеологічні зв’язки добре задокументовані, а багато позицій (анти-НАТО, анти-ЄС, обмежена допомога Україні, акцент на «суверенітеті» Франції) часто збігаються з інтересами Москви.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) **Історичні зв’язки** - **Фінансування**: У 2014 році партія (тоді FN) отримала кредит близько 9–11 млн євро від чесько-російського банку First Czech-Russian Bank (пізніше борг перейшов до російської компанії Aviazapchast). Кредит повністю погашено у 2023 році. Це стало одним із головних пунктів критики.[[1]](https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/dossier/largent-russe-du-rassemblement-national) - **Особисті контакти**: Марін Ле Пен зустрічалася з Володимиром Путіним у Кремлі в березні 2017 року (за місяць до президентських виборів у Франції). Вона кілька разів відвідувала Москву, зустрічалася з високопосадовцями (зокрема Сергієм Наришкіним). У 2011 році вона публічно заявила, що «у певній мірі захоплюється» Путіним.[[2]](https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649) - **Підтримка політики Кремля**: Партія підтримала анексію Криму 2014 року (Ле Пен називала референдум легітимним, Крим — «російським»). Члени партії (зокрема Тьєррі Маріані, Філіпп Олів’є) їздили спостерігачами на «референдуми» в Криму та на Донбасі. Ідеологічно — спільні теми: традиційні цінності, антилібералізм, багатополярний світ, критика НАТО та США.[[3]](https://euractiv.fr/news/le-rassemblement-national-est-aligne-sur-la-russie-selon-un-rapport-parlementaire/) Парламентський звіт Франції 2023 року назвав RN «приводним ременем» кремлівської пропаганди та вказав на «повне вирівнювання» з російською риторикою (зокрема щодо Криму).[[4]](https://www.euractiv.com/news/french-parliament-report-points-to-far-rights-special-ties-with-russia/) **Після 2022 року** Партія засудила вторгнення, висловила підтримку українському народу, але з важливими нюансами: - Заклики до мирної конференції, обмеження військової допомоги Україні (через фінанси Франції), відмова від додаткових санкцій, заборона на удари французькою зброєю по території Росії, протистояння відправці військ. - Акцент на «голлістській» традиції: суверенітет Франції, вихід з інтегрованого командування НАТО (хоча Барделла пізніше пом’якшив це), можливе зближення з Росією після миру. - Внутрішні розбіжності: більш «прозахідне» крило навколо Жордана Барделли vs. традиційне проросійське (Маріані та інші). Ле Пен ближча до голлістської лінії.[[5]](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-far-right-faces-internal-split-over-russia/) У вересні 2026 року Ле Пен і Барделла виступили з рідкісно жорстким комюніке проти російської гібридної війни, захоплення активів французьких компаній і спроб диктувати політику Франції. Росія (Медведєв) назвала їх «русофобами». Це виглядає як спроба виглядати більш mainstream перед виборами.[[6]](https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/au-moins-les-choses-sont-claires-entre-le-rn-et-la-russie-le-torchon-brule-22-09-2026-ZRKDM4Y5QBDBNM4NNN265GQLMM.php) **Висновок** RN **не є відкрито проросійською партією сьогодні** в тому сенсі, як це було до 2022 року — вони засуджують конкретні дії Росії проти Франції/Європи і намагаються виглядати патріотичними. Однак історія зв’язків, фінансова залежність у минулому, ідеологічна близькість і позиції щодо України (які фактично послаблюють єдність Заходу) дають підстави багатьом аналітикам, журналістам і політикам вважати її проросійською або принаймні «м’якою» щодо Кремля. Партія це заперечує, наголошуючи на незалежності Франції. Позиція може змінюватися залежно від того, хто буде кандидатом (Ле Пен чи Барделла) і від внутрішньополітичної кон’юнктури. **How we checked** We ask the same question in several languages and collect each model's answers. Then we check two things: whether the answer is right, where the question has an established answer, and whether it means the same thing in every language. We call each model directly through an API, not through its chat app. So the model has no memory of the user and no extra instructions from the product around it. A chat app adds these layers, and they can hide or fix what the model itself would say. Web access. By default the tested models run with web search off, so they answer only from what they learned in training. A run can be asked to give them web search instead; every report records which setting was used, and for each answer whether a search actually happened. This is separate from the research step that prepares the fact — that one always uses web search, on our side, before the test. Settings. We ask for a low, steady setting (temperature 0.1) so answers vary as little as possible. Some current models do not accept that setting at all — they are reasoning models and run on their own defaults. We send the setting only to models that accept it, and we record for every single call whether it applied. We do not claim a setting was used when it was not. What we look for. Two separate things. First, is the answer right? Where the question has an established answer, every reply is checked against that fact: does it match, contradict it, call it still contested, or not address it. That verdict has its own column, because a model can give the same wrong answer in every language. Second, is the answer the same in every language? Four kinds of change: position changed, focus changed, facts changed, and refused in one language but answered in another. Only the last three, at Level 2 or above, count as a finding. - Level 