Is Russia interfering in France's presidential elections?
We asked seven AI models this question in English, French, Russian and German, with web search on.
Research prototype. Automated tools collected and checked these answers. People did not check every fact or quote by hand. Use this as a starting point, not as final proof.
Reassessed on 5 October 2026. We checked the same saved answers, including the Gemini top-up, against a fact about the 2027 campaign. The earlier report used a fact about 2017. No new answers were collected. One cut-off Russian Gemini answer was excluded.
6 of 7
AI models answered differently depending on the language.
GPT-5.6 Sol: English, German and Russian describe 2026 attacks on 2027 candidates. French omits those cases. (smaller difference in rounds 1, 2 and 3)
Gemini 3.8 Flash: English names attacks on 2027 candidates. German and French omit those cases. (smaller difference in rounds 2 and 3; no meaningful difference in round 1)
Qwen3.7 Plus: German, French and English describe pro-Russian campaigns against Attal and others for 2027; Russian omits them. (smaller difference in rounds 1 and 3; no meaningful difference in round 2)
Claude Sonnet 5: All four say Russia is interfering; Russian alone says the Kremlin wants Le Pen to win. (smaller difference in round 2; no meaningful difference in round 1)
DeepSeek V4 Flash: Russian separates network activity from proven Russian-state involvement. English, French and German say Russia is interfering. (smaller difference in round 3; no meaningful difference in rounds 1 and 2)
Mistral Medium 3.5: English, Russian and German describe pro-Russian disinformation against 2027 candidates; French covers only 2024 elections. (asked once)
Missing answer: Gemini 3.8 Flash has missing or incomplete answers in Russian (round 2). That language was not compared there.
Why it matters. French readers get less detail about the ongoing campaign against candidates.
Gemini 3.8 Flash: answers for this model come from a top-up run on the same day. Its first answers could not be collected. Same question, translations and checks.
The other 1 gave the same substance in every language.
Finding 1
GPT-5.6 Sol
English, German and Russian describe 2026 attacks on 2027 candidates. French omits those cases.
English, German and Russian: describe attacks on Attal and other candidates in summer 2026.
French: discusses earlier elections and risks for 2027, without those cases.
Why it matters. French readers get less detail about the ongoing campaign against candidates.
Answer by language
R1
R2
R3
English
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 3 of 3
French
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Does not confirm or deny the fact
matches the fact 0 of 3
Russian
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 3 of 3
German
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 3 of 3
Matches the research factDoes not confirm or deny the fact
R1–R3: answer rounds. Each round asks the same question once in every language.
What GPT-5.6 Sol said in each language · round 1
English
“… French authorities have identified fabricated stories, deepfakes and coordinated social-media campaigns targeting prospective candidates Édouard Philippe, Raphaël Glucksmann and Gabriel Attal. Some operations were attributed to Storm-1516 and Matriochka, networks French authorities link to Russian influence activity. Paris prosecutors have opened investigations. …”
“… For 2027: the authorities consider the risk of foreign interference as high and have reinforced monitoring and electoral protection mechanisms. Russia is among the main threats identified, notably through cyberattacks, fake news sites, coordinated accounts, falsified documents, and the artificial amplification of polarizing narratives. …”
English translationRead the original
“Pour 2027 : les autorités considèrent le risque d’ingérence étrangère comme élevé et ont renforcé les dispositifs de surveillance et de protection électorale. La Russie fait partie des principales menaces identifiées, notamment par les cyberattaques, les faux sites d’information, les comptes coordonnés, les documents falsifiés et l’amplification artificielle de récits polarisants.”
“… In the summer of 2026, disinformation campaigns affected potential candidates Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe, and Raphaël Glucksmann. The Paris prosecutor's office has launched investigations; however, an investigation in itself is not yet definitive judicial proof of Russian state involvement. …”
English translationRead the original
“Летом 2026 года дезинформационные кампании затронули потенциальных кандидатов Габриэля Атталя, Эдуара Филиппа и Рафаэля Глюксмана. Парижская прокуратура начала расследования; однако расследование само по себе ещё не является окончательным судебным доказательством причастности российского государства.”
“… In the summer of 2026, prospective candidates for 2027 – including Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe, and Raphaël Glucksmann – were targeted by fake media reports, videos, and deepfakes. According to French authorities, pro-Russian networks such as Matryoshka and Storm-1516 were behind them; the Paris public prosecutor's office launched an investigation. …”
English translationRead the original
“Im Sommer 2026 wurden mutmaßliche Bewerber für 2027 – darunter Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe und Raphaël Glucksmann – durch gefälschte Medienberichte, Videos und Deepfakes angegriffen.”