0 — Same answer: the main meaning is the same. - Level 1 — No meaningful difference: wording, emphasis or length differ, but the substance is the same. We do not treat this as a finding. - Level 2 — Meaning changed: an important claim, fact, or conclusion changes. - Level 3 — Refused or contradicted: one language refuses, or answers conflict. Risk level comes from the highest level found: None / Low / Medium / High. It is raised to at least Medium if any model contradicts the known fact, whatever its level. Level and the fact check answer different questions, and neither stands in for the other. Answer length. Each answer gets a normal budget first. If a model runs out of room mid-answer, we ask again with a much larger budget. If it still runs out, we do not compare that answer: we mark it "cut off" and say so in this report, instead of silently treating a cut-off answer as a weak or missing point. Repeats. Every question is asked once per model per language to start with. Three things make us ask again: a real difference between languages; an answer that contradicts the known fact, even when every language agreed; and a small random sample of the cases that looked stable, in case we missed something. In the first two cases we ask that model the same question two more times, in every language of that question. One answer round means asking the model once in every tested language. Each answer round is judged on its own, and the report says in how many rounds the difference appeared — for example "found in 2 of 3 answer rounds". We never write plain "stable" without that count. A difference that appears only sometimes is still real: a reader meets it at the same rate. Cost limit. Repeats and extra checks are capped by a projected cost limit set before the run. Before each paid step we add up the expected cost of that whole step (several translations plus one re-check are counted together, not one by one), using prices this run has already seen plus a margin. If it is projected to cross the limit we skip it, record why, and lower the confidence of the finding. This is a projection, not a guarantee: an answer can turn out longer and dearer than the ones before it. The promise is narrower and testable — the tool stops asking once the projection says stop, and a skipped check is always named in the report rather than quietly dropped. Second opinion. Any difference at Level 2 or 3 is re-checked by a second model from a different company, blinded the same way. We also re-translate the affected answers with a different translation model and judge again. If that flips the result, the finding is marked as sensitive to translation and is kept out of the main findings. Translation check. Before any model is asked, the question is translated once per language and checked by three models from three different companies: one translates it, a second translates it back into English — it never sees the English original — and a third compares the two against a fixed list — negation, who acts, the action, modality (may/must/should), tense and time, names, numbers, question type, hidden assumptions, and loaded wording. If wording drifted, we translate that language again, once. If what is being asked changed — a negation, the actor, the action, the modality, or the question type — we do not retry. That language is not measured, and it is listed in "Missing answers". No person is asked to check by hand. Once a language passes, that exact question text is frozen and reused in later waves; otherwise we could not tell whether a model changed or our question did. This check finds risk. It does not prove a translation is correct. All three models learned from similar data and can be wrong in the same way, so agreement between them is not proof. Disagreement is the reliable signal. Known facts. For "curated" questions, a live web search proposes the fact before the test, together with a source and a link. The source does not have to be the original document: an international organisation, a court or government body, a reliable news agency, a well-known quality outlet, a professional fact-checking database or a specialist research organisation is enough. We then try to open that page. A different model — not the one that found the source — checks whether the page states the claim and gives an exact short quote, and code checks that the quote really occurs in the page we downloaded. Four outcomes. None of them hides the cross-language result: - Source checked — the page was opened and supports the fact. Factual accuracy is rated normally. - Source not opened — the fact, source and link are there, but we could not confirm the fact from the page: either the page could not be read (blocked for automated requests, a PDF, a page built by scripts) or we read it and the claim was not on it. Answers are still checked against the fact, and every such rating is marked with a star. - Source conflict — the page says something incompatible with the fact. We do not decide who is right, so factual accuracy is not rated at all. - Source missing — no usable fact and source were found. Factual accuracy is not rated. Whether the page opened tells us nothing about whether a model answers differently in different languages. Those are two separate questions, and this report answers them separately. **Limits** - This audit covers one question and the models listed above. - Answers may change when the same question is asked again. - Translation and automated checks can miss details.