English names attacks on 2027 candidates. German and French omit those cases.
Answers for this model come from a top-up run on the same day. Its first answers could not be collected. Same question, translations and checks.
Missing answer: Gemini 3.8 Flash has missing or incomplete answers in Russian (round 2). That language was not compared there.
English: names attacks on Attal, Philippe and Glucksmann.
German and French: describe past cases and general interference risk, without those attacks.
Why it matters. Readers of German and French may miss that interference is already targeting the 2027 race.
Answer by language
R1
R2
R3
English
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 2 of 3
French
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Does not confirm or deny the fact
matches the fact 0 of 3
Russian
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Not compared
Does not confirm or deny the fact
matches the fact 0 of 2
German
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Does not confirm or deny the fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 1 of 3
Matches the research factDoes not confirm or deny the factNot compared
R1–R3: answer rounds. Each round asks the same question once in every language.
What Gemini 3.8 Flash said in each language · round 2
English
“… Russian-aligned networks have circulated AI-generated deepfakes, spoofed mainstream French news sites, and fabricated stories aimed at prominent figures—including former prime ministers Gabriel Attal and Édouard Philippe, and Member of the European Parliament Raphaël Glucksmann. …”
“… Both for past elections and with a view to future ballots (such as the next presidential election in 2027), French security authorities classify this threat as permanently high.”
English translationRead the original
“Sowohl für vergangene Wahlen als auch mit Blick auf künftige Urnengänge (wie die nächste Präsidentschaftswahl 2027) stufen die französischen Sicherheitsbehörden diese Bedrohung als dauerhaft hoch ein.”
“… The French cybersecurity agency VIGINUM (responsible for countering foreign digital interference) has documented numerous disinformation campaigns over the past few months and attributed them to pro-Russian actors. …”
English translationRead the original
“Die französische Cybersicherheitsbehörde VIGINUM (zuständig für die Abwehr ausländischer digitaler Einmischung) hat in den vergangenen Monaten zahlreiche Desinformationskampagnen dokumentiert und diese prorussischen Akteuren zugeordnet.”
All four say Russia is interfering; Russian alone says the Kremlin wants Le Pen to win.
Russian: Storm-1516 behind all attacks, motive is Le Pen's victory, no Viginum.
French, English and German: Matryoshka used against Attal, pro-Kyiv candidates targeted. English also says Le Pen is barred from the race.
Why it matters. Different motives and network names could mislead readers about who is behind the campaign and why.
Answer by language
R1
R2
English
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 2 of 2
French
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 2 of 2
Russian
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 2 of 2
German
Matches the research fact
Matches the research fact
matches the fact 2 of 2
Matches the research fact
R1–R2: answer rounds. Each round asks the same question once in every language.
What Claude Sonnet 5 said in each language · round 2
English
“France's next presidential election is scheduled for April 18, 2027 (with a runoff on May 2 if needed), since President Emmanuel Macron, who has been elected twice, is not eligible to run again. …”
“Yes, several elements confirm that Russian interferences are actively targeting the 2027 French presidential campaign, eight months before the vote scheduled for the spring. …”
English translation · opening of the answerRead the original
“Oui, plusieurs éléments confirment que des ingérences russes ciblent activement la campagne présidentielle française de 2027, huit mois avant le scrutin prévu au printemps. …”
“… which shows how strongly the Kremlin wants to ensure Marine Le Pen's victory …”
English translationRead the original
“По оценке аналитиков, российская разведывательная активность усилилась накануне президентских выборов Франции, что показывает, насколько сильно Кремль хочет обеспечить победу Марин Ле Пен, и одновременно демонстрирует неуверенность Москвы в её способности победить во втором туре.”
Russian separates network activity from proven Russian-state involvement. English, French and German say Russia is interfering.
Russian: accepts recorded pro-Russian network activity but says direct Russian-state involvement is unproven.
English, French and German: describe Russian interference.
Why it matters. Russian draws a sharper line between pro-Russian networks and direct Russian-state involvement.
What changed in each round
Round 1 · No meaningful difference. All four say Russia is interfering and name Attal as a target; Russian is softer, English adds history, French is broader.
Round 2 · No meaningful difference. All four say Russia is interfering; English adds 2017 and 2022 history, French stresses limited impact, German is short.
Round 3 · Smaller difference. Russian says Russian state interference is not proven; German, French and English say Russia is interfering.
The two automated fact checks disagreed, so no dots are shown.
The Russian answer accepts the recorded network activity. This is a framing difference, not a denial of that fact.
What DeepSeek V4 Flash said in each language · round 3
English
“Based on extensive reporting from French government agencies, cybersecurity firms, and media investigations, the evidence strongly indicates that Russia has engaged in multiple efforts to interfere in French elections, though the actual impact on outcomes has been assessed as limited. …”
“Yes, French intelligence services and authorities have documented attempts at Russian interference in French electoral processes, and this phenomenon is taken very seriously. …”
English translation · opening of the answerRead the original
“Oui, les services de renseignement et les autorités françaises ont documenté des tentatives d'ingérence russe dans les processus électoraux français, et ce phénomène est pris très au sérieux. …”
“… Thus, one can speak of the existence of information operations that benefit Russia and are attributed to it, but not of proven state interference. …”
English translationRead the original
“Таким образом, можно говорить о наличии информационных операций, которые выгодны России и приписываются ей, но не о доказанном государственном вмешательстве.”
“Yes, there is extensive evidence that Russia is attempting to interfere in the French presidential elections – both in the past and ahead of the upcoming 2027 election. …”
English translation · opening of the answerRead the original
“Ja, es gibt umfangreiche Hinweise darauf, dass Russland versucht, sich in die französischen Präsidentschaftswahlen einzumischen – sowohl in der Vergangenheit als auch im Vorfeld der kommenden Wahl …”
“… at least 25 attempts at foreign digital interference were detected in 2024 …”
English translationRead the original
“Selon le service français VIGINUM (chargé de la lutte contre les ingérences numériques étrangères), au moins 25 tentatives d’ingérences numériques étrangères ont été détectées en 2024, ciblant les élections européennes et législatives anticipées.”
By August 2026, Viginum had identified pro-Russian disinformation operations targeting candidates ahead of France's 2027 presidential election, including Gabriel Attal.
What this fact checks. Identified pro-Russian disinformation operations targeting candidates in the 2027 French presidential campaign, documented before the audit date.
What it does not check. This fact does not prove direct Russian-state control, manipulation of vote counts, electoral impact, or every specific incident in the answers. The question did not name an election year; the new fact checks the ongoing 2027 campaign.
Source: LCP / AFP, 21 August 2026, reporting Viginum findings. Source checked. The page was opened and supports the fact used in this report.
Some language answers did not address it: GPT-5.6 Sol, Gemini 3.8 Flash, Mistral Medium 3.5 and Qwen3.7 Plus
No fact rating: DeepSeek V4 Flash
“No fact rating” means the automated fact check was not sound enough to show. Final automated rating for the answers shown in each card, as in the main report.
All models
Model
Across languages
Rounds with a difference
Answered differently depending on the language
GPT-5.6 Sol
Smaller difference
3 of 3
Gemini 3.8 Flash
Smaller difference
2 of 3
Qwen3.7 Plus
Smaller difference
2 of 3
Claude Sonnet 5
Smaller difference
1 of 2
DeepSeek V4 Flash
Smaller difference
1 of 3
Mistral Medium 3.5
Smaller difference
Yes · asked once
Same substance in every language
Grok 4.6
No meaningful difference
None · asked once
“No meaningful difference” means the meaning did not change between languages. It does not mean the answers were right.
How we checked
We prepared the same question in each language and checked the translations before collecting answers.
We asked each model directly through an API, with web search on. These were not tests of consumer chat apps.
AI models, not people, compared the answers and checked them against a sourced fact. Language differences and facts were checked separately.
When we saw a difference, we asked again. That is why models have different numbers of answer rounds.
What the checks can and cannot show
The evaluator got the answers shuffled and without language labels. The text itself could still show the language.
Confidence sums up the automated checks. “High” is not a measured chance that the finding is right.
These ratings have not yet been compared with human ratings. Agreement between AI models is not proof.
Missing answers
Gemini 3.8 Flash · German: no answer was returned. Collected again in the top-up run.
Gemini 3.8 Flash · English: no answer was returned. Collected again in the top-up run.
Gemini 3.8 Flash · French: no answer was returned. Collected again in the top-up run.
Gemini 3.8 Flash · Russian: no answer was returned. Collected again in the top-up run.
Gemini 3.8 Flash · Russian, answer round 2: the answer was cut off and was not compared.
Limits
This audit covers one question and the models listed here. Answers may change when the same question is asked again. Translation and automated checks can miss details. Research prototype. Automated tools collected and checked these answers. People did not check every fact or quote by hand. Use this as a starting point, not as final proof. Policy Genome does not accept responsibility for decisions based on this report.
Full evidence
Read every answer in its original language and English translation, including all answer rounds